

HOUGHTON COLLEGE LIBRARY - Houghton, NY



1000304596

HOW MORAL CAN A GOOD PERSON BE?
ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON PLEASURE, THE HIGHEST GOOD, AND
MORAL WORTH

STANFORD

How Moral Can a Good Person Be?
Aristotle and Kant on Pleasure, the Highest Good, and Moral Worth

by
Benjamin Stanford

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for Major Honors in the
Department of Religion and Philosophy

Houghton College, Houghton, New York
April, 2010


Honors Committee


PETER C. MEILAENDER, CHAIR


BENJAMIN J. B. LIPSCOMB, CHAIR


SHIRLEY A. MULLEN

CARLTON D. FISHER









Acknowledgements

A project of this scope is impossible to finish without the help of many people. First, I owe a great debt to my co-advisors: Professor Benjamin Lipscomb, for his invaluable assistance in helping me choose a topic and hone its scope, and Professor Peter McInerney, for reading, editing, and talking through countless drafts of this project. The impact of our many conversations can be seen on every page; without their insightful comments, justified criticisms, and probing questions, this project would have meandered into oblivion shortly after it began. President Shirley Muller deserves special mention and gratitude for far exceeding the requirements of a reader for this project, by meeting with me and commenting on drafts of both chapters, her questions helped me find the direction of my conclusion, and improved the quality of the writing. I also want to thank Professor Carlton Fisher for his willingness to be on my committee, for his comments on an early draft of the first chapter.

Dedicated to
George Kollias,
who taught me to love philosophy
and take joy in excellence.

I am indebted to my friends and family who have commented on large sections of the draft of this project, particularly my mother, Jane, and Brittany and Gerald. Thank you for the attention you have given to the details. To the many people I have not mentioned who have conversed with me about various points and questions in this project, I extend my gratitude. Our conversations have brought more clarity to this paper than you will ever know. Finally, many thanks to my friends and family who have supported me through the research and writing of this project. This paper is as much a product of my upbringing and the quality academic community at Houghton College as it is my own endeavor. *Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam.*

Acknowledgements

A project of this scope is impossible to bring to fruition without the help of many people. First, I owe a great debt to my co-advisors: Professor Benjamin Lipscomb, for his invaluable assistance in helping me choose a topic and hone its scope; and Professor Peter Meilaender, for reading, editing, and talking through countless drafts of this project. The impact of our many conversations can be seen on every page; without their insightful comments, justified criticisms, and probing questions, this project would have meandered into oblivion shortly after it began. President Shirley Mullen deserves especial mention and gratitude for far exceeding the requirements of a reader for this project. In meeting several times with me and commenting on drafts of both chapters, her questions helped me determine the direction of my conclusion, and improved the quality of the paper as a whole. I also appreciate Professor Carlton Fisher's willingness to be on my reading committee, and for his comments on an early draft of the first chapter.

I am indebted to my friends and family who have commented on large sections of the draft of this project, particularly my mother, Jane, and Brittany and Gerard. Thank you for the attention you have given to the details. To the many people I have not mentioned who have conversed with me about various points and questions in this project, I extend my gratitude. Our conversations have brought more clarity to this paper than you will ever know. Finally, many thanks to my friends and family who have supported me through the research and writing of this project. This paper is as much a product of my upbringing and the quality academic community at Houghton College as it is my own endeavor. *Ad Maiorem Dei Gloriam.*

Introduction	24
What is Moral Worth Worth?	50
The Good Life, the Moral Life, and the Supremacy of Reason	57
Bibliography	60

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements	iii
Introduction: Dancing Through Time	1
Introducing the Introduction	1
Difficulties, Considerations, and Limitations	3
Pleasure	6
Introduction	6
Aristotle on Pleasure	6
Kant on Pleasure	15
Strict Opposites?	19
Paths Toward Dialogue?	26
The Highest Good	33
Introduction	33
Aristotle on the Highest Good	33
Kant's Criticism of Eudaimonism	38
Kant on the Highest Good	43
Similarities	44
Conclusion	49
Conclusion: How Moral Can a Good Person Be?	50
Introduction	50
What Is Moral Worth Worth?	50
The Good Life, the Moral Life, and the Supremacy of Reason	57
Bibliography	60

Introduction: Dancing Through Time

Introducing the Introduction

For most of the past two hundred years, it has been uncontroversial to assert that Aristotle and Kant are irreconcilably different on topics as diverse and important as pleasure, the highest good, and moral worth. For example, Aristotle places a strong emphasis on the role of pleasure in the well-lived life, *eudaimonia*, while Kant explicitly rejects any account of morality that includes pleasure at its core. The highest good for Aristotle starts from empirical conditions, whereas Kant's account of the highest good begins in pure principles of practical reason. Moreover, Kant considers lacking in moral worth any theory that locates the highest good as the center of morality, and begins an account thereof with empirical principles. Finally, Aristotle seems to lack a concept of moral worth; Kant argues that an Aristotelian agent completely lacks moral worth.

In the past few decades, however, scholars immersed in life-long studies of Aristotle and Kant have offered new interpretations of crucial passages and topics in each author's works. In many cases, these interpretations break with the traditional lines of interpretation on these thinkers in ways that suggest Aristotle and Kant may not be as contrary to one another as has traditionally been thought. I will argue that Aristotle and Kant reject hedonistic accounts of pleasure that make sensual pleasure the end of action. While Kant dismisses any theory that begins with and ends in sensual pleasure (and he

lumps Aristotle in this group), Aristotle does not seem to be susceptible to Kant's criticism in this regard. The ideal Aristotelian and Kantian agents can live good and moral lives, respectively, by heeding the promptings of their inner dispositions. Regarding the highest good, Kant's criticisms of the ancient Greeks on this matter largely do not apply to Aristotle. Aristotle's and Kant's accounts of the highest good are surprisingly similar.

One of Kant's criticisms of Aristotle, however, runs throughout these topics—the condemnation that empirically-based systems of thought can reach the truth only contingently as a matter of chance, because they do not start from necessary *a priori* principles of cognition. Whatever Aristotle's response might have been to this charge, it would not have swayed Kant. This irreconcilable difference lies at the foundation of the distinction between the good life and the moral life.

The good life, as Aristotle articulates it, begins from a conception of what it means to be human, and then judges human conduct and character based on how closely humans approximate the ideal. Aristotle no more requires a human to be good than a mouse is “required” to do what mice characteristically do. Because the disposition toward the highest good for humanity is inherent in our nature, we move toward that highest good—the life of *eudaimonia*—somewhat on our own (there are, of course, a number of important qualifications to this claim that will be made later). The quality of our lives is judged by how well we live, not by how rightly we conform to an external law. The moral life, by contrast, emphasizes the presence of the moral law that constricts our actions and determines what life counts as right and best. Morality, then, is a matter of adherence to the dictates of that law. I am particularly interested in how

Aristotle's and Kant's views on pleasure and the highest good inform the distinction between the good life and the moral life.

Difficulties, Considerations, and Limitations

Before proceeding to exegesis, there are a number of difficulties and limitations to this project that should be considered. Some readers might doubt whether such a project as this can even be carried out. After all, how can one compare an ancient Greek who has little conception of rule-governed action with a modern German who thinks largely in those terms? I will briefly consider issues of egalitarianism, cultural differences, and distinctions in discourse.

Aristotle and Kant have different expectations regarding who should attain an ideally ethical life. In a hierarchically organized, male-dominated society, Aristotle's ideal agent is a wealthy man who is raised well, has the best education possible, and who has the leisure to engage in the pursuit of virtue. Not only is Aristotle's ideal agent a rare kind of person, but also Aristotle does not expect everyone to live virtuously, nor does he think this would be possible. Some people are born incapable of living a good life, and that is just the way the world functions. Aristotle is not interested in "something for everyone." The well-lived life is reserved for the wealthy males of society; the other members of the *polis* must suffice with the best lives they can lead.

Kant, by contrast, is an egalitarian. While he lived in a largely hierarchical society like Aristotle, egalitarian thought had achieved a far greater place in the eighteenth century after the birth of Christ than in the three centuries before it. Kant's expectations of morality are universal; all people are required to obey the moral law,

despite the fact that everyone is incapable of perfectly fulfilling its precepts. Aristotle and Kant agree on the universal potential of humans to live imperfectly, but they disagree on the expectations that should be placed on them.

Does this difference in emphasis prevent Aristotle and Kant from talking to each other and not merely past each other? There is plausibility to the view that they talk past each other, for the incommensurability between the good life and the moral life—Athens and Germany—is quite large. Aristotle does not think in terms of the requirements of universal laws, just as Kant cannot (or, at least, will not) even consider a system of thought beginning in something as malleable and imperfect as human nature. Furthermore, there are certain cultural difficulties to overcome. The nature of public discourse was different in the small (compared to modern) cities that dominated Aristotle's era and the modern nation-states of Kant's era. Aristotle and Kant do not think in the same way, and this is partly due to the cultural divide that separates them. However, Aristotle and Kant are engaged in a conversation about how humans should live; the differences are not as great as we might make them out to be. While they approach ethics from different angles, they are both discussing the same problems, despite the separation in years. They belong to the same philosophical tradition (Western philosophy), and Kant was familiar enough with Aristotle's works to reject them in detail. If they were not talking about the same topics, Kant would not have bothered to criticize Greek philosophy as much as he did.

While differences of perspective, culture, and discourse are important when comparing any two authors, and play a role in limiting conclusions that otherwise might stray beyond the realm of plausibility, it is also imperative to look at the surprisingly

large range of similarities between Aristotle and Kant, from the way they view the moral world to their theories on the same topic. Although one must avoid hasty conclusions, one must more importantly consider how Aristotle and Kant engage in the same discourse using similar terms and dialogue. Let us enter in on it now.

Introduction

Does Kant reject Aristotle's view on pleasure? While this view initially seems plausible, in depth consideration of the topic renders it unlikely. Aristotle locates pleasure at the core of acting well, while rejecting views that make sensual pleasure into an end of activity. Although Kant rejects pleasure as having a part in moral worth, he is rejecting sensual pleasure here, just as Aristotle does. However, this does not point to agreement between these philosophers on the matter, for Kant does not think of pleasure in the same way that Aristotle does. Ultimately, we must look to their accounts of the best life for humanity—the highest good—for evidence of their accord or discord on the topic of pleasure.

Aristotle on Pleasure

Aristotle's account of pleasure is found chiefly in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, primarily in Books VII and X. Here Aristotle portrays pleasure not as an end or motivational force in itself, but rather as an important topic to consider when exploring what it means to be an animal, chiefly a human animal. Pleasure proves to be an integral part of human nature, occurring only in activities. There are, of course, distinctions to be made here, particularly between pleasure as enjoyment of an activity and pleasure as experiencing pleasant sensations. Pleasure also has a role in the development of virtue. While Aristotle advocates for a fundamental role for pleasure in the life and activity of

Chapter One: Pleasure

Introduction

Does Kant reject Aristotle's view on pleasure? While this view initially seems plausible, in depth consideration of the topic renders it unlikely. Aristotle locates pleasure at the core of acting well, while rejecting views that make sensual pleasure into an end of activity. Although Kant rejects pleasure as having a part in moral worth, he is rejecting sensual pleasure here, just as Aristotle does. However, this does not point to agreement between these philosophers on the matter, for Kant does not think of pleasure in the same way that Aristotle does. Ultimately, we must look to their accounts of the best life for humans—the highest good—for evidence of their accord or discord on the topic of pleasure.

Aristotle on Pleasure

Aristotle's account of pleasure is found chiefly in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, primarily in Books VII and X. Here Aristotle portrays pleasure not as an end or motivational force in itself, but rather as an important topic to consider when explaining what it means to be an animal, chiefly a human animal. Pleasure proves to be an integral part of human nature, occurring only in activities. There are, of course, distinctions to be made here, particularly between pleasure as enjoyment of an activity and pleasure as experiencing pleasant sensations. Pleasure also has a role in the development of virtue. While Aristotle advocates for a fundamental role for pleasure in the life and activity of

humans, he is far from a hedonist. Indeed, the pursuit of sensual pleasure as an end in itself is despicable for Aristotle, for only when pleasure is bound up in the performance of virtuous activities and the attainment of good ends does it find its proper place.

