The Human Psyche in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov

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The Human Psyche in The Brothers Karamazov: Introduction

Prior to the beginning of his literary career, Dostoevsky wrote a letter to his brother explaining his understanding of his chief purpose in life: "Man is a mystery. The mystery must be solved [...] I am preoccupied with this mystery because I wish to be a man" (qtd. in Freeborn 19). This goal—to understand humankind and, thereby, to understand himself as a human being—permeated all of Dostoevsky's works, leaving behind a collection of diverse characters who often share in the author's search for meaning and self-understanding. From the self-conscious, hyper-intellectual, neurotic protagonist in "Notes from the Underground" to the cold, calculating, nihilistic Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment to the innocent, Christ-like Prince Myshkin in The Idiot, Dostoevsky created a broad range of characters that probed the depths of human nature. None of these works, however, attempted to depict the entirety of the human essence; instead, each captured particular dimensions of the human condition.

In his final work, The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky produced three more intriguing characters, each of whom possesses his own distinctive psychological eccentricities: the brothers Dmitri, Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov. In spite of the author's insistence that he is not a psychologist (qtd. in Freeborn 133), several scholars have noted that the three brothers form what Konstantin Mochulsky calls a "collective personality," with each of them representing a different part of the human psyche (597). Scholars do not, however, agree on exactly what part of the psyche the brothers represent. Mochulsky labels Dmitri "the principle of feeling," Ivan "the principle of reason" and Alyosha "the principle of will" (598). Richard Peace, on the other hand, claims Dmitri is "the emotions," Ivan "the intellect" and Alyosha "the soul" (229), while Avrahm

Yarmolinsky lists Dmitri, Ivan and Alyosha as "the life of the senses [...] that of the mind [... and] the life of the spirit" respectively (386).

Although these designations share semantic similarities, they also appear to differ significantly from one another. Yarmolinsky's term "the life of the senses," for example, may or may not include the "emotions" Peace associates with Dmitri; and one or both of their labels for Mitya may be covered by Mochulsky's "principle of feeling." Unfortunately, none of these scholars fully develop definitions of their terminology, leaving the scholarly world with multiple interpretations of the Karamazov brothers' symbolic presentation of the psyche, which creates an overall impression of the brothers that is blurred and partial at best.

In an attempt to sift through these critics and create a more defined, comprehensive picture of the Karamazov brothers' representation of the psyche, I will begin my analysis of the trio by establishing the Karamazov brothers as representatives of humanity. This section of my paper will discuss their father's role as an archetypal father figure and Dostoevsky's use of the term Karamazov in the novel. After providing this background information, I will analyze the three brothers using two separate methodologies. First, I will employ Freud's tripartite model in an attempt to understand the ways in which Dmitri, Alyosha and Ivan resemble the id, ego and superego respectively. This use of Freudian criticism—popularized by Henry A. Murray's "In Nomine Diaboli" in which the author utilizes Freud's model to psychoanalyze character interactions in Moby Dick—will provide a well-known basic framework from which the brothers can be discussed as portions of the psyche while simultaneously illuminating some of the motivations behind their behavior and how they interact with one another.

While this methodology can account for the majority of the Karamazov brothers actions and interactions, its strict categorization of the psyche also produces a number of limitations, including the absence of a legitimate spiritual realm—a realm that is a critical component of Dostoevsky's worldview. In light of this and other drawbacks to Freud's model, I will critique its findings, noting its inadequacies and weaknesses, then proceed to reevaluate the brothers from a more textually-oriented perspective, arguing that the author's work presents the Karamazov siblings as representatives of a different sort of tripartite model. Choosing the terms *body*, *mind* and *spirit* as generic and frequently-used divisions within the psyche, I will define each of these terms thoroughly and attempt to illustrate how the model stems from the text itself and the author's personal philosophy of the human psyche. This model will account for the behaviors of the brothers that the Freudian model cannot explain and will also further elucidate the trio's rationales behind their actions as well as their interconnectedness. After I use this model and critique its analysis, I will integrate the findings of both the psychoanalytic and the textual model, utilizing the tools of Freudian psychology, historicism and textual criticism in an effort to obtain a more complete illustration of how the brothers Karamazov function as a tripartite model of the human psyche.

Chapter 1: Dostoevsky's Philosophy of Human Nature and the Karamazov Brothers as Representatives of Humankind

Dostoevsky's "Law of the Ideal" and "Law of Individuality"

As Dostoevsky persevered in his quest to understand the mystery he labeled "man", he noticed early in his career that "the atmosphere of [man's] soul consists of a fusion between heaven and earth" (qtd. in Freeborn 17), creating what Richard Freeborn calls a "vision of humanity as a battlefield of contraries, of *pro* and *contra*" (17). This conception of human nature resembles traditional Orthodox theology in which, as a result of the fall of Adam and Eve, humankind now has "inherited death, mortality, and corruption" (Clendenin 132) and, through "the knowledge of good and evil" (Genesis 2.4-3.24, NIV), has the capability to "sin freely" or, through Christ, "attain incorruption" and do good (Clendenin 133).