Pleasure is an important topic of consideration for Aristotle, because without a proper understanding of pleasure we will not fully grasp how *eudaimonia*—the highest good—is to be achieved. That is, Aristotle's views on pleasure are inexorably tied to his views on human nature. Human education and moral formation proceed using pleasure as an incentive to act toward good ends and pain as a deterrent from acting toward bad ends. Aristotle compares them to rudders that direct the young where they should go (NE 1172a21). Furthermore, the development of character is largely realized by cultivating pleasure toward the proper and good ends and activities, and feelings of pain toward bad ends and activities (1172a23).

In the remainder of the animal kingdom, animals experience pleasure by engaging in activities characteristic of those animals. For the mouse, this consists in the mouse experiencing pleasure while doing things that mice characteristically do, such as consuming food or procreating. The kinds of things a mouse typically does *qua* mouse bring it pleasure (1176a3-8). A mouse is not truly a mouse that does not have pleasure while engaging in activities or while achieving ends that mice typically attain. The pleasures characteristic of mice are, of course, different from those of a lion, for the animals are involved in quite different activities and they pursue divergent ends (1176a4-5).

Development toward the human *telos* is more complicated, for human nature does not reach its fullest development solely through our animal nature. Rather, the

potentialities inherent within the human baby must be developed by reason through moral training that involves learning and habituation (1103a18-20). Through these, children are encouraged to form positive associations with virtuous actions and negative associations with vices (1104b11-13). The point of this period of law and conditioning is to inculcate a disposition toward good in the child (1104b3-1105a17). That is, humans are raised to eventually move intrinsically toward *eudaimonia*, and to enjoy both the pursuit and the realization of this end. Of course, this applies not only to the highest end but also to any of a range of typical human pursuits that Broadie calls “civilized pleasures” (317).

If pleasure is tied up in our nature as animals, and if that nature develops over time, it seems easy to conclude that pleasure is realized as part of a process that is developed and completed over time. That is, pleasure is experienced in greater completeness with the passage of time. Aristotle, however, warns the reader against thinking this, as pleasure is integral to activities and not to processes (1174a12-1174b14). Pleasure, whenever experienced, is whole and complete; a few more moments of pleasure will not make it more complete. Unlike pleasure, which does not attain its fullness through the passage of time (1174b8), processes are ongoing, and they develop over time, like motion (1174a19). In motion, each moment is incomplete, and only when the motion has developed to its end does it arrive at its fullness of significance. Similarly, the building of a temple is a process that approaches completion over time, but is only wholly complete when the temple is fully constructed. Pleasure is not like this, for it exists whole and complete in the moment it is felt (1153a9-11).

In turn, are superior to the pleasures of the senses.” (1175a17-1176a3). Aristotle gives

In what moment, then, is pleasure felt? When an activity is completed and its end is reached, pleasure accompanies this moment (1174b31-34). Pleasure, however, does not accompany an activity as something that makes that activity complete in the same way that the taste of food completes the sense of taste (1174b19). Rather, pleasure is part of the moment of the completion of an activity. It is incomprehensible to Aristotle that a fully developed and normal animal might not experience pleasure when an activity reaches completeness. In a human who has been well brought up, pleasure will accompany the completion of good activities as surely as tapping a hammer on one's knee will initiate the patellar reflex.

Less clear is Aristotle's understanding of how one pleasure can be better than another. Deep within the frame of Aristotle's science is the conviction that an animal's pleasures are ranked in two ways, by the level within the organization of the animal's soul and by the goodness or badness of the activities corresponding to the pleasures (*NE* 1175b24-21, 1175b36-37). An animal has pleasures corresponding to the highest level of organization of its soul. For all animals but one, this is the category of an animal nature, which feeds itself, propagates, and raises its young. For humans, the highest organizing principle in our nature is reason, which finds its chief expression in ordering the activities of human life, particularly as expressed in culture. To put it succinctly, animal pleasures like eating and propagation, while still complete pleasures, are not as high or good as pleasures of culture like poetry or art. In this instance, the pleasures accompanying activities requiring reason are better pleasures: "Sight is superior in purity to touch, and hearing and smell are superior to taste... The pleasures of thought, in turn, are superior to the pleasures of the senses..." (1175b37-1176a3). Aristotle gives

little justification on this point, other than the idea that because one activity is purer than another, that former activity is higher than the latter. Some things just *are* better than other activities or senses. However, activities of reason are superior to activities of the senses not just because the former are more pure, but also because intellectual activities involve a higher level of our nature than feeding does.

Furthermore, different activities of reason are ranked according to the goodness of their objects. This doesn't mean that certain pleasures are "better" than other pleasures *qua* pleasures, for pleasures cannot be separated from their respective activities (1175a29-30). A pleasure is only ever superior to another pleasure if the former's activity aims at a better end than the latter pleasure's activity. Aristotle puts it this way: "We see that differences in activities make for corresponding differences in pleasure" (1175b36-37). The reference point for comparison is not the pleasure itself but rather the activity that it accompanies. We should not speak of good or bad, better or worse pleasures, but rather of good or bad, better or worse activities.

However, sensual pleasure can legitimately be part of the end of an activity as long as it is not the sole end of that activity. C. C. W. Taylor takes up this theme in *Pleasure, Mind and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy*, where he argues that pleasure as part of the activity of wine tasting is different from the "merely" pleasant sensations of the drunkard, because "enjoyment of [the] activity [of wine tasting] is not to be separated from enjoyment of the sensation(s)" (115). Aristotle writes about this distinction when discussing the difference between the self-controlled person and the self-indulgent person in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. While the wine taster engages in his activity by discrimination between flavors, the self-indulgent person—a

drunkard—enjoys wine only by pleasure derived from touch, which is why the glutton desires to have a longer throat (*NE* 1118a24-24). The former engages in an activity in which the sensation of touch is an integral part, yet because the pleasure of touch is bound to the realization of the activity of wine tasting, it is a proper form of pleasure. Sensual pleasure can be part of the end of a good activity, so long as the pleasant sensations are not pursued for their sake alone. The drunkard engages in drinking wine merely for the pleasant sensations, not for the sake of any activity greater than getting drunk. The activity of wine tasting allows for the enjoyment of pleasant sensations because of the use of reason. There are some activities (Taylor points to sexual caressing [116] and to the chocolate fancier [117]) which are characterized by taking pleasure in certain sensations, yet they are still good activities when pursued in moderation and in the right contexts. Pleasure can never be the whole end of a good activity, although it can be an integral part of that end. Aristotle condemns the pursuit of sensual pleasure as an end in itself.

The manner in which Aristotle proceeds in talking about pleasure in Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics* makes it tempting to think about the relationship between pleasure and its activity in terms of excess and deficiency, as though there is a virtue of getting this relationship right. On this view, the excess lies in the view espoused by Eudoxus of Cnidus who takes pleasure to be the good (1172b9-1173a13), and the deficient view is one that considers pleasure evil (1173a14-1174a10). The mean, of course, is the self-controlled wine taster who finds pleasure within the given activity, but does not allow the fact that pleasure is part of the end of the activity to become an opportunity to make sensual pleasure into the sole end of the activity. Although

Aristotle's argument in Book X might appear to imply such a reading, however, this is not an adequate statement of his view.

A proper attitude toward pleasure is not actually a matter of one's view regarding pleasure but rather is a matter of one's attitude toward activities. The position of excess regarding activities and pleasure is to make sensual pleasure into an end in itself, and the activity into a means of obtaining the pleasure. In Aristotle's estimation, this would almost certainly be a pleasure of touch, as pleasures that are bound up in particular activities—as in the pleasures of getting geometry right in 1175a31-35—cannot be acted toward apart from the activity itself. A person could relate to pleasures via activities in a manner of deficiency if she took no concern for, or even denigrated, the pleasure accompanying the activity. This might be seen in a geometer who cares only for the simple performing of an activity, without regard for enjoying it or taking pleasure in the activity. The mean between excess and deficiency in terms of getting activity *right* lies in the proper relationship between pleasure and activities described above, where “there is no pleasure without activity, and every activity is completed by pleasure” (1175a18-20).

When pleasure is appropriately tied to activities and is utilized as an educational tool in raising the young, pleasure serves as a guide toward virtue for the good man. Julia Annas, in “Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness,” argues that because the good man's pleasures are tied to good activities, pleasure will, in a sense, be an indicator that an action is good (285). If a person takes pleasure in good things, she will be led toward virtuous actions by acting according to that which gives her pleasure. Aristotle phrases this as follows: “... if virtue or excellence and the good man, insofar as he is good, are

the measure of each thing, then what seems to him to be pleasures are pleasures and what he enjoys is pleasant” (1176a16-20). The good man can furthermore use pleasure as a guide to good action, for these have become inextricably linked. Earlier, we saw how learning to take pleasure in good things was a fundamental part of education, in Aristotle’s view. This education reaches its end in the good man, for virtue has become a settled disposition in the good man, and doing what he enjoys and doing the proper activities merge into the same thing (1104b27-29).

On a deep level, Aristotle views the enjoyment of something as enjoyment of that thing for its essence, for what it *is*. The enjoyment is an affirmation that the thing is good. An activity that appears to the agent as pleasant is appearing to the agent as good. If something seems pleasant to me, it seems good to me at a level preceding reflection (*EE* 1235b26-28). If I am pursuing an activity I see as good, it is necessary that I also experience pleasure in this pursuit. When something appears to me to be good, Broadie says that I am at the same time affirming it *as* good (330). If pleasure can be a prereflective affirmation that something is good, this can also be a source of movement for the agent. It is difficult to draw a clear line between pleasure and the nature of the thing desired. Indeed, in speaking about activities, Aristotle says that it can be argued that there isn’t a distinction: “...pleasure is so closely linked to activity and so little distinguished from it that one may dispute whether [or not] activity is identical with pleasure” (1175b32-34). Without accompaniment by pleasure, Aristotle argues that an activity is not truly that activity (1175a19-21). Pleasure completes an activity. Our enjoyment of an activity is the highest acknowledgement of its worth.

This concept of pleasure as intrinsic to an activity highlights the importance of properly educating the young to take pleasure in good things. If the young are not raised correctly and they learn to take pleasure in ends that are not good, this will strengthen their tendency toward bad actions, since it strengthens their dispositions thereto.

Aristotle puts it this way: "Similarly, since an unjust or a self-indulgent man initially had the possibility not to become unjust or self-indulgent, he has acquired these traits voluntarily; but once he has acquired them it is no longer possible for him not to be what he is" (1114a19-22). Dispositions, particularly moral ones, are formed by repeatedly engaging in particular actions or activities. It is by this method that we learn to take pleasure in the right things. A young person begins by obeying the authority of her parents to do good actions. If her parents and educators have raised her well, as she grows up, she will internalize the reasons why good activities are good, and move toward them on her own volition, and not because an authority-figure told her to. However, people often fail to learn to associate pleasure with good activities and ends. It is of great importance to take pleasure in the right activities, lest one stray from the path of virtue.

However Aristotle's thoughts on pleasure might be phrased, he cannot be taken to be a hedonist, as he sometimes is, because he does not hold that sensual pleasure can be properly pursued as the end of activity. We saw earlier how a hedonistic approach to wine, in which an intemperate person drank wine solely for the sake of the sensual pleasure it brought, could not be considered proper by Aristotle. There are many ways of dealing with pleasure in an improper way, and the proper way of thinking about pleasure begins from a concept of the highest good and then determines what will count

as pleasant in light of the end that we are striving for (Annas 288). The life that is considered pleasant is determined by the life that is considered good. Aristotle explicitly rejects any inversion of this relationship that involves sensual pleasure determining what kind of activities we engage in. Pleasure is not the sole guide to the good life, as the hedonist might argue. The supreme end for humans is not the supreme end because we derive the most pleasure from it. Instead, the supreme end is such because it is the greatest realization of our rational nature as humans, and for this reason it is the most pleasurable activity a human can engage in.

Because humans are foundationally motivated by pleasure and pain, Aristotle argues that any serious account of human agency must include pleasure as it relates to the rational and animal aspects of human existence. Yet, we should not be motivated by sensual pleasure as though it were the end of activity. Rather, every pleasure is tied up with its corresponding good. Pleasure must occur as part of an activity, not a process, for pleasure is not realized over time but is complete in every moment it is experienced; the first moment of pleasure is just as full as the last. Because a particular pleasure accompanies a corresponding activity, our enjoyment of that activity is our greatest acknowledgement of its worth. The ideal agent, who is well raised, will reflexively associate virtuous activity with pleasure and corrupt action with pain. Pursuing *eudaimonia* is the highest good for an ideal agent.

Kant on Pleasure

A number of difficulties attend any attempt to articulate Kant's view on pleasure as it relates to moral motivation. First, Kant is not particularly concerned to treat

pleasure as a beneficial aspect of moral worth. Indeed, pleasure—and its corollaries, like inclination—are often the antagonists against which Kant's vision of moral worth is contrasted and defined. Second, Kant doesn't have a unified theory of pleasure in the same way that Aristotle did. In fact, Kant specifically rules out pleasure as a component of moral worth from the very beginning of the *Groundwork*. The only way in which pleasure seems to have any worth for Kant, or so Lewis Beck and Roger Sullivan maintain, is in acting for the well-being of a person, or *Glückseligkeit*.

There is little doubt that concerning the needs of humans as sensual beings, Kant thinks humans are motivated hedonistically. For example, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant writes, "That determination of the capacity of desire must be preceded by pleasure as cause is called inclination. ...So if a pleasure necessarily precedes the determination of the capacity of desire, the practical pleasure must be called an interest of inclination" (12/6:212). The ground of inclination is pleasure. However, this is a material principle, and "*empirical principles* are not at all fit to be the ground of moral laws" (G 48/4:442).¹ A principle drawn from the happenstance of human life is inadequate to ground moral laws because it cannot be universalized *a priori*.² A hedonistically conditioned principle is materially-based. Writing in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant admits that humans have a duty to act for their own well-being and happiness (176/6:421). Because achieving physical, mental, and spiritual well-being brings humans pleasure, the pursuit of pleasure can be said to be a duty. This statement must be qualified, however, for Kant views happiness as secondary to moral duty. Humans

¹ See also *KpV* 22, where Kant says that "all *material* practical rules put the determining ground of the will in the *lower faculty of desire*..."

² Kant writes earlier in the *Groundwork* that the will must be determined by a principle of volition *sans* empirical principles: "[the will] must be determined by the formal principle of volition as such when an action is done from duty, where every material principle has been withdrawn from it" (13/4:400).

always have a duty to preserve their health and lives, but well-being is never allowed to supersede the moral law as the primary motivating factor in a person's life (*KpV* 52/5:60). Kant's basic qualm with Aristotle's approach is that it is based upon the empirical realm, which is contingent and therefore not an adequate basis for maxims by which one can live. The ideal agent determines her actions by practical principles of reason that have been derived *a priori* and not through any empirical experience. Happiness is inadequate as a determining ground for action because it is empirically based (*G* 28-29/4:418-419).

Kant does not dismiss as unimportant, however, the fact that humans are physical bodies in addition to rational minds. Toward the end of the third section of the *Groundwork*, Kant explains that reason can "induce a feeling of pleasure or of delight in the fulfillment of duty" (64/4:460), but this is only to make the human as a participant in the realm of the senses conform to the principle of reason. This feeling of pleasure is a tool, enabling the mind to engage the body to invest in the end the mind has selected. Because pleasure is only a product of the sensory realm, there is no pleasure *a priori*. Even where pleasure *does* have a role in the fulfillment of duty, this occurs in a quasi-deceptive manner. Pleasure is in no way linked to the intrinsic fulfillment of the human *telos*. The achievement of the ultimate goods of human existence for Kant is not tied intrinsically to pleasure and enjoyment as it is for Aristotle. Rather, Kant only uses pleasure as a means of making the body cooperate with the ends the rational mind has set.

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant again draws our attention to the usefulness of pleasure as a means to an end, specifically to the agreeable (51/5:59). If

there were not something immediately good (viz. the moral law), then the good would be merely a means to a state of agreeableness or contentment. In this section on good and evil v. well-being and ill-being, Kant articulates pleasure as merely a “state of feeling” (52/5:60), not inexorably tied up with the good itself. Indeed, the purpose of reason is to reflect upon what is good and evil and use it to be the supreme condition of well-being (54/5:62). Either a rational principle determines practical laws *a priori*, or the faculty of desire determines the will to pursue pleasure and avoid pain. Again, pleasure as an end is here taken to be opposed to the absolute good. Kant argues that if we try to determine the concept of the good on our own, it will end up agreeing with our feelings of pleasure (55/5:63). An action based on well-being can be good in a limited sense, only in reference to sensibility.

Happiness (*Glückseligkeit*) and pleasure are, furthermore, closely linked. Beck argues in *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* that because a rational being's perception of life going well and being pleasant is for Kant happiness (*Glückseligkeit*), a person who desires pleasure is at the same time desiring happiness, and a person who desires happiness is desiring pleasure (97). As with Aristotle, happiness (as distinguished from the highest good) is defined around pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the feeling we have when we are happy and pain is the goad that spurs us on to obtain pleasure on the sensual level. Sullivan points out in *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory* that a life aimed at *Glückseligkeit* has goodness only insofar as it is also pleasurable (41). Happiness for Kant “is the satisfaction of all of our inclinations” (*KrV* 677/B834). As Kant articulates in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, happiness refers to our well-being and the satisfaction of our bodily desires and needs (*KpV* 53/5:61).

In conclusion, while Kant dismisses pleasure as having a role on its own in moral worth, it is useful for *Glückseligkeit*, since humans have a duty to attend to their sensual needs. (As we'll see in the next chapter, *Glückseligkeit* is a crucial component of the highest good.) However positively this duty might be construed, however, Kant is clear that it cannot ever have anything to do with moral worth (*KrV* 681/B841). Indeed, at the one moment where Kant says that reason causes us to feel pleasure when fulfilling duty, he quickly indicates that this is only as a means of getting the human to conform to the principles of reason. Kant not only does not appear to have a philosophy of pleasure, but he denigrates the role pleasure can play in a morally valid life. Are the critics right who maintain that Kant rejects as not having moral worth many of the elements that most of us consider necessary to a well-lived life, such as joy, pleasure, and delight?

Strict Opposites?

With this body of evidence before us, it seems increasingly unlikely that Aristotle could be made to fit Kant's views, or that Kant can be interpreted along Aristotelian lines. After all, Kant explicitly rejects pleasure as having a role in moral worth, and Aristotle considers a life without pleasure not fully human. But does Kant strictly exclude Aristotle's concept of pleasure? In this section, I consider whether Kant may actually think about pleasure in a way similar to Aristotle. I argue that Kant is reacting strongly against an idea of pleasure that Aristotle also rejects. Furthermore, I consider whether Richard McCarty's argument that the feeling of respect for the moral law can be considered as a higher-level pleasure in Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*

might be analogous to Aristotle's understanding of the pleasure derived from virtuous activity. While Aristotle and Kant are by no means saying the same thing when they talk about pleasure or the feeling of respect for the moral law, they do talk in ways that are interestingly similar.

When Kant rejects sensual pleasure as a motivation containing moral worth, he talks mainly about pleasure as it relates to *Glückseligkeit*, which, as we saw above, is linked quite closely with pleasure. In his discussions on the topic of moral worth in the *Groundwork*, Kant dismisses almost without comment any conception of motivation that takes sensual pleasure as the aim of action. Kant not only rejects a view that seeks sensual pleasure outside the constraints of *Glückseligkeit*, but even within *Glückseligkeit* Kant sees no moral worth in sensual pleasure. While Aristotle talks about pleasure (including sensual pleasure) as a beneficial thing to have as long as it is experienced in the proper manner, he is just as keen as Kant to reject hedonistic methods of living life. We saw earlier (pp. 10-11) that Aristotle treats with contempt the intemperate person who wants a longer throat to better experience the pleasant sensations of eating. Aristotle furthermore would reject as having moral worth, as Kant does, a view of sensuous pleasure as an end of action. The well-being of the human animal for Aristotle is not to be separated from his pursuit of *eudaimonia*. Indeed, *eudaimonia* is only possible with the presence of external goods, such as health. A view that treats the sensual aspects of human existence as separate from the kind of life humans should lead is for Aristotle at least to be rejected and at most incomprehensible. Aristotle and Kant are united in opposing hedonistic lifestyles as having moral worth. This also implies that Kant would be wrong to reject Aristotle on account of the role

pleasure plays in his ethical theory, as Aristotle does not include in the good life as valid ends of actions the kind of sensual pleasure Kant rejects as lacking moral worth.

Let us move on to consider moral aspects of Kant's theory. We have seen that Kant was a motivational hedonist regarding the sensual aspects of human existence. McCarty, writing in *Kant's Theory of Action*, claims that Kant's motivational hedonism extends not just to the sensual aspects of our natures but also to the totality of Kant's moral theory. McCarty contends that Kant is a motivational hedonist, by which he means "...the doctrine that human beings cannot act without feelings of pleasure or displeasure forming part of their motivation, or that feelings of pleasure and displeasure are explanatory for all human actions" (51-52).

In order to show that Kant is a motivational hedonist regarding both nonmoral and moral matters, McCarty needs to show that Kant has some kind of intellectual pleasure that can motivate humans at the level of reason. McCarty begins his claim that Kant might support a broader role for pleasure in motivation by quoting Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*: "Every determination of choice proceeds from the representation of a possible action to the deed *through the feeling of pleasure or displeasure*, taking an *interest* in the action or its effect" (106/6:399, emphasis added). To demonstrate that Kant thought this early in his career, McCarty points to an early lecture in Kant's *Lectures on Metaphysics* (c. 1770): "If we take away the faculty of pleasure and displeasure from all rational beings, and enlarge their faculty of cognition however much, then they would cognize all objects without being moved by them; everything would be the same to them, for they would lack the faculty for being affected by objects" (62/28:246). Finally, in the *Groundwork*, Kant says: "In order for a

¹ For an alternative explanation of this seeming contradiction, see Daniel Grollman, *Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation*, pp. 93-125.

sensibly affected rational being to will that for which reason alone prescribes the 'ought,' it is admittedly required that his reason have the capacity to *induce a feeling of pleasure* or delight in the fulfillment of duty..." (64/4:460). The implication of these passages is that all motivation depends to some extent on feelings of pleasure (McCarty 52).

This feeling McCarty identifies with the feeling of respect for the moral law (*KpV* 63-64/5:73). How the feeling of respect can motivate may be explained in several ways. First, in a footnote in *Groundwork* 14/4:402n, Kant compares the feeling of respect for the law to inclination and fear. McCarty points out that the nature of inclination and fear is that of a motivator, and since Kant portrayed them as analogous to the feeling of respect for the moral law, he presumably thinks of the feeling of respect as a motivator as well (175).

In order to make sense of the second manner in which the feeling of respect can motivate, McCarty draws a distinction between objective and subjective aspects of the moral law. He points out that Kant asserts at one point in the 2nd *Critique* that "the incentive of the human will (and of the will of every created rational being) can never be anything other than the moral law" (62/5:72). However, Kant claims at a later point that "respect for the moral law is therefore the sole and also the undoubted moral incentive, and this feeling is also directed to no object except on this basis" (67/5:78).