Throughout his canon, Dostoevsky conveys both ends of this spectrum of human actions. The author's protagonist in "Notes from the Underground" observes that humans love both "to create" and to participate in creation's opposite, "destruction and chaos" (Underground 74), then illustrates this point by creating and destroying a relationship with the prostitute, Liza. Dostoevsky juxtaposes these contrasting sides of human nature again in Crime and Punishment, depicting guilt-ridden Raskolnikov oscillating between compassion and malice. One moment, Raskolnikov summons a police officer to protect a drunken girl from a potential rapist; the next he tells the officer to "Let them be [...] Let him amuse himself" (41). He also begins his relationship with Sonia by tormenting the young girl with cold, spiteful words, then professes his love and

devotion to her in the novel's epilogue. Of all his novels, The Idiot contains perhaps the most striking of Dostoevsky's depictions of the good and evil potential of humanity side-by-side: he places the innocent, "positively good man" (qtd. in Leatherbarrow xv) Prince Myshkin in society with Rogozhin and Nastasya Filipovna—sources of impulsive destruction that ultimately bring themselves and Myshkin to ruin.

Later in his life, Dostoevsky names these two divergent sides of human nature that surface in his works. In his 1864 reflections on his first wife, he labels one side the "law of individuality" and the other the "law of the ideal" (Unpublished 1:39-41). Both of these laws reflect his Russian Orthodox heritage; they mirror the Metropolitan Hilarion's two categories of "a person's orientation in the world: *self-assertion* in earthly life and *spiritual salvation* for the achievement of which it is necessary to free oneself from the slavery of earthly cares" (Esaulov 117). The law of individuality stems from humankind's corrupted nature after the Fall, as described by the Orthodox tradition. This law facilitates human corruption by driving humanity to obey their "natural impulses," encouraging them to submit to "[their] temperament, [their] character, [their] heredity, cosmic or psycho-social ambiance, [and their…] historicity" (Lossky 72).

The law of the ideal, on the other hand, focuses on imitating the love of Christ by giving oneself "wholly to each and every one, wholeheartedly and selflessly" (Unpublished 1:39)—an idea which resembles Russian Orthodoxy's kenotic tradition. This particular strand of Orthodoxy strove to imitate "Christ's extraordinary humility" (Ziolowski 32). Kenotics based much of their ideology on Paul's description of Christ in Philippians 2 (33), in which the apostle writes that Christ "did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a

servant. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death—even death on a cross!" (vv. 6b-8) Using this passage as their model, kenotics advocated "unceasing self-humiliation as a means of transcendence" (Ziolkowski 33). Dostoevsky's own words seem to reflect their philosophy when he writes, "the highest use which [one] can make of [one's] individuality [...] is to seemingly annihilate that *I*" which would then allow one to love others with selfless humility (Unpublished 1:39).

Though this humble, loving law of the ideal should be sought, Dostoevsky does acknowledge that "on earth man is only a developing creature"; the self-centered law of individuality will always serve as "the constraint" and keep humankind from fully actualizing the law of the ideal (Unpublished 1:39). While neither law ever annihilates the other, if "the animal, selfish will is not restrained by the spiritual, moral will, the law of [individuality] defeats the law of [the ideal]" (Scanlan 85).

Fyodor Pavlovich as an Archetypal Father Figure

In the Karamazov family, the father, Fyodor Pavlovich, serves as an example of the law of individuality defeating the law of the ideal. Initially described by Dostoevsky's narrator as "worthless [...] depraved [and] muddleheaded," (Karamazov 7), Fyodor's defining character trait is his sensuality. He loves the pleasures of the flesh—eating, drinking cognac, chasing women—and revels in hoarding money and mocking others.

Yet even in the carnal father Karamazov, the law of individuality does not completely triumph. Occasionally, he experiences moments of "spiritual fear, a moral

shock, that almost [...] resounded physically in his soul" (93), which appear to be fugitive glimpses of the law of the ideal at work. This law also causes him, on rare occasions, to act compassionately. For example, when Alyosha collapses in a convulsive fit after his father derides his mother, Fyodor immediately expresses concern and orders Ivan to fetch some water for reviving his brother (137). Based on such instances of goodness and spiritual awareness, the reader can accept Alyosha's diagnosis of his father, "You're not an evil man, you're just twisted" (174), as an apt description of Fyodor's character—words that, according to Robert Louis Jackson, "[echo] Dostoevsky's view that the evil that men do rarely serves to define their whole inner nature" (305). Instead of depicting the father of the Karamazovs as a mere lustful beast, Jackson argues that Fyodor represents "the disfiguration of man made in the image of God" (304). This analysis implicitly makes the connection that Victor Terras makes explicitly when he labels Fyodor "old Adam," an allegorical representation of humankind's father (45).

Along with father Karamazov's corrupt two-sided nature, Dostoevsky's use of the family name Karamazov also contributes to Fyodor's archetypal stature as an Adam figure. Towards the beginning of the novel, Dostoevsky limits the term to members of the Karamazov family proper. When Miusov alludes to "a Karamazov conscience" and Rakitin labels all Karamazovs "sensualists" (76; 80), both restrict the range of their statements to Fyodor and his three sons. As the novel progresses, however, the name Karamazov expands in application to the extent that the term may refer to the family, to humankind, or to both simultaneously. For example, in Ivan's conversation with Alyosha, he tells his younger brother that "cruel people—passionate, carnivorous, *Karamazovian*—sometimes love children very much" (238, emphasis added). In this

instance, Ivan's use of his family name involves himself and other "cruel people" who exhibit "Karamazovian" traits. But whether this use of Karamazov refers to all people or to specific "cruel people" remains unclear.