How can the moral law and the feeling of respect for that law be both the *only* moral incentive? McCarty resolves this difficulty by suggesting that the moral law has objective and subjective dimensions (33).³ The objective dimension of the moral law

³ For an alternative explanation of this seeming contradiction, see Daniel Guevara, *Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation*, pp. 93-125.

shows reason where it needs to go. The subjective dimension provides motivation to do what the moral law shows as necessary. That is, a subjectively forceful motivator is necessary, in McCarty's view, because of the weakness of the human will. On his interpretation, "the objective law supplies the direction of motivation, and the subjective feeling of respect supplies its strength" (177).

If the feeling of respect for the moral law can be an intellectual motivator, McCarty argues that it can also be viewed as pleasure. While Kant does deny that respect is a feeling of pleasure (66/5:77), since the feeling of respect is hindering self-conceit, McCarty asserts that from the perspective of the moral law, inhibition of self-conceit is a positive outcome, "and a positive effect on feeling should count as pleasure, again, from the moral law's point of view" (179). In asserting this, McCarty is committing to an interesting view of a "moral pleasure," which arises from a frustrating experience of inhibited desires.⁴ If Kant doesn't agree that this is a moral pleasure, he certainly does consider the effect to be subliminally positive: "...since this constraint is exercised only by the lawgiver of his *own* reason, it also contains something *elevating*, and the subjective effect on feeling, inasmuch as pure practical reason is the sole cause of it, can thus be called *self-approbation* with reference to pure practical reason" (*KpV* 69/5:80-81). McCarty compares this to the feeling of the sublime, while not going so far

⁴ While McCarty doesn't point to this passage in support of his argument, the following passage could be construed as supporting McCarty's argument: "With respect to [duties of wide obligation]... there is a subjective principle of ethical *reward*, that is, a receptivity to being rewarded in accordance with laws of virtue: the reward, namely, of a moral pleasure..." (*MS* 154/6:391). This passage, however, doesn't identify the moral feeling with pleasure, but rather points to the effects of the moral feeling being interpreted as pleasurable. Of course, if an agent incorporated this pleasure into her incentive for conforming to the moral law, she would no longer be acting for or from duty and her action would thus lack moral worth. Regardless, the possibility of a pleasurable reward accompanying moral action presents an interesting problem for the Kantian agent acting for the sake of duty alone.

as to equate the two. If the feeling of respect for the moral law for Kant is not pleasure, it is on McCarty's interpretation, at least in certain respects, pleasant.

Yet this "pleasant" feeling is far from pleasure, and McCarty's point here does little to advance his argument that Kant includes pleasure in moral motivation. A far more plausible interpretation of Kant at this point is to interpret the moral feeling of respect for the law as a sublime feeling, like awe of a powerful god or overpowering natural phenomena, such as a violent storm or tsunami. The passage I quoted above from the *Metaphysics of Morality* occurs in a section where Kant explains the nature of the moral feeling. While Kant does say, as related above, that the "determination of choice proceeds" via "the feeling of pleasure or displeasure" (106/6:399), it occurs in a passage that discusses the feeling produced by the moral law in us. McCarty is right, in pointing toward the moral feeling of respect for the moral law as the subjective incentive in acting in accord with the moral law (*KpV* 67/5:78). When placed in the context of Kant's discussion of the moral feeling, however, it is clear that respect for the moral law is not a feeling of pleasure (66/5:77), nor is it altogether pleasant as we ordinarily speak of the term. The awe of supernatural power or extraordinary and sublime natural power is more akin to fear than to pleasure. Indeed, as noted above, Kant aligns the moral feeling with foundational motivations in human nature, inclination and fear (*G* 14/4:402n).

However McCarty phrases his argument, it does not arrive at the two-level motivational hedonism that he wants to ascribe to Kant. In order to say that Kant has a role for pleasure on the nonmoral level of *Glückseligkeit* and on the level of the moral law, McCarty has to show, contrary to Kant's own beliefs, that the moral life and duty

¹ I articulate this more fully in the conclusion to the next chapter, pp. 48-49.

are only possible with the addition of some kind of pleasure in motivating us to act in accord with the moral law. While McCarty ultimately fails to support his argument with convincing evidence, he does point to the moral feeling as a crucial source of motivation toward duty and the moral law. If the moral feeling is not pleasure, it does share many characteristics with it, if the moral feeling is akin to awe. Both elevate our feelings. Kant calls the moral feeling “*self-approbation* with reference to pure practical reason” (*KpV* 69/5:80-81). He does not think that only heartless action in accordance with duty is the reality in moral action, for moral action is not truly possible without the feeling of respect for the moral law. While this moral feeling thwarts self-conceit, it is also uplifting. If it is not pleasure itself, the moral feeling can certainly contain elements of pleasure.

Aristotle and Kant, if they agree on nothing more, agree to the despicableness of a life that aims merely at pleasant sensations. Furthermore, neither sees the sensual satisfaction of desire as having moral worth in and of itself. While Kant rejects sensual pleasure as having any part in moral worth, Aristotle does not affirm that sensual pleasure as an end of action has a part in the good life. Indeed, it’s hard to know what Kant *would* say about the way Aristotle uses pleasure, if Kant understood Aristotle properly in this regard. The tone of McCarty’s argument suggests far more, that the moral feeling in Kant can contain forms of pleasure. Kant’s moral theory allows for some form of pleasure to be part of moral activity in a way that is adaptable to Aristotle’s view. The possibility here is that both Aristotle and Kant allow pleasure to play a role in motivating us to the highest good.⁵ While Kant does not go so far as to

⁵ I articulate this more fully in the conclusion to the next chapter, pp. 48-49.

say—as Aristotle does—that, for the good person, acting toward pleasure will lead to a virtuous life and likely *eudaimonia*, the effect of acting as the moral feeling dictates is going to be just that. Both the good person and the moral person can lead good and moral lives if they act in response to their inner, positive feelings toward certain courses of action.

Paths toward Dialogue?

If Kant does not strictly exclude Aristotle's view on pleasure, and may even go further toward Aristotle's view than previously thought, can we hold a view of pleasure similar to Aristotle's and still have moral worth under Kant's theory? Of particular concern here is Kant's view on duty, as Kant is averse to considering any motive other than duty as having moral worth. Yet he offers conciliatory remarks at the end of the *Critique of Practical Reason* that might allow for interpretations that would make room for part of Aristotle's view on pleasure and ideal moral motivation. Barbara Herman, writing in *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, argues that in order to read Kant accurately, we must first view the Categorical Imperative not as an oppressive tyrant intent on squeezing the joy from life but rather as a limiting concept that asks only whether we are doing anything forbidden by the moral law. The concern of the CI is not to make sure that we have no motivation other than duty, but rather to make sure that duty is the determining ground for our actions. We must be able to act such that even if there were no inclination spurring us on to action, we would still act from the motivation of duty alone. As long as duty is the primary motivation, other factors, such as inclination, one's personal *telos*, and pleasure, can factor in as well. The CI is a floor, not a ceiling.

Herman's construal, however, runs up against a more plausible reading of Kant (as well as criticisms by Baron, Guevara, and others). The better construal of Kant is that he does not allow for overdetermined actions, for hedonistically conditioned actions cannot have moral worth, no matter how they are combined with duty. This seems likely to doom any attempt to interpret Kant in ways amenable to Aristotle's view of the good life, but I will have more to say on this anon.

Herman argues that Kant allows for nonmoral motivation to be present with duty, as long as the motivation of duty is primary. While in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant says that the will must be determined by the moral law (62/5:71), it does not follow that the moral law has to be the only force at work inside us. Herman suggests that it is reasonable to interpret Kant here as saying that it is better to act only from duty than to act only from inclination, but also that it's better to have the primacy of duty with inclination and personal interest also factoring in, although many commentators disagree with this interpretation.⁶ While in 62/5:72 Kant says it is hazardous to so much as let any other incentive cooperate alongside the moral law, and while duty excludes inclination as a determining ground (69/5:80), Kant never says that inclination wholly disappears from the person (*G* 19-20/4:407-8).

Indeed, the Categorical Imperative must have motives and desires to test. The CI does not give anyone a purpose in life or goals to pursue, but instead measures our inclinations, to ensure that we do not act improperly. Practical reason does not require that we renounce claims to happiness, but only that practical reason be the primary motive behind acting (78/5:93). Humans are not perfect and can never be wholly rid of

⁶ See, for example, Samuel J. Kerstein, *Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality*; Marcia W. Baron, *Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology*; Daniel Guevara, *Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation*; and Richard McCarty, *Kant's Theory of Action*.

desires and inclinations (72/5:84). Concerning these desires, we must base our maxims on what is morally necessary. Perhaps, then, Aristotle's concept of the human *telos* can be the starting place for our maxims but cannot be the determining ground for our actions.

While Like the concept of the noumena, Herman argues that the Categorical Imperative should be interpreted primarily as a limiting concept. The concept of duty requires subjective accord with the moral law by keeping the spirit of the law. The primary function of the CI is to ensure that we do not act on motives that could change, such as inclination and sympathy. The problem with the sympathetic person is that she has no concern whether her action is right or wrong (5); sympathy is a nonmoral motivation, just like inclination. Moral motives are ones that provide the agent interest in the rightness of the action. To have moral worth is to be acting with interest in the rightness of actions (6). Happiness and morality are two different elements of the highest good (94/5:112). Morality is the first element of the highest good, but happiness is a second element (100/5:119). As long as morality is the determining ground of our actions, we may seek happiness also, and Kant leaves open the exact form this happiness might take (Herman 11-12). It is permissible on Herman's account to act for a nonmoral duty (e.g. "I need money") as long as the action satisfies both the nonmoral desire and the motive of duty (15). One must act in such a way that duty alone would be sufficient to bring about the action, but Kant's requirement is only that we do not act in prohibited ways (33). Duty need only be present as a limiting condition and self-sufficient motivation. The good will, in taking the CI seriously, takes rational nature as its end.

Herman's interpretation of Kant leaves open the possibility of overdetermined actions, in which nonmoral motives are coupled with moral ones. In fact, Herman argues, this is a necessary feature of human existence, as our responses to moral duties cannot be somehow separated from the emotions and complexities that attend life. While duty must be the primary (and self-sufficient) motive, an ideal agent will have ancillary motives as well, such as inclination, or perhaps pleasure.

This view of overdetermined actions and what constitutes acting "from duty" is controversial, however. For example, Marcia Baron argues, in *Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology*, that Herman's interpretation of duty as a primary motive and nonmoral motives as secondary motives inverts the relationship between the two (113). Instead, Baron asserts that on Herman's view the Categorical Imperative and duty function as secondary motives because they constrain the conduct of the agent, whereas the nonmoral motive is the primary motive because it provides the moral gumption to act. If this were the case, Herman's construction, as interpreted by Baron, would lack moral worth because acting from duty as a secondary motive is not really acting from duty (134). However, Baron also notes that if those actions alone have moral worth in which no inclination is involved at all, then it would be a fairly simple matter to determine which actions have moral worth (150). The fact that Kant considers this determination very difficult in certain cases shows that Kant allows for actions that contain both inclination and duty and still have moral worth.

Leaving aside the criticisms of Herman's interpretation of Kant by Baron (and Guevara, and Kerstein, and McCarty, and others), Herman's view runs against Kant himself. While Kant does not say that *possessing* an inclination toward something is

contrary to doing it from duty, he does implicitly distinguish between inclination accompanying an action, and acting *from* inclination (*G* 19/4:406). Kant certainly does not recognize the existence of morally valid actions that are done both from inclination *and* from duty—overdetermined actions. For all the venom that has been injected into Herman's argument by Baron and others, I think that Kant cannot recognize the existence of overdetermined actions for the simple reason that, on his view, acting from inclination and acting from duty are mutually exclusive.⁷ As we saw earlier, on p. 16, acting from inclination involves taking a hedonistic principle as an end. Samuel J. Kerstein, in *Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality*, concludes from this that if "Kant held that a particular action could be done at the same time from duty and from inclination, then he would also be committed to the view that a hedonistically conditioned action could have moral worth" (103). As I had occasion to note earlier, Kant holds that empirically based principles cannot have moral worth (*G* 48/4:442). He states this view more explicitly at *KpV* 79/5:93:

Now, because all determining grounds of the will except the one and only pure practical law of reason (the moral law) are without exception empirical and so, as such, belong to the principle of happiness, they must without exception be separated from the supreme moral principle and never be incorporated with it as a condition, since this would destroy all moral worth just as any empirical admixture to geometric principles would destroy all mathematical evidence...

In this passage, any determining ground of the will other than the moral law is empirical, and is thus ultimately hedonistic. Indeed, Kant says that the addition of an empirical principle would "destroy all moral worth." It follows that no action that is

⁷ Herman appears to use "inclination" to mean some kind of tendency toward some kind of action, but her use of the word implies that "inclination" refers to nonmoral motivation in general (18). That is, she does not use the word in the same sense in talking about overdetermined actions as Kant would have used it.

done partially or totally from inclination can have moral worth. Even if overdetermined actions existed in Kant's mind, they could not have moral worth due to the presence of inclination.⁸ There is little doubt that Kant would like himself to be represented as saying that for some action to have moral worth, it must be done "*for the sake of the law*" (G 3/4:390), with no nonmoral motives added to the equation.⁹

This would seem to make more difficult my project of bringing Aristotle and Kant closer together on the topics of pleasure and the highest good. Aristotle's view of the good life seems to lack moral worth on this reading, as he incorporates pleasure at the heart of his substantive account of *eudaimonia*. Although I argued above (p. 16) that Aristotle and Kant both deny hedonistic interpretations of pleasure as having a part in the good life (and, consequently, that Aristotle's pleasure *qua* pleasure is not of the sort that lacks Kantian moral worth), Kant must still reject Aristotle's account of the good life as having moral worth, because it is empirically conditioned. The conclusion I suggested on p. 26—that both the good person and the moral person can lead good and moral lives if they act in response to their inner, positive feelings toward certain courses of action—seems to be in doubt, for Kant seems to exclude from validity Aristotle's view of the good life at its very roots. In order to test this theory, we must first look at

⁸ This isn't to say that it cannot be argued that Kant *should* recognize the moral worth of overdetermined actions. I'm not as much interested in "what Kant might have said," as the title of an essay on "Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action" by Richard G. Henson reads, but rather in what Kant *did* say and would have liked to have himself portrayed as saying. Part of the argument for overdetermined actions is the slipperiness of knowing what our motives truly are. While I have noted above (and will have occasion to note again below) that Kant also recognizes this fact, he holds that we are ultimately capable of choosing the right reason for acting, viz. for the sake of duty alone.

⁹ See also *KpV* 63/5:72, "What is essential in every determination of the will by the moral law is that, as a free will—and so not only without the cooperation of sensible impulses but even with rejection of all of them and with infringement upon all inclinations...—it is determined solely by the law," and *KpV* 69-70/5:81, "It is of the greatest importance in all moral appraisals to attend with the utmost exactness to the subjective principle of all maxims, so that all the morality of actions is placed in their necessity *from duty* and from respect for the law, not from love and liking for what the actions are to produce."

Aristotle and Kant's accounts of the highest good before returning to the question of moral worth in the penultimate conclusion of this paper.

Chapter Two: The Highest Good

Introduction

While I ended the previous chapter on a pessimistic note, in this chapter, I'll argue that Aristotle and Kant's views on the nature of the highest good are remarkably similar, despite several considerations that render this judgment initially implausible. Chief among these is the fact that Kant rejects the ancient Greek account of the highest good—including that of Aristotle—because it allows an object of the will to determine moral law. Furthermore, Aristotle bases his ethics on happiness, and hence ultimately on pleasure, which altogether lacks moral worth for Kant. Problematic for Kant's critics is the fact that Aristotle's articulation of the highest good is not susceptible to either criticism. This does not mean, however, that Kant can simply uncritically endorse Aristotle's view. Yet when Aristotle's account of the highest good is placed beside Kant's account they prove remarkably similar. While their accounts cannot be considered identical, their commonalities are more important than their differences.

Aristotle on the Highest Good

The highest good, for Aristotle, is the life of *eudaimonia*. It is the final end of human activity, and the person in possession of this good needs no other end to make her happy. The highest good is determined through study of human nature and what makes humans peculiarly human, in contrast to other species. When we live well, we

Chapter Two: The Highest Good

Introduction

While I ended the previous chapter on a pessimistic note, in this chapter, I'll argue that Aristotle and Kant's views on the nature of the highest good are remarkably similar, despite several considerations that render this judgment initially implausible. Chief among these is the fact that Kant rejects the ancient Greek account of the highest good—including that of Aristotle—because it allows an object of the will to determine moral law. Furthermore, Aristotle bases his ethics on happiness, and hence ultimately on pleasure, which altogether lacks moral worth for Kant. Problematic for Kant's barbs is the fact that Aristotle's articulation of the highest good is not susceptible to either criticism. This does not mean, however, that Kant can simply uncritically endorse Aristotle's view. Yet when Aristotle's account of the highest good is placed beside Kant's account they prove remarkably similar. While their accounts cannot be considered identical, their commonalities are more important than their differences.

Aristotle on the Highest Good

The highest good, for Aristotle, is the life of *eudaimonia*. It is the final end of human activity, and the person in possession of this good needs no other end to make her happy. The highest good is determined through study of human nature and what makes humans peculiarly human, in contrast to other species. When we live well, we

fulfill our purpose and function as a species. This best kind of life for humanity is one of virtuous activity of the soul that lasts for a lifetime. However, this well lived life isn't composed solely of virtuous activity, for *eudaimonia* needs external goods (like wealth, beauty, and political power) to be attained. *Eudaimonia* thus has a component that is largely in our control, virtue, and a component out of our control, external goods and the vicissitudes of fortune. While the happy person acts nobly when fortune is against him, the happy life is largely characterized by *eupraxia*, things going well for the person in question.

That there is a highest good for humans Aristotle takes as obvious, as it is the consequence of humans existing at all. Aristotle says, "the good, therefore, has been well defined as that at which all things aim" (NE 1094a3). Every activity humans engage in is directed toward the achievement of a goal. The goal determines what counts as success in an activity (Lear 14). Some activities and goals are instrumental, as bridle-making is done for the sake of horsemanship and military strategy (NE 1094a11-13). Subordinate goods are pursued for the sake of higher ends, and these for the sake of ends still higher. If this process were to continue without end, "the process will go on infinitely so that our desire would be futile and pointless" (1094a20-23). In order for our lives to have meaning, there must be a stopping point, a final good which centers our lives. Otherwise, there is no place to ground meaning and measure the goodness of ends.

Indeed, this highest good must be both final and self-sufficient as an end. It is final in that it is not pursued for the sake of any other end (1097a31-32). This end must be chosen as an end in itself and never as a means to another end. The highest good

must also be self-sufficient. That is, on its own the highest good “is sufficient to be the organizing principle of a life worth choosing” (Lear 52). *Eudaimonia* encompasses the totality of the well-lived life. But self-sufficiency does not imply social isolation, as though happiness and happiness alone is all humans need. Rather, *eudaimonia* must include dwelling in community, for humans are, by nature, social animals (NE 1097b9-12), and as physical beings, we need other humans to survive.

The well-lived life of *eudaimonia* is, according to Aristotle, the highest good. While Aristotle begins the *Nicomachean Ethics* by asserting that *eudaimonia* is the highest good (1097b19-21), he arrives at this conclusion by studying humanity (1097b27-1098a7). We discover what *eudaimonia* is not by abstract theorizing, but by conducting a science of humanity and determining what the *telos* of humanity is. Through careful observation of many different species, Aristotle argues that we come to understand the *telos* belonging to each kind. The answer Aristotle is seeking cannot be as easy as “simply living” (1097b33), for the highest good of humans will not lie in the functions they share with other living things. Rather, the highest good of humanity must reside in the distinctive functioning of humans, “something peculiar to man” (1097b34-1098a1). Whatever the highest functioning of humans is, it must be related to what makes us different from other creatures. As Sarah Broadie writes in *The Ethics of Aristotle*, “On general principles of natural teleology, the human possession of reason makes sense only if some sort of rational activity is indeed our *end*” (49). The best life for a mouse is not characterized by the aspects of mouse-ness that are held in common with lions, but by the goods that *distinguish* mouse activity from that of other species.

The distinctive aspect of humans that Aristotle identifies, of course, is our rational nature, which formulates its own rational principles and obeys them (*NE* 1098a3-4). Since the use of a faculty is greater than its mere possession, “activity of the soul in conformity with a rational principle” is “the proper function of man” (1098a7-8). Furthermore, the function of any animal can be performed either well or poorly. The highest good of humanity is not rational activity simply, but rather *excellent* rational activity. The finest functioning of humans is therefore achieved through a lifetime of virtuous, rational activity of the soul (1098a10-17).

Moreover, this special kind of activity that constitutes the highest good is only possible in the presence of factors exterior to the agent, which Aristotle calls external goods. I explained in the first chapter of this work how pleasure and pain are tools in education. They form young people’s dispositions so that they feel pleasure at virtuous activity and pain at vicious activity (1104b11-13).¹⁰ This kind of good upbringing (1099b2) and moral habituation (1103a17), as well as other factors such as “friends, wealth, and political power... good children, and beauty...” (11099b1, 1109b3), are among the external goods necessary to attain the highest good and live a life of *eudaimonia*. The simple possession of these goods does not guarantee that someone will lead a well-lived life; like any other instruments, external goods must be utilized properly and with due care in order for the best result to occur. External goods are like our rational nature in this respect: they do not ensure excellent activity, but they do make it possible. Without external goods, *eudaimonia* is all but unattainable (1099b26-27). *Eudaimonia* depends for its realization on the good fortune of an individual in

¹⁰ pp. 7-8.

possessing certain talents, being raised in certain environments, and being endowed with favorable social connections (1099b8). Without goods such as these, one is handicapped in the quest for *eudaimonia*.

Because the vicissitudes of fortune at any moment can destroy a person's hope for happiness, *eudaimonia* requires a "complete lifetime" to be realized (1100a3-4). As Aristotle says, "We are unwilling to call the living happy because changes may befall them" (1100a31-1100b2). If a man loses an external good necessary for *eudaimonia*, he can no longer be called happy. Despite Aristotle's recognition that human life and fortune are transient, he also considers virtuous activity permanent and not strictly tied to good fortune (1100b3). Virtue is in part permanent because of the permanence of the activities and actions that constitute it. Actions that accord with virtue are permanent (1100b13), and the virtuous person acts consistently in each situation, even bad ones. But this does not guarantee permanent happiness, as *eudaimonia* and virtue need external goods. The mark of virtue is the ability to bear the misfortunes of life with "nobility" and "dignity" (1101a1-2). The truly virtuous person "will never become miserable" (1101a7), although he may not be truly happy. If a person is changed by misfortune and embittered by personal defeat, she is not fully in possession of virtue. The person of virtue, by contrast, consistently displays a stable disposition, manifested in her unwavering emotional strength.

Although the virtuous person may be marked by strength in times of duress, the better sign that he is attaining *eudaimonia* is whether his life is going well, or not. *Eudaimonia*, after all, is the life well-lived. Broadie points out that happiness for Aristotle is not just the "exercise of virtue: it is *eupraxia* or faring well" (50). While

eudaimonia is virtuous activity, it also requires a certain measure of good fortune to be successfully enacted. (See also *EE* 1214b11-27.)

This paradigm of *eudaimonia* constitutes the highest good for humans. The supreme good for humans confers purpose upon all human striving. It must be a final and self-sufficient end; the life of *eudaimonia* is the best life for humanity. Because this end must be derived from what is essentially human, it is rational activity of the soul in accordance with virtue. Happiness is not the result of our efforts alone, but is also the result of good fortune. *Eudaimonia* is the result of our efforts toward virtue and our happening to have the necessary external goods as background conditions for *eudaimonia*.