The range of "Karamazov" retains its ambiguity until prosecutor Ippolit Kirillovich's speech at Dmitri's trial. Although Dostoevsky occasionally uses Ippolit to lampoon the use of psychoanalysis in legal proceedings, the prosecutor also appears to articulate certain aspects of the author's own ideology, one of which is Ippolit's characterization of the Karamazovs as a representative of Russia's "modern-day educated society" (695). In the midst of his comparison, he observes that "we [Russians] are an amazing mixture of good and evil, we are lovers of enlightenment and Schiller, and at the same time we rage in taverns and tear out the beards of little drunkards, our tavern mates" (698). At first glance, this passage seems to limit itself to the Russian people of Dostoevsky's day; but, as James Scanlan notes, Dostoevsky's nationalistic Russian focus functions as "one element in his lifelong quest to plumb the human mystery" (243). Based on this premise, Scanlan concludes that "[Dostoevsky's] nationalism is less fundamental than the universal values that he believed it served" (243).

While Scanlan's analysis does not mean that each of Dostoevsky's references to Russia contain universal applicability, in this particular case, his thesis seems to hold true. Earlier in the novel, Dmitri has already lamented the broadness of humankind, telling his brother Alyosha that he would "narrow [humanity] down" (Karamazov 108)—a sentiment that broadens the seeming particularity of Ippolit's description of Russians. Also, Helen Caniff de Alvarez's evaluation of the Karamazov surname supports the universality of Ippolit's characterization. In her dissertation, "The Augustinian Basis of

Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov," de Alvarez dissects the symbolic aspects of the roots and context of the word "Karamazov." Noting that the word has Tartar roots, de Alvarez connects Karamazov to "the word Tartar," which functions as "a metaphor for the state of nature" (23-24). Based on this evidence, she asserts that the Karamazov family name extends beyond the borders of Russia and refers to "the family of man [...] who must acknowledge this Karamazov nature" within each human being (25-26).

De Alvarez's suggestion that the Karamazovs represent the archetypal human family finds further support in the text of the novel. During his closing speech at Dmitri's trial, Ippolit Kirillovich dubs Fyodor a "paterfamilias" (695)—a Latin term that not only denotes Fyodor's position in the Karamazov household but can also imply a much broader scope for his paternal role that would include all families and, hence, all humankind. This potential meaning seems more plausible in light of Dostoevsky's preoccupation with the breakdown of the family in Russia. Joseph Frank posits that "for Dostoevsky, the breakdown of the family was only the symptom of a deeper, underlying malaise: the loss of firmly rooted moral values among educated Russians stemming from their loss of faith in Christ and God" (Prophet 570). Once again, one must question whether Dostoevsky sees this problem as Russian or universal. The prosecutor's use of Latin, a classical language of the Western tradition, provides a subtle push towards a universal interpretation, but cannot be taken as conclusive evidence.

Instead, one must look into what Dostoevsky considers to be the ideal family: a tightly-knit unit, grounded in the Russian Orthodox faith, holding one another accountable to the morality of the national and familial religion. If this model is Dostoevsky's ideal, his critique of the breakdown within the family system includes the

West—in which scientific progress, intellectualism, and the social Darwinism of modern business devalued family ties and religious values—as well as all the nations influenced by the West, from the Far Eastern countries of China and Japan to nations, such as Russia, wedged in between Eastern and Western people groups. Thus, when a member of the crowd at Mitya's trial comments on the prosecutor's speech, saying that "he summed us up [...] at the start of the speech, [...] that we're all the same as Fyodor Pavlovich" (Karamazov 723), he does not speak for the Russian people alone but for all of humankind. Fyodor is humankind's paterfamilias; its natural human with natural desires, corrupted by depravity; its Adam.

Justifying the Three Karamazov Brothers as a Representation of Humankind

If the Karamazov father represents an archetypal father figure, his children would, by deduction, represent the composition of humanity. As mentioned in the introduction (cf. p. 1), many scholars have already noted this connection and have attempted to analyze each of the three brothers as a part of the human psyche while still acknowledging their unity in what Yarmolinsky calls "the heritage of the Karamazovs" (385).

In an attempt to describe this heritage, V.V. Zenkovsky suggests that "the Karamazov family may be seen as a symbol of human life, of human vitality, and in particular, of human Eros, or 'sexual energy,' in all its manifestations" (ctd. in Terras 44). Within the novel itself, Dostoevsky tends to divide this Karamazovian temperament into two primary characteristics: sensuality and a love of life. Ernest Simmons notes how these two aspects of the Karamazovs seem to set the boundaries for their natures: "The

Karamazov taint is carnal sensuality, which in its less vicious manifestations Dostoevsky describes as a zest for living" (330). As a result, all three of the Karamazov brothers reflect these two poles of their character. The first of the two, sensuality, dominates Dmitri's behavior. He assaults his father and Snegiryov, professes love for both Katerina Ivanovna and Grushenka, and blindly follows his impulses in an attempt to gratify each of his carnal desires. His brother Ivan manages to suppress most of his sensual urges, but even his passions surface from time to time. Regardless of his efforts to stifle his emotions, he falls in love with Katerina Ivanovna; and near the end of the novel he seems to lose the power to restrain his passions, which leads to his animated outburst at his brother's trial.

Of the three brothers, Alyosha seems to be the least carnal. Throughout the majority of the novel, the youngest Karamazov searches for ways to actively love those around him, from family members to his brothers' lovers to those his family has abused. Nevertheless, Alyosha still shares in the sensuality that defines the Karamazov family, and acknowledges this fact in a conversation with Dmitri when he depicts Karamazovian sensuality as a ladder:

> I'm on the lowest [rung], and you [Dmitri] are above, somewhere on the thirteenth. That's how I see it, but it's all one and the same, all exactly the same sort of thing. Whoever steps on the lowest will surely step on the highest. (Karamazov 109)

The reader occasionally sees Alyosha step onto this ladder of sensuality. His interactions with Liza convey a present but muted sensual nature. "I wish you would always like me," he tells her, "but I don't know how to do it"; then, later in their conversation he

kisses her twice (218-22). Alyosha also mentions the "earthy force of the Karamazovs" that he also possesses, which leads to his confession, "maybe I don't even believe in God" (220). In this instance, Alyosha further notices the strain between the law of the individual that exalts his Karamazovian sensuality and the law of the ideal that clings to a belief in Christ, his love and his humility.

While his moments of sensuality are rare, Alyosha clearly and frequently evidences the love of life that makes up the Karamazovian heritage. The most famous example of Alyosha's exultation in his existence occurs outside the monastery after he has a vision of his recently deceased elder, Zosima. "Filled with rapture," Alyosha admires the night:

> Over him the heavenly dome, full of quiet, shining stars, hung boundlessly. From the zenith to the horizon the still-dim Milky Way stretched its double strand. Night, fresh and quiet, almost unstirring, enveloped the earth. The white towers and golden domes of the church gleamed in the sapphire sky. The luxuriant autumn flowers in the flowerbeds near the house had fallen asleep until morning. The silence of the earth seemed to merge with the silence of the heavens, the mystery of the earth and the mystery of the stars... (362)

As he contemplates this scene, the beauty of it overwhelms him; he throws himself to the ground and kisses it, "[vowing] ecstatically to love it" (362). Here, all of creation and thus all of life becomes the object of Alyosha's affection.

Earlier in the novel, Ivan also recognizes the Karamazovian "thirst for life" in himself (230). In a conversation with Alyosha, he declares that "the sticky little leaves that come out in the spring are dear to me, the blue sky is dear to me, some people are

dear to me" (230). Despite the fact that these affections defy logic—which is also dear to Ivan—he too is a Karamazov and wants to live "even if it be against logic" (230).

Ivan's elder brother Dmitri, however, rarely observes logic. He constantly defies rationality in his enjoyment of the pleasures of life; and his Karamazovian exuberance for existence presents itself with greater frequency and visibility than it does in his more cerebral sibling. One of the most striking instances in which Mitya expresses this love for life takes place after his arrest, when Alyosha comes to prison to visit him. In a moment of reverie, Dmitri exclaims, "You wouldn't believe, Alexei, how I want to live now, what thirst to exist and be conscious has been born in me precisely within these peeling walls!" (592). In other words, Dmitri's imprisonment has fostered within him an awareness of the love of life that exists in every true Karamazov.

What about Smerdyakov?

Along with the three legitimate Karamazov brothers, the novel also contains a potential fourth brother, the lackey Smerdyakov, who may have been fathered by Fyodor Pavlovich. If he is, in fact, of the Karamazovian line, he must also be considered part of Dostoevsky's symbolic representation of humankind through the Karamazov siblings; if not, his role in the brothers' portrayal of humanity remains precarious.

Scholars have not reached a consensus on the matter of his relationship to the Karamazov family. While Mochulsky includes Smerdyakov in his model, labeling him the "embodied temptation and personified sin" of the legitimate Karamazov brothers (598), Yarmolinsky leaves him out of his symbolic interpretation of the three brothers as representatives of the human psyche. In spite of this division among critics, a careful

analysis of the text in the context of Dostoevsky's canon and philosophy suggests that the author himself excludes Smerdyakov from sharing in the Karamazov family heritage. If Dostoevsky does, in fact, place Smerdyakov outside of the Karamazov family, he would also appear to exclude him from playing a part in Dostoevsky's characterization of humankind that includes Dmitri, Ivan and Alyosha Karamazov.

Upon a cursory reading, the text would not appear to support this conclusion. The novel's narrator mentions Smerdyakov's questionable parentage and the pervasive and convincing rumor that Fyodor Pavlovich slept with Smerdyakov's mother during one of his drunken nights. These hints nearly force the reader to believe that Smerdyakov is Fyodor's son. On the other hand, even though this rumor predominates public opinion and Fyodor has taken Smerdyakov into his home as a servant, the novel never refers to him as a Karamazov. Considering that Dostoevsky's characters usually speak without restraint, the fact that none of them—even Smerdyakov—ever attach him by name to the Karamazov family seems to imply that he should not be included in the family proper.

Along with Smerdyakov's exclusion from the Karamazov surname, he also lacks both characteristics that delineate the Karamazovian nature. As Peace notes, "he does not know the thirst for life; he does not know the torments of sensuality"; and this gives his character an un-Karamazovian "narrowness" (237). This narrowness evidences itself in Smerdyakov's conversation with Maria Kondratievna. After Smerdyakov plays the second verse of a song for her, she criticizes him for the lack of tenderness in his lyrics, to which he replies, "Consider for yourself: who on earth talks in rhymes? And if we all started talking in rhymes, even by order of the authorities, how much would get said, miss? Verse is no good, Maria Kondratievna" (Karamazov 224). His denouncement of

poetry implicitly disconnects Smerdyakov from the sensuality inherent in the other Karamazovs, who each use poetry to expound upon their emotional states. Mitya frequently cites Schiller during his confession to Alyosha; and Ivan also refers to the German romantic poet after confessing his love to Katerina Ivanovna, which causes Madame Khokhlakov to remark to Alyosha, "And [Ivan] recited that little German verse, just like you!" (195). According to Nina Perlina, the brothers' quotations of Schiller "reveal the character[s'] own world-view and [their] awareness" (42), which would attach each of them to the majestic sensuality of his poetry. Smerdyakov, on the other hand, only uses poetry to mock poetry because he lacks the Karamazovian carnality—an absence in his character that he further betrays by failing to respond to Maria's advances. She flirts with him shamelessly, praising his intellect and nobleness; yet her flattering words seem to have no effect on him. Instead, Smerdyakov continues to rant and philosophize, creating the impression that he is either oblivious to her desire for him or is not interested in her companionship.