Kant's Criticism of Eudaimonism

Before proceeding to articulate Kant's view of the highest good and comparing it to Aristotle's, we must first consider Kant's criticism of the ancient Greek philosophers. As we have seen above, Aristotle's view of the highest good is derived from empirical observation and rational deduction. The highest good is a natural consequence of the manner in which we talk about our activities and their ends. Yet isn't this the very view that Kant rejects in his *Critique of Practical Reason*? Doesn't Kant exclude Aristotle's philosophy from validity from its very presuppositions? Kant rejects the Greek philosophers (and Aristotle along with them) as having nothing helpful to say regarding the highest good because they subordinate practical reason to pleasure. They thereby permit the objects of the will to determine the moral law, instead of the other way around. Here I follow T. H. Irwin and Stephen Engstrom in

arguing that while certain Greek philosophers are susceptible to Kant's criticisms, Aristotle neither subordinates practical reason to pleasure nor does he choose an object for the will before determining the rules that will guide the will to that object. However, Aristotle is susceptible to Kant's criticism inasmuch as Aristotle founds his substantive account of the highest good on empirical observations.

According to Kant, Greek theories are subject to a single, great criticism, that practical reason is subordinated to an object of the will (*KpV* 55-56/5:64). The proper ordering, of course, is that the moral law should guide our wills to proper objects, not that objects, like the highest good, should determine rules to guide our wills to realize the object. Ultimately, the latter approach relies "upon empirical conditions for a moral law," which results in good and evil being determined by their "relation to feeling, which is always empirical" (56/5:64). As I discussed earlier, while Kant's theory of morality is not hedonistic, he argues that empirical determinations of the will are founded in pleasure (19/5:21). Indeed, "All material practical principles as such are, without exception, of one and the same kind and come under the general principle of self-love or one's own happiness" (19/5:22). The word translated as "happiness" here is *Glückseligkeit*, which refers to individuals getting their own way in the world; that is, their pleasures are realized and their material well-being is achieved. Because the Greek theorists begin from empirical considerations, their theories are ultimately rooted in hedonism.

As T. H. Irwin points out in "Kant's Criticisms of Eudaemonism," Kant considers eudaimonists to be a brand of hedonists. Kant unfortunately doesn't recognize a view of *eudaimonia* that isn't founded in pleasure. Since the Greeks linked the highest

good with happiness in this sense of the word, they can be universally dismissed by Kant as lacking moral worth. The true despicableness of the Greek position is not that they are interested in happiness, but that they place inclination “prior to rational judgments about what ought to be done” (70). An object of the will is made its determining ground; the empirical realm is made the foundation for morality.

While some eudaimonists are susceptible to Kant’s hedonistic criticism, not all ancient Greeks are vulnerable to Kant’s barbs. Kant understands *eudaimonia* as implying happiness on the level of *Glückseligkeit*, which he rejects as conveying any semblance of moral worth *on its own*.¹¹ Many of the ancient Greek writers do not understand *eudaimonia* this way. Aristotle, for example, rejects a hedonic interpretation of the highest good, while he still bases his ethics on empirical evidence and observation. While Kant understands *Glückseligkeit* as things going according to the agent’s wishes in a pleasure-based way,¹² Aristotle articulates *eudaimonia* as having to do chiefly with the exercise of virtue. *Glückseligkeit* and *eudaimonia* thus cannot be taken as equivalents (Engstrom 106). The ancient Greek philosophers are only exposed to Kant’s criticism here if they actually do view *eudaimonia* as not only starting from but ending in inclinations of sensual pleasure.

Furthermore, not all Greeks are treated the same by Kant. The Stoics, in particular, are singled out as having chosen wisely: “The Stoics, on the contrary, had chosen their supreme practical principle quite correctly, namely virtue, as the condition of the highest good” (*KpV* 106/5:126). The fact that the Stoics held the highest good at

¹¹ Later, I will argue that the highest good for Kant necessarily includes *Glückseligkeit* subsumed under—and governed by—the moral law and virtue.

¹² For example, consider the following passage from Kant: “...where each has to put his happiness comes down to the particular feeling of pleasure and displeasure in each...” (*KpV* 23/5:25).

with *eudaimonia*, he then proceeds to identify this with virtuous activity (113). That is, virtue is at the core of *eudaimonia*. As Aristotle puts it, “[An inquiry into the nature of virtue] will perhaps better enable us to discover the nature of happiness” (*NE* 1102a5-7). It is not that Aristotle thinks the goodness of virtue depends on what a given action contributes to the highest good; rather, a complete concept of the highest good for humans must include virtuous action. Knowledge of the highest good does not lead to knowledge of virtue; rather, the highest good is known by studying virtue. While Kant’s characterization of the ancient Greek philosophers as devoted to the highest good applies to Aristotle, Aristotle does not make the highest good “the determining ground of the will in the moral law” (*KpV* 55/5:64).

Aristotle and Kant thus do not seem to hold strictly incompatible views regarding the highest good. Aristotle is susceptible to Kant’s criticism of theories that start from empirical foundations. However, Kant seems to reject empirically based theories in part because they result in hedonism. If this is the case, Aristotle is not vulnerable on this count. While Kant would likely still reject a non-hedonistically based empirical theory due to its lack of *a priori* justification, Aristotle escapes the worst of Kant’s invective by the fact that Aristotle does not actually advocate a hedonistic interpretation of *eudaimonia*, nor does he let his version of the highest good strictly determine what virtues we should emphasize.¹³ Aristotle’s ethical theory is not prevented from being true by the fact that Aristotle’s argument is based in empirical (and hence contingent) observations and rational deduction. Rather, Kant’s criticism here is that it lacks *a priori* necessity. If Kant cannot wholly reject Aristotle’s view on

¹³ While it is true that the highest good—the life of reasoned activity of the soul—requires certain virtues for it to be lived out, it is also true that Aristotle takes some virtues to be necessary and good regardless of their attachment to a highest good.

the highest good, then we must determine Kant's own view of the highest good before proceeding to consider similarities between the two on this matter.

Kant on the Highest Good

The highest good for Kant is composed of two aspects, virtue and happiness (*Glückseligkeit*). While the highest good is the object of pure practical reason, it can only function in this role if virtue plays the superior role in its relationship with happiness. When virtue and happiness are properly related to one another, they constitute the highest good, and the highest good is the true object of a good will.

While virtue and *Glückseligkeit* compose the highest good, the relationship between the two needs clarification. First, it is worth noting that in the passage where Kant discusses the relationship between virtue and happiness in the highest good, he begins by distinguishing between supreme and complete aspects of the term "highest," which might otherwise be termed "final and self-sufficient," the terms Aristotle uses to talk about the highest good (*KpV* 92/5:110). Here, Kant argues that virtue contains the quality of finality as an end insofar as things can be desirable to us, but it is not yet the whole and self-sufficient object of the "faculty of desire." In order for virtue to be both final and self-sufficient, it needs to be paired with *Glückseligkeit*, things going well with oneself in the world.

However, this pairing is not a simple addition equation, such that virtue plus happiness equals the highest good. Rather, Kant says that virtue is "worthiness to be happy" (*KpV* 92/5:110). That is, "happiness [is] distributed in exact proportion to morality" (*KpV* 93/5:110). Things going well for a person in this world are linked to

how virtuous that person is. The highest good can only function as the proper object of the good will when happiness is the “morally conditioned yet necessary result” of virtue (100/5:119). In their proper relationship, happiness is a result of morality. Things can go well for a person in the world only when happiness is thought of as the result of virtue.

However, this necessary connection between virtue and happiness can exist only in a world in which all people do as they ought. This connection is dependent upon this condition for its realization and thus “this system of self-rewarding morality is only an idea, the realization of which rests on the condition that **everyone** do what he should” (*KrV* 679/B838). The highest good for Kant can only be realized in a world in which “the morally most perfect will, combined with the highest blessedness, is the cause of all happiness in the world” (*KrV* 680/B388-9). The imperfect world in which we live ensures that the ideal connection between virtue and happiness does not translate to reality. Indeed, Kant assumes that *Glückseligkeit* will not necessarily follow virtue in this world when he says, “Thus without a God and a world that is now not visible to us but is hoped for, the majestic ideas of morality...would not fulfill the whole end that is natural for every rational being and determined *a priori* and necessarily through the very same pure reason” (*KrV* 681/B841). We can only hope for a necessary highest good in some kind of afterlife. In the sensible world, virtue cannot always produce happiness as its result (Silber 471).

Similarities

There are a number of obvious and less obvious similarities between Aristotle and Kant’s accounts of the highest good. They talk about the highest good using similar

terms, and they both exclude certain poorly conceived ideas of what the highest good is (for example, they both reject hedonistic interpretations thereof). I will argue that Aristotle has analogous concepts to virtue and *Glückseligkeit* in his highest good. Additionally, we find a similar connection between virtue and prosperity in Aristotle as we do in Kant. Finally, the highest good serves similar motivational functions for Aristotle and Kant.

The most apparent similarity between Aristotle and Kant's versions of the highest good lies in the words they use to talk about it. A striking similarity I alluded to above is that both Aristotle and Kant assert criteria of finality and self-sufficiency for the highest good. While Kant's conditions are translated as "supreme" and "complete," Kant defines them as "not subordinate to any other," and as the "whole" which doesn't need anything else added to it to complete it (*KpV* 92/5:110). In terms of their intended meanings, Aristotle and Kant have the same conditions for the highest good (Engstrom 122).

In order to compare Aristotle and Kant's accounts of the highest good directly, we need to see whether Aristotle's version of *eudaimonia* has components comparable to virtue and *Glückseligkeit* in Kant's description of the highest good. Engstrom delineates virtue as the component of the highest good within our control, and *Glückseligkeit* as "the part that depends on other causes and hence belongs among the gifts of fortune" (122). If the comparison is done on these terms, Aristotle clearly divides *eudaimonia* along similar lines. Aristotle divides the highest good into factors agents control and do not control: virtue, and external goods and one's fortune in life, respectively. Similarly, Kant divides the highest good into moral virtue and

Glückseligkeit. While *Glückseligkeit* isn't solely composed of good fortune, it is translated as "happiness," and it is equated to things going well in the world for us (*KpV* 104/5:124).

If there is a similarity at least in terms and divisions in the highest good between Aristotle and Kant, does Aristotle envision a similar connection between virtue and prosperity as Kant does between virtue and *Glückseligkeit*? While Aristotle does not draw as explicit a link between virtue and prosperity as Kant does, the idea does appear in a weaker form within Aristotle's thought (Engstrom 128). Aristotle points out that the happy man "may have many vicissitudes befall his descendants: some of them may be good and may be granted the kind of life which they deserve, and others may not" (*NE* 1100a23-25). The assumption here is that, according to Engstrom, the progeny of the happy man deserve to be blessed with some kind of external prosperity (129), since *eudaimonia* is described at one point as the prize of virtue (*NE* 1099b16-17). The implication is that a virtuous person deserves *eudaimonia* and thus external prosperity. Honor, furthermore, is described as a prize merited by the virtuous (1123b35). The most suggestive passage proceeds as follows: "For the deserts of the better man are always greater, and those of the best man the greatest" (1123b27-29). The insinuation here is that the best man, the virtuous one, deserves the greatest reward. While Aristotle nowhere explicitly says that external prosperity is the desert of the virtuous, these passages indicate that Aristotle supposes just this.

However strongly one states the connection in Aristotle between virtue and external goods, the relationship never approaches the level of causation that Kant asserts exists between the two. Indeed, in Book VII of *The Politics*, Aristotle is careful

to avoid stating too strong a connection between virtue and external goods. He writes, "...Mankind does not acquire or preserve the excellences by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of the excellences" (1323a39-b1). While this passage confirms that for Aristotle the virtuous person—the excellent person—is better positioned to obtain external goods, Aristotle goes on to say, "[happiness] is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods" (1323b2-4). Aristotle's focus is upon the role external goods have in forming virtuous people, for "it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are desirable at all" (1323b18-19). External goods are necessary for virtue, but an excess of external goods can harm one's pursuit of virtue (1323b5-6). External goods must be possessed in moderation, lest they distort one's path to *eudaimonia*.