In the midst of their interaction, Smerdyakov also vividly displays his lack of the other Karamazovian trait: a love of life. He laments his birth and declares, "I'd have let them kill me in the womb, so as not to come out into the world at all" (224). For Dostoevsky, this antipathy towards life denies one's humanity; it rejects "the gift of God given him once in all eternity" (Terras 75). To be truly human in Dostoevskian terms, one must embrace life. Those who intentionally end their lives, on the other hand, are subhuman and have committed an unpardonable sin. This idea of Dostoevsky evidences itself in his novel The Devils. After Stavrogin confesses to Bishop Tikhon that he sexually molested a twelve-year-old girl and subsequently chose not to stop her from

committing suicide, Tikhon suddenly cries, "you [Stavrogin] [...] have never been so near another and still greater crime as you are at this moment" (704). The "greater crime" Tikhon refers to occurs at the end of the novel when Stavrogin hangs himself. Until this point in the book, Stavrogin still has a chance to repent; the law of individuality has not completely destroyed the law of the ideal. In his confession to Bishop Tikhon, Stavrogin shows that he still contains elements of this second law. In the end, however, Stavrogin submits completely to the law of individuality and, by killing himself, commits a crime that Dostoevsky considers worse than taking advantage of a twelve-year-old girl sexually. Through suicide, he murders the law of the ideal and ceases to be human.

Smerdyakov also commits suicide; but, unlike Stavrogin, he never evidences a love of life or a desire to love life. Instead, he emanates contempt for others and himself, utterly rejecting the law of the ideal throughout the novel and, as a result, never resembles what Dostoevsky considers to be human. Perhaps the author betrays this disposition when he records Grigory in a fit of anger telling Smerdyakov, "You are not a human being, you were begotten of bathhouse slime" (Karamazov 124). Edward Wasiolek even notes that "there is some evidence that Smerdyakov and the Devil are one," citing Smerdyakov's ghastly appearance in his last meeting with Ivan and the fact that Smerdyakov's death coincides chronologically with the appearance of Ivan's devil (176). Regardless of whether or not one finds this argument convincing, its existence and plausibility further indicates that Smerdyakov defies the novel's definition of a human being and, therefore, does not appear to be a legitimate part of Dostoevsky's representation of humanity through the Karamazov brothers. As a result, the three

legitimate Karamazov brothers can be interpreted as Dostoevsky's symbolic rendering of the psyche without including Smerdyakov as a fourth aspect of his psychological model.

Chapter 2: A Psychoanalytic Reading of the Karamazov Brothers as a Pre-Freudian Representation of Freud's Tripartite Model

If the three Karamazov brothers are, as argued in the previous chapter, a representation of the human psyche, how should one analyze their symbolic or analogical significance? Most critics have utilized a combination of new criticism and historicism, attempting to describe the brothers' representative relationship to the psyche based on a close reading of the text and Dostoevsky's cultural milieu. While this approach has its merits, it fails to take advantage of modern advances in psychology—from the childhood development of the human brain to the psychological implementation of gender roles to the relationship between writing and psychological processes—that can aid scholars in dissecting and understanding the psychological inner workings of literature.

The reluctance among critics to use these tools—commonly referred to under the broad category of psychoanalytic criticism—might stem from an overuse of what scholars now label "Vulgar Freudianism." This particular approach accepts Freud's assumption that human behavior is primarily influenced by sexual desire; consequently, every round, concave image becomes a yonic symbol and every long, round or pointed object represents the phallus. Often, an entire piece of literature is reduced to an outpouring of the author's libidinal desires (Bressler 134-35).

Not all Freudian criticism, however, focuses solely on the repressed sexuality in literature. Even Freud himself, in his well-known article "Dostoevsky and Parricide," uses his concept of the Oedipal complex to analyze the Karamazov brothers' desire for their father's death while he simultaneously attaches that desire to Dostoevsky and, implicitly, to all humankind. Although Freud's article has been the recipient of severe

criticism, it retains a quasi-classical status in the world of literary criticism: most Dostoevsky scholars allude to it; many concede that it examines and expounds upon the novel's central theme of parricide; and it continues to be published in anthologies of critical essays (Terras 82; Jones 171-72; Freud, "Dostoevsky" 98-111). Other scholars in the latter part of the twentieth century have also utilized Freudian theories in reading The Brothers Karamazov. Harry Slochower, for example, interprets Dmitri's relationship with Katerina Ivanovna as a manifestation of Mitya's unconscious incestuous desires for his mother. According to Slochower, Katerina serves as a "latent incest-figure" for Mitya, "substituted [...] for his mother" (Terras 82).