This connection is weak in comparison to Kant, however, who asserts a strong causal link between virtue and external goods. Nothing in Aristotle can compare to Kant's statement that happiness is the "morally conditioned yet necessary result" of virtue (*KpV* 100/5:119). Is there any middle ground between their views on this matter? Engstrom suggests that for Kant there is a necessary connection between virtue and *Glückseligkeit* only in a perfect world. He writes, "Precisely because *Glückseligkeit* depends on external causes, it cannot be guaranteed by the mere presence of virtue in the individual person" (130). Indeed, as I argued more extensively on p. 44, the vicissitudes of fortune are capable of preventing a virtuous person from gaining *eudaimonia* just as they can prevent the Kantian agent from reaching the highest good. Just as Kant acknowledges that very few people will be able to act consistently in a

morally worthy fashion, so too Kant should also concede that *Glückseligkeit* will not always be the result of virtue. For Aristotle, as for Kant, the highest good requires the joining of virtue with external conditions. While there is a correlation between virtue and prosperity, the nature of fortune determines that it remain only that.

Finally, Aristotle and Kant see the highest good playing a similar role in motivating the agent to virtuous actions. Aristotle regards the highest good as a kind of motivating end in the virtuous life: “But as soon as a man becomes corrupted by pleasure or pain, the goal no longer appears to him as a motivating principle” (*NE* 1140b16-19). The highest good is the supreme end of action that humans can strive toward (1094a3). As related earlier, without a final and self-sufficient end that we can move toward, our actions cease to have meaning to ourselves. Kant reasons that if the moral law is included in the concept of the highest good, “the concept of [the highest good] and the representation of its existence as possible by our practical reason are at the same time the *determining ground* of the pure will...” (*KpV* 92/5:109-110). The highest good can have some role in determining the will and spurring humans to a life of virtue. John Silber, in “Kant’s Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and Transcendent,” says that for Kant, the “will is now guided by means of the idea of the highest good to seek its own moral perfection... The idea of the highest good thereby provides the answer to the second of Kant’s three basic questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope?” (469). The highest good for Kant, as for Aristotle, provides a unity to the human life that it could not otherwise have, for it answers questions of meaning and moral action.

In sum, Aristotle and Kant speak of the highest good in similar terms, and include components in the agent's control, virtue, and outside his control, external goods of some sort. Furthermore, on both accounts, the virtuous person deserves, and usually obtains, some kind of external prosperity. However, this link is hampered by the shifting favor of fortune, such that it remains imperfect. Finally, the highest good serves as a motivational force for Aristotle and Kant, and it provides unity and meaning to the human life that it would otherwise not have. As Kant writes in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, reason "seeks the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason, under the name of the *highest good*" (90-91/5:108).

Conclusion

Lest I overstate the matter, let me begin this conclusion by conceding that Aristotle and Kant's views of the highest good are not identical, for they differ in several important aspects. For example, it should be apparent from the first chapter that pleasure does not function in the same way in Aristotle's highest good as it does in Kant's. Pleasure is part of the completion of activities, for Aristotle, and its role in the life of *eudaimonia* is far more in the background (yet still integral to *eudaimonia*) than *Glückseligkeit* is for Kant. As we have seen, *Glückseligkeit* is a crucial component of Kant's highest good, for it would not be self-sufficient if happiness (determined, of course, by pleasure) were not part of it. While pleasure is necessary to both accounts of the highest good, external goods are necessary for the exercise of certain virtues on Aristotle's view, while virtue on Kant's account is not beholden to *Glückseligkeit* for its very existence.

Yet these differences between their accounts should not distract us from the great similarities between Aristotle and Kant's descriptions of the highest good. They reject hedonistic views of the highest good, maintain that the highest good must be both final and self-sufficient, assert that the highest good is composed of virtue that we largely control and external factors beyond our control, and they see a correlation between virtuous action and external prosperity. Not only does Kant not exclude Aristotle's conception of the highest good, but they also share a similar perspective on the nature and role of the highest good. Their accounts of the highest good are by no means identical (as Kant disapproves of the origins of Aristotle's ethics), yet they are far closer than even Kant himself could have dreamed.

Conclusion: How Moral Can a Good Person Be?

Introduction

At the end of these two chapters on pleasure and the highest good, we are left with a more complicated view of the relationship between Aristotle and Kant than when we began. Kant univocally rejects the empirical foundations of Aristotle's philosophy for its hedonistic end of empirical foundations and lack of necessary *a priori* principles. However, it has become clear that Aristotle is susceptible only to the latter of these accusations. Furthermore, Aristotle and Kant agree on a number of important issues, ranging from the lack of value inherent in hedonistic actions and ends to a relatively similar view of the highest good. Despite their differences, Aristotle and Kant aim for similar outcomes of ethical action. While Aristotle's ethical theory seems to lack moral worth on Kant's view of morality, Aristotle and Kant's accounts of the highest good share much in common. Indeed, they are far more alike than they are different.

What Is Moral Worth Worth?

Aristotle and Kant appear similar in certain aspects of their ethical systems. Yet, in Kant's view, Aristotelian agents seem unable to do actions that have moral worth. Is this fact all that important? What is it about moral worth that is so crucial that Herman must show overdetermined actions to have it? What kinds of actions count as having moral worth? I'll begin by presenting McCarty's provocative view that virtuous actions,

while worth doing, don't always have to have moral worth. If a good action can be done without moral worth, then moral worth might therefore not be all that worthwhile for actions to have. Virtue, according to McCarty, is commensurate with moral worth as equal partners in the best life for a Kantian agent. However convincing McCarty's argument might seem, I'll make the case that his line of reasoning misinterprets the core of what Kant has to say regarding duty, moral worth, and virtue.

First, what is so important about moral worth? McCarty argues that doing right in Kant's eyes involves doing actions that have moral worth as often as possible (199). Critics of Kant (such as Herman and Stocker) take "morally worthy" and "virtuous" to mean similar things. This is why, McCarty asserts, Herman and Stocker criticize Kant for not allowing obviously virtuous actions to have moral worth. Surely, they might say, a theory that doesn't allow virtuous actions (like visiting a friend in a hospital) to have moral worth must somehow be wrong! The thrust of Herman's argument is to argue that virtuous actions have moral worth for Kant, despite Kant's language to the contrary (189). However, it's not clear, McCarty argues, that Kant thinks actions must always have moral worth in order to be right actions. McCarty makes the case (a) that Kant distinguishes between right actions that have moral worth and right actions that are virtuous (but not morally worthy), and (b) that Kantian morality is expressed in terms of moral worth *and* virtue. Both are needed to live a full life.

Let us consider McCarty's arguments that moral worth may not be the only thing worth having. In the opening of the second section to the *Groundwork*, Kant casts doubt on the idea that there have been any morally worthy actions at all. Indeed,

It cannot be inferred with certainty that no covert impulse of self-love, under the mere pretense of that idea, was not actually the real determining cause of

the will; for we like to flatter ourselves by falsely attributing to ourselves a nobler motive, whereas in fact we can never, even by the most strenuous self-examination, get entirely behind our covert incentives...

From love of humankind I am willing to admit that even most of our actions are in conformity with duty; but if we look more closely at the intentions and aspirations in them we everywhere come upon the dear self, which is always turning up (19-20/4:407-8).

While Kant uses these paragraphs to bolster his argument for the *a priori* necessity of moral worth, he also casts serious doubt on the possibility of humans acting with moral worth as they are. If the moral ideal is essentially impossible, what hope do we have in this life? There is, certainly, the possibility of acting with moral worth, but that possibility is comparatively rare.

Even if moral worth were easily attainable in this life, a person living out the best life for a human could not always act with moral worth, no matter how hard she tried, because the highest life for humans contains nonmoral elements and requirements that cannot have moral worth. I argued in the previous chapter that *Glückseligkeit* is a crucial component of the highest good, yet the former lacks moral worth on its own; furthermore, we have a duty to act for our bodily well-being (*KpV* 53/5:61; *G* 12/4:399). It is right to act for the good of our bodies, yet this cannot have moral worth because the fulfillment of this duty is rooted in inclination. Additionally, we have a duty to improve and perfect ourselves and to take the happiness of others as an end (*MS* 150-1/6:386-8). This kind of action cannot have moral worth, McCarty argues, because (for example) the latter takes the happiness of others as its end. However, these imperfect duties are not worthless, for they remain virtuous, even if they lack moral worth (McCarty 195).

As we have seen, actions seem to be virtuous while lacking moral worth; moral worth and virtue do not necessarily coincide. McCarty begins by establishing that the criterion for moral worth is different than the one for virtue. While Kant thinks that there may never have been an action with true moral worth (McCarty cites *G* 19-20/4:406-7), he expresses admiration for actions most people would consider to be virtuous: "It is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them and from sympathetic benevolence" (*KpV* 70/5:82). McCarty concludes from this (and similar passages) that Kant is saying that actions motivated by inclination can be virtuous, and there is no reason to discourage such actions (189-190). Kant's moral theory holds that two kinds of duties are necessary: duties that aim at specific ends, and duties that require the cultivation of certain ends (196-7). The former is identified with moral worth, and the latter with virtue. McCarty concludes: "It is a mistake to think of the moral life in accordance with Kantian ethics as a single-minded devotion to increasing one's 'moral worth.' We are not expected to act from duty alone as much as possible... We have other ends and incentives to cultivate, and these are the bases for an admirable life of virtue" (199). Right acting can have moral worth or virtue, or both. The moral life requires both actions done from moral worth and virtuous actions that lack moral worth.

For all the merits of McCarty's argument (I commend him for the boldness of his claims and his tenacity in defending them), he seems to misinterpret Kant's doctrine of virtue, and its relation to duty and moral worth. Contrary to McCarty, I will primarily argue that in the *Doctrine of Virtue* (on which McCarty bases much of his argument), Kant maintains that duties of virtue have moral worth. While not all morally worthy

actions are virtuous, it is plausible to think that all virtuous actions could have moral worth. Indeed, there seems to be reason in the *Doctrine of Virtue* to think that any virtuous actions failing to meet the criteria for moral worth are not actually virtuous.

In the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant views virtue as the ability to control oneself. In one place, he speaks of the “moral capacity to constrain oneself,” and he defines virtue as “the moral strength of a *human being’s* will in fulfilling his *duty*” (MS 157/6:394, 164/6:405). Virtue is equated with the ability to bring about the requirements of the law in our lives. While this definition seems quite different from Aristotle’s concept of virtue, there are some deep similarities between the two. For example, when Kant speaks of virtue’s ability to constrain oneself, he writes that “action springing from such a disposition...can be called virtuous (ethical) action” (157/6:394). Similarly to Aristotle, Kant sees virtue as a settled disposition to act in certain directions, and a “long-standing *habit* of morally good actions acquired by practice” (148/6:384). Additionally, Kant’s definition of virtue carries with it not only the strength of will to act in accordance with duty, but it also carries an effect in the world (164/6:405). The substance of Kant’s account of virtue is not altogether different from Aristotle’s.

Regardless of similarities to Aristotle, Kant does not speak as if actions in accordance with virtue can lack moral worth. An action with moral worth is one in conformity to the moral law done for the sake of duty. The duty of virtue is grounded “in accordance with moral principles” (147/6:382), and it pursues ends that are duties (148/6:383). Because the end is prescribed, it is prescribed unconditionally and is thus “a categorical imperative of pure practical reason, and therefore an imperative which connects a *concept of duty* with that of an end in general” (149/6:385). McCarty argues

that duties of virtue could lack moral worth if they were prompted by inclinations. However, Kant is saying here that a duty of virtue is such because it fulfills the Categorical Imperative to “*act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law*” (G 31/4:421). The effect of any duty is to constrain through law (MS 156/6:394). Thus, a duty of virtue, if fulfilled, constrains through law and meets the universalizability criterion of the CI. Indeed, Kant phrases it just this way: “The supreme principle of the doctrine of virtue is: act in accordance with a maxim of *ends* that it can be a universal law for everyone to have. In accordance with this principle... it is in itself his duty to make man as such his end” (157/6:395). The duties of virtue, *qua* duties, constrict action to fulfill the criteria of acting in accordance with duty. When Kant says that there is a range of means to reach the ends the duties of virtue set before us (168-9/6:411), he does not imply that inclinations can serve as incentives to act in accordance with the duties of virtue. Arguing this (as Herman and McCarty do) entails forsaking the idea of acting in accordance with duty. However, *because* the duties of virtue are duties, they must be done for the sake of duty. To act other than from duty in attempting to fulfill a duty is not only to lack moral worth, but also to fail in fulfilling that duty. The idea that acting from inclination can fulfill a duty of virtue seems to be far from Kant’s mind. He states that the highest stage of human morality is “nothing more than virtue,” which is “quite free from the influence of any incentive other than that of duty” (148/6:383). It remains unclear if an inclination can ever fulfill a duty of virtue. In fact, inclination is listed as *the* thing virtue has to overcome in fulfilling the “highest, unconditioned end of pure practical reason...that virtue be its own end” (158/6:396).

If an agent is going to act for the end (and duty) of self-perfection (154-5/6:391-393), this duty of virtue must be done from duty alone if it is to count as a fulfilled duty. Kant says that the agent should cultivate “the crude predispositions of his nature” because doing so is “a duty in itself” (154/6:392). The height of this duty is manifest in the cultivation of morality: “The greatest perfection of a human being is to do his duty *from* duty” (155/6:392). This would appear to be a quite narrow duty, yet Kant asserts in the next paragraph that it is actually a wide duty, because it constrains only the end and not the means (155/6:393). It is doubtful that any nonmoral motive could ever fulfill this duty of virtue.

It might be (justly) argued at this point that I am being unfair to McCarty’s argument, as I have not examined the duty of virtue most often pointed to when justifying overdetermined actions: the duty of benevolence. The argument generally proceeds as follows. Kant argues for the cultivation of a disposition to benevolent actions toward people. However, the fulfillment of this duty involves cultivating the *inclination* to do such actions. Therefore, an inclination can be instrumental in acting *from* duty, or so proceeds the argument in its simplest form. One problem with this argument is that “inclination” is used in the sense of “a feeling, like an emotion.” This is not used as Kant defines it—to indicate a desire and tendency in humans that aims ultimately for pleasure. He argues that feelings cannot be the target of duties, because this leads to an absurdity. Unselfish benevolence is often (and inappropriately, Kant adds) called a feeling (161/6:401), and feelings cannot be cultivated from constraint. He interprets the Golden Rule (love your neighbor as yourself) not to mean that one should cultivate a feeling of love toward one’s neighbor, but “*do good* to your fellow human

being,” and one might add, ‘because it is your duty,’ “and your beneficence will produce love of them in you (as an aptitude) of the inclination to beneficence in general” (162/6:402). The byproduct of fulfilling one’s duty of benevolence is an inclination, not the other way around. In the next paragraph, Kant calls a contradiction the idea of having a duty “to be constrained to take pleasure in something.”

Kant’s argument in the *Doctrine of Virtue* leaves little doubt that duties of virtue are truly duties and have moral worth. While McCarty argues that moral worth and virtue are different from each other because inclination can be a means to fulfilling a duty of virtue, Kant’s argument runs counter to that assertion. Far from condoning inclination as part of the duties of virtue, Kant condemns it at several points in his twenty-some pages on the topic. At one point, Kant even calls McCarty’s kind of assertion a contradiction. Even though inclination and moral worth cannot coexist in the same action, this is not a problem for virtuous actions. In order for these actions to be virtuous, they must meet the standard of the Categorical Imperative. One’s fulfilling a duty of virtue not only conveys moral worth, but also ceases to be a duty of virtue if it is not done *from* duty.

The Good Life, the Moral Life, and the Supremacy of Reason

What are the implications of Kant’s *Doctrine of Virtue* for my project of comparing Aristotle and Kant on these matters? A plausible argument might be made that inasmuch as Aristotle’s theory emphasizes virtue, it could count as close to moral worth in Kant’s ethical theory. However, the differences between Aristotle’s good life and Kant’s moral life are too great in the end to allow a grand synthesis to occur.

Irreconcilable dissimilarities exist between Aristotle and Kant, but that does not mean this project has been a failure. Similarities abound, both in the particular ends they seek for human existence, and in the structure of their thought.

As I pointed out in my introduction to this paper, the differences between the good life and the moral life are deep, and there is an abiding lack of recognition between the two. Aristotle has little conception of morality constrained by external laws. Instead, the agent pursues the best kind of human life, because it is what humans characteristically do. This science of ethics ideally results in the highest good. By contrast, the moral view espoused by Kant is founded in the idea of the moral law and the constraints it puts on us. The best human life is no longer a matter of better or worse action in accordance with the human *telos*. Instead, the highest good is a matter of right and wrong; the forensic model comes to the forefront. The empirical good life stands in direct opposition to the *a priori* moral life.

If we lay aside differences rooted in the contrast between an emphasis on the good life and the assertion of the moral life, however, it is hard to see the areas where Kant rejects the substance of Aristotle's ethical thought. It seems clear that Aristotle's ideal for action does not meet the criteria for moral worth, because it is not done from duty. Aside from this point, however, it is not clear how Aristotle fails the criteria. It is hardly plausible to dismiss Aristotle's moral theory because Aristotle was born too early to recognize the supremacy of acting from duty in accordance with the moral law.

Despite these initial (and important) differences, Aristotle and Kant agree on a surprising number of points. They reject hedonistic motivations, actions, and ends. They assert that perfect action is nearly impossible in this world, concur that an ideal agent

acting on her inner (good/moral) dispositions will usually act rightly in the world, and agree on the centrality of the highest good. Both men support the centrality of virtue to ethical action, and share very similar views on the highest good.

One final similarity is the centrality and supremacy of reason. Both Aristotle and Kant place reason at the center of their accounts of what it means to be human. Reason is used both to determine good and moral means of action, and to measure the outcomes thereof. In their systems of thought, reason demands adherence and aspiration to a standard of excellence of action and of character. It shapes virtues, dispositions, and decisions. Reason requires us to aim toward a certain direction in life. The highest good for Aristotle and for Kant is remarkably similar. Reason lies at the center of their thinking. Indeed, if an Aristotelian agent could think in terms of a constraining moral law, he might be a morally concerned Aristotelian, and still fulfill Aristotle's and Kant's criteria for the highest good. Inasmuch as an Aristotelian agent could act virtuously from a sense of what the moral law requires of him, his actions could have moral worth.

University Press, 1983. Print.

Davis, Martin W. *Justice & Injustice: Political Philosophy*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell

University Press, 1995. Print.

Dick, Lewis White. *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*. Chicago:

The University of Chicago Press, 1960. Print.

Goodrich, David. "Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's Ethics." *Phronesis* 33.3 (1988):

291-372. JSTOR. Web. 1 Jan 2010.

Bradley, Sarah. *Early with Aristotle*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Print.

Bibliography

- Annas, Julia. "Aristotle on Pleasure and Goodness." *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics*. Ed. Amélie Oksenberg Rorty. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980. 285-300. Print.
- Aristotle. *Eudemian Ethics*. Trans. H. Rackham. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard, 1961. Print.
- . *Nicomachean Ethics*. Trans. Martin Ostwald. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1999. Print.
- . *The Politics and The Constitution of Athens*. Ed. Stephen Everson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.
- Barnes, Jonathan, ed. *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Print.
- Baron, Marcia W. *Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1995. Print.
- Beck, Lewis White. *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960. Print.
- Bostock, David. "Pleasure and Activity in Aristotle's Ethics." *Phronesis* 33.3 (1988): 251-272. JSTOR. Web. 1 Jan 2010.
- Broadie, Sarah. *Ethics with Aristotle*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Print.

- Caygill, Howard. *A Kant Dictionary*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers, 1995. Print.
- Cooper, John M. *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975. Print.
- Engstrom, Stephen. "Happiness and the Highest Good in Aristotle and Kant." *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*. Ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986. Print.
- Gonzalez, Francisco J. "Aristotle on Pleasure and Perfection." *Phronesis* 36.2 (1991): 141-159. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.
- Gosling, J. C. B., and C. C. W. Taylor. *The Greeks on Pleasure*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982. Print.
- Guevara, Daniel. *Kant's Theory of Moral Motivation*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000. Print.
- Guyer, Paul. *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*. New York, Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.
- Hardie, W. F. R. *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968. Print.
- Henson, Richard G. "What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action." *Philosophical Review* 88.1 (1979): 39-54. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.
- Herman, Barbara. *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. New York: Harvard University Press, 1996. Print.

Hursthouse, Rosalind. *On Virtue Ethics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Print.

Hutchinson, D. S. "Ethics." *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle*. Ed. Jonathan

Barnes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. Print.

Irwin, T. H. "Kant's Criticisms of Eudaemonism." *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics:*

Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting.

New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

Johnson, Monte Ransome. *Aristotle on Teleology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005. Print.

Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.

---. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New

York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Print.

---. *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals*. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.

---. "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose." *Political Writings*.

Trans. H. S. Reiss. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 41-53. Print.

---. *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1996. Print.

Kenny, Anthony. "Aristotle on Happiness." *Articles on Aristotle*. Ed. Jonathan Barnes,

Malcolm Schofield, and Richard Sorabji. Vol. 2. New York: St. Martin's Press,

1978. 25-32. Print.

---. *Aristotle's Theory of the Will*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979. Print.

Kerstein, Samuel J. *Kant's Search for the Supreme Principle of Morality*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Print.

Knight, Kelvin. *Aristotelian Philosophy: Ethics and Politics from Aristotle to MacIntyre*. Malden, Massachusetts: Polity Press, 2007. Print.

Korsgaard, Christine M. "From Duty and for the Sake of the Noble: Kant and Aristotle on Morally Good Action." *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*. Ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

---. *The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.

---. *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Print.

---. *The Sources of Normativity*. Ed. Onora O'Neill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

Kraut, Richard. *Aristotle on the Human Good*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989. Print.

Lear, Gabriel Richardson. *Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004. Print.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. *A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century*. 2nd ed. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1998. Print.

Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993. Print.

McCarty, Richard. *Kant's Theory of Action*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.
Print.

McDowell, John. "Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle's Ethics."

Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty. Ed. Stephen
Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Print.

Oates, Whitney J. *Aristotle and the Problem of Value*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1963. Print.

Owen, G. E. L. "Aristotelian Pleasures." *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 72
(1971-1972): 135-152. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.

Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. "The Place of Pleasure in Aristotle's Ethics." *Mind* 83.332
(1974): 481-497. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.

Sherman, Nancy. *Making a Necessity of Virtue: Aristotle and Kant on Virtue*. New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Print.

---. "The Importance of the Highest Good in Kant's Ethics." *Ethics* 73.3 (1963): 179-
197. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.

Silber, John R. "Kant's Conception of the Highest Good as Immanent and
Transcendent." *The Philosophical Review* 68.4 (1959): 469-492. *JSTOR*. Web. 4
Jan 2010.

---. "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics." *The Review of*
Metaphysics 36.2 (1982): 397-437. *JSTOR*. Web. 4 Jan 2010.

Stocker, Michael. "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theory." *20th Century Ethical*
Theory. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995. Print.

Sullivan, Roger J. *Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Print.

Taylor, C. C. W. *Pleasure, Mind and Soul: Selected Papers in Ancient Philosophy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. Print.

Timmons, Mark. *Moral Theory: An Introduction*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Print.

Walsh, James J. and Henry L. Shapiro, eds. *Aristotle's Ethics: Issues and Interpretations*. Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967. Print.

Whiting, Jennifer. "Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian Reading of *Eudemian Ethics* viii 3." *Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness and Duty*. Ed. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Print.

Wieland, Georg. "Happiness: the perfection of man." *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100-1600*. Ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1982. Print.

Wood, Allen W. *Kant*. Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. Print.

---. *Kant's Ethical Thought*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Print.