Along with incorporating Freud's theories of human sexuality into literary analysis, critics have employed other aspects of Freudian psychology to supplement their understanding of literary works. While some scholars, such as Norman Holland, Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari have combined the basics of Freudian psychoanalysis with other forms of criticism, perhaps the most famous adapter of Freud is the French critic, Jacques Lacan. Relying heavily on Freudian ideas of the unconscious motivation of human behavior, the mother-child relationship, and the castration complex, as well as poststructuralist ideas of language, Lacan depicts the unconscious psyche as resembling a linguistic system: both can be systematically analyzed and both are fragmented and incomplete (Bressler 129-31).

Lacan also creates a tripartite model of the psyche—the Imaginary, Symbolic and Real Orders—which contain similarities to the content and interrelational nature of Freud's tripartite model (129). Prior to Lacan, other critics also found Freud's three-part model of the psyche to be helpful in the interpretive process. As mentioned in the

introduction, Henry A. Murray employed Freud's tripartite model to analyze character relationships in Moby Dick. Although his article delves into psychobiography (another critical form disavowed by most contemporary scholars), his theory that Ahab represents the relentless strivings of the id, the whale serves as the inescapable conscience or superego, and the first mate Starbuck "stands for the rational realistic Ego, which is overpowered by the fanatical compulsiveness of the Id" (31) still retains merit as an analysis of the symbolic representation of the psyche in literature; it illustrates how the personification of the psyche in literature allows the reader to gain a better understanding of his/her own psychological dynamics.

This chapter will include a methodology similar to Murray's. It will utilize Freud's tripartite model to compare the three brothers to the id, ego and superego in an attempt to gain a better understanding of how the brothers function as a model of human psychological processes, shedding light on Dostoevsky's concept of the psyche and, hopefully, uncovering aspects of "the mystery of man" he sought to investigate in his writings.

Freud's Tripartite Model

In Freud's tripartite model, the first section, the id, "contains the passions" (Ego 25). According to Freud, this portion of the psyche resides in the human unconscious—an area of the psyche that can never be perceived by the conscious mind. The id is governed by the pleasure principle, which Freud describes in "Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning" as "processes [that] strive towards gaining pleasure" and "draw back from any event which might arouse unpleasure" (219). In this pursuit of

pleasure, the id relies primarily on instincts to achieve its goal—instincts which often involve the libido's sexual desires, which the id perceives as "needs" (Ego 29). Freud observes that these instincts "fill [the id] with energy, but it has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle" ("Anatomy"). Consequently, the id lacks logic and will even exhibit contradictory impulses simultaneously in its efforts to obtain pleasure ("Anatomy").

Freud also defines the id as being all that "the ego"—the second part of his model—"is not" ("Anatomy"). Representing "reason and common sense" (Ego 25), the ego operates on the reality principle; it "strive[s] for what is *useful* and guard[s] itself against damage" ("Formulations" 223). The ego's reliance on the reality principle does not mean, however, that it strives to abstain from pleasure. On the contrary, as Freud notes, it strives to "choose the line of greatest advantage instead of yielding in the direction of least resistance" (223). Tenable pleasure is the ego's ultimate aim. To serve in this capacity, the ego must perceive reality and is therefore partially within the realm of the conscious that can be readily accessed by the mind. As it functions, it "acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world" by satisfying the id and remaining in reality simultaneously (Outline 2). Since not all of the id's impulses can be satisfied within the confines of the real world, the ego takes some of the id's desires and sublimates them by transferring them onto itself. Through this process, the ego "is forcing itself [...] upon the id as a love-object and is trying make good the id's loss by saying: 'Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object'" (Ego 30). When the ego

succeeds in this task, it placates the id, achieves the pleasure it and the id desire, and enables the psyche to accept reality as it is. When it fails, neuroses develop.



Figure 1: Freud's Tripartite Model

Along with the ego and id, Freud also includes the superego in his tripartite model. Like the id, the superego primarily operates in the realm of the unconscious; though some of it does enter into the conscious portion of the psyche. In all other respects, however, the superego serves as the antithesis of the id. While the id strives to fulfill its instinctual impulses, the superego provides "an energetic reaction-formation" to the id "in the form of conscience or perhaps an unconscious sense of guilt" (Ego 34-35). In this sense, the superego "exercise[s] [...] moral censorship" and is both "the representative of our relationship to our parents," which is the source of the psyche's over-idealistic standards, and "the germ from which all religions have evolved [...] produc[ing] the religious sense of humility to which the believer appeals in his longing" (36-37). In a balanced psyche, the superego aids the ego in enforcing the reality principle upon the id, helping the psyche obtain a greater amount of pleasure. On the other hand, because the superego strives for unattainable moral and religious perfection, an overactive superego can lead to illness and/or crime in an attempt to subdue its strong feelings of guilt (50-52), while the

passivity of a relatively inactive superego allows the id's impulsivity to dominate the psyche. Both types of imbalanced superegos stymie the psyche's quest for pleasure.

In most cases, "the ego submits to the categorical imperative of its superego" (48). To achieve optimal pleasure, the ego must therefore attempt to "satisf[y] simultaneously the demands of the id, of the super-ego and of reality" (Outline 3). Unfortunately, Freud concedes, the ego cannot always maintain this harmony. In its efforts to appease the id's unattainable desires and conform with reality, the ego may curtail the id's "aggressiveness towards the exterior" (Ego 54)—its ceaseless yearning to gratify its carnal urges. As a result, the ego will often unwittingly translate the id's exterior aggressiveness onto the superego which, in turn, transforms the id's aggressive energy into "super-moral" interior scrutiny that can lead to guilt complexes (54). Alternately, the ego can stifle the superego and succumb to the impulses of the libidinal id, resulting in detachment from reality, delusion and/or hysteria. Often, the ego is trapped between these two extremes, "defend[ing] itself vainly [...] against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the punishing conscience" which results in "interminable self-torment" as it struggles to maintain the precarious balance within the psyche that is essential for its ultimate pleasure (53-54).

Although Freud divides his model into three designated parts, he acknowledges the artificiality of these divisions, admitting that "the extent of these differentiations varies very greatly from person to person" ("Anatomy"). In fact, in his own diagrams, Freud illustrates the overlapping within his tripartite model (see fig. 1). The ego, despite its dissimilar functions, is described as "part of the id" and the superego as "a differentiation within the ego" and therefore part of the id as well (Ego 24, 28). This

interconnectedness of the psyche allows for the superego to "act as a representative" for its antithesis, the id, to the ego because the superego "is always close to the id" and "reaches deep down into [it]" (48-49). Based on this reasoning, Freud recommends his model as a theoretical outline of the psyche while simultaneously warning his readers that "after we have made our separations, we must allow what we have separated to merge again" ("Anatomy").

The Brothers Karamazov and Freud's Tripartite Model: Dmitri and the Id

Before allowing the Karamazov brothers to merge into a composite picture of Freud's tripartite model of the psyche, they must be analyzed individually to determine what characteristics each of them share with their corresponding part of Freud's diagram. The eldest brother, Dmitri (Mitya), seems to bear the closest resemblance to his analogous part of Freud's model: the id. From Dostoevsky's first physical description of Mitya, the author's words connect his character with Freud's concept of the id developed years later. Dostoevsky writes: "Even when he [Dmitri] was excited and talking irritably, his look, as it were, did not obey his inner mood but expressed something else, sometimes not at all corresponding to the present moment" (Karamazov 67). This rift between his thoughts and expressions reflects the status of the id, where "contradictory impulses exist side by side without neutralizing each other or drawing apart" ("Anatomy"). It is this id-like ability that leads the prosecutor Ippolit Kirillovich to describe Dmitri as "broad [...] capable of containing all possible opposites [...] at once" (Karamazov 699), depicting him as what Terras labels "the very image of disorder" (45).

Mitya's lack of internal organization partly stems from his reliance on his passions—an element that also serves as Freud's defining characteristic of the id (Ego 25). "In all his [(Dmitri's)] undertakings," Dostoevsky's narrator notes, "he gave himself passionately to every new idea" (Karamazov 383). This internal passion drives him to run to Samsanov and to try to borrow money to fund his flight from town with Grushenka; it compels him to blindly follow Samsanov's advice and seek the needed money from Gorstkin; and after he learns that Grushenka's "former, indisputable one" has come back for her, it sends him to the inn in Mokroye to pay his respects to her lover and deliver his last farewell to his beloved before he kills himself. His decision to go to Mokroye in particular evidences the lack of logic and the predominance of passion in Dmitri that also typifies the id's behavior; it was made, according to the narrator, "without reasoning, in an instant, [it] had been felt at once and accepted as a whole with all its consequences" (410).

Along with his passions, many of Dmitri's actions also involve sexual impulses. Like the id, Dmitri often "feels erotic trends as needs" (Ego 29) and allows what he labels his "insect sensuality" (Karamazov 109)—which resembles the id's libido—to govern him. In his confession to his brother Alyosha, Mitya cites a specific instance in which his sexual impulses dictate his behavior:

> Once there was a picnic for the whole town; we went in seven troikas; in the darkness, in winter, in the sleigh, I began squeezing a girl's hand, the girl who was next to me, and forced her to kiss me—an official's daughter, a poor, nice, meek, submissive girl. She let me, she let me do a lot in the darkness. She thought, the poor dear, that I would come the next day and propose [...]; but after

that I didn't say a word to her for five months [...] This game only amused my insect sensuality, which I was nurturing in myself. (109)

Dmitri's recollection of this sexual escapade establishes a potential framework for explaining his behavior towards women throughout the rest of the novel. As he frantically tries to maintain his standing before his two love interests, Katerina Ivanovna and Grushenka, on the supposed basis of "honor," Mitya could also be under the influence of his unconscious, passionate sexual drive which, like the id, can strive to achieve its erotic desires unbeknownst to the conscious portion of the mind. In fact, this submerged sexual tension could be the reason behind Dmitri's division of the three-thousand rubles he took from Katerina: by splitting the money in half under the pretext of honor, he may actually be trying to preserve the potential of future sexual relationships with both women.

Regardless of the validity of this hypothesis, Dmitri clearly remains under the influence of his sexual drive and his passions, which often causes him to act impulsively. As previously mentioned, Mitya regularly obeys his whims, choosing to neglect reason. In some cases, however, the eldest Karamazov brother acts on whims that reside beneath his conscious perception. He cannot, for example, explain why he picked up the brass pestle as he left Fenya's place; when asked for the "purpose" behind this action by the district attorney Nikolai Parfenovich, he replies, "What purpose? No purpose! I just grabbed it and ran" (470). He gives a similar response when the prosecutor questions his motives for jumping down to Grigory after he struck his father's servant with the pestle: "Ah, the devil...I jumped down to the stricken man...I don't know why!" (477). In each of these instances, Mitya does not appear to choose his behavior; his behavior chooses

him. This aspect of his character provides support for Ernest Simmons observation that "Dmitri acts on instinct" (335)—yet another characteristic that the eldest of the three brothers shares with the id (Ego 25).

By operating from a combination of passion, instinct and sexual energy, Dmitri resembles what Peace calls "the savage": a man full of "primitive emotion" (256) that creates an interior world Erik Krag describes as "chaos" (269). "There is no order in me," Dmitri laments, "no higher order" (Karamazov 405). Like the id, Mitya Karamazov "has no organization and no unified will, only an impulsion to obtain satisfaction for the instinctual needs, in accordance with the pleasure-principle" ("Anatomy").

As a result, Dmitri often incarnates a representation of the frustrated id. As Malcom Jones observes, "the essentially physical Dmitri knows only too well that unbridled physical appetite leads to disorder" that renders him "helpless" (186). Overwhelmed by the "contradictory impulses [that] exist side by side without neutralizing each other or drawing apart" as they do in the id ("Anatomy"), Dmitri bemoans his frustration to Alyosha in one of the most famous passages in the novel:

> [...] here God gave us only riddles. Here the shores converge, here all contradictions live together. [...] I can't bear it that some man, even with a lofty heart and the highest mind, should start from the ideal of the Madonna and end with the ideal of Sodom. It's even more fearful when someone who already has the ideal of Sodom in his soul does not deny the ideal of the Madonna either, and his heart burns with it [...]. Here the devil is struggling with God, and the battlefield is the human heart. (Karamazov 108)

This image of two conflicting, contradictory impulses—God and the devil, the Madonna and Sodom—characterize the confusing, complex, illogical workings of Dmitri and the id, both of which act on passion and/or instinct and contain a large quantity of sexual energy.

The Brothers Karamazov and Freud's Tripartite Model: Ivan and the Superego

While passions and instinctual drives guide Dmitri's actions, his brother Ivan's cerebral, introspective character often mirrors the behavior of Freud's superego. This portion of Freud's model, "in the form of conscience, [...] exercise[s] moral censorship" (Ego 37). Consequently, the superego concerns itself primarily with monitoring behavior and reproving immoral actions for what it perceives to be the benefit of the whole. Ivan Karamazov shares these concerns. In his initial words on Ivan's character, the narrator refers to the middle Karamazov brother as "prudent"; and throughout the novel Ivan maintains what Roger Anderson describes as "an image of intelligence and propriety" (154). Along with his upright behavior, his brother Alyosha and Katerina Ivanovna both note Ivan's "deep conscience" (Karamazov 655, 690)—a conscience that Yarmolinksy observes is "more exacting [...] than he [Ivan] knows" (386). This hyperactive moral monitor creates within Ivan a desire for justice that Robin Feuer Miller depicts as "a hopeless, passionate desire for justice [...] here on earth, and now" (37). F.F. Seeley echoes Miller's argument, asserting that "Ivan's clamor is for justice, without which his life will not be worth living" (118). In his conversation with Alyosha, Ivan exemplifies Seeley's thesis when he rejects God's created world because of its injustice. After voicing his disgust at the suffering of innocent children, Ivan says, "I need retribution,

otherwise I will destroy myself" (Karamazov 244). The type of justice Ivan desires surfaces through the words of his poem, "The Grand Inquisitor." According to Dostoevsky, the poem's title character shares Ivan's views (qtd. in Yarmolinsky 394); he strives to meet humankind's desire to have "someone to take over [its] conscience" and fulfill the "great need of mankind for universal and general union" (Karamazov 257). In other words, like the superego, he seeks the pleasure of the psyche; but Ivan's desire is universal in scale. To achieve his goal, Ivan's Inquisitor has organized the Catholic Church in an attempt to give humankind something "to bow down before that [...] is indisputable, so indisputable that all men at once would agree to the universal worship of it" (254), which would, theoretically, unite humanity under one system of theology and morality. This idea exemplifies the characteristic of the superego Freud describes as "super-moral" (Ego 54). No longer satisfied with the morality of the real world, the superego will seek to recreate a more pleasurable model of the world with the moral perfection it desires.

Unfortunately for Ivan (and overactive superegos), this level of moral flawlessness cannot be attained. Thus, instead of striving for the universal implementation of his principles, Ivan works for moral sanctity in his immediate sphere of influence. As previously noted, this desire evidences itself in his behavior. Seeley notes one aspect of this manifestation: "a 'repressed' sense of humor" that surfaces later in the form of Ivan's devil (117). Although Ivan occasionally exhibits a comic side—his response ("Literary theft!") to Alyosha's kiss at the end of his "Grand Inquisitor" poem; his quoting of Schiller after confessing his love to Katerina Ivanovna, to name a few—he appears severe and somber in most of his interactions with others. And even when the

middle Karamazov brother does use humor, he usually seems to employ it as a tool to further a more serious cause. For example, when Ivan jokingly asks Alyosha, "do you consider me capable [...] of killing [our father]?" Alyosha realizes that "his brother had stepped a step towards him, and that he must have done so for some reason, with some purpose in mind" (143). In this instance, Ivan has subtly stepped towards Alyosha to test his younger brother's capacity for his "super-moral" vision. Through this slightly morbid joke, Ivan learns that Alyosha respects him and will not label him heartless and cruel when his Grand Inquisitor decides to kill Christ again for the benefit of humankind.

Along with keeping his humor in check, Ivan's self-restraint also involves a repression of his impulses. Unlike his id-like brother Dmitri who chases after his passions, Ivan suppresses his carnal urges. When he "suddenly felt an insistent and unbearable urge to [...] go out to the servants' cottage, and give Smerdyakov a beating" (275), he refuses to succumb to this feeling. His capacity for self-control continues to pervade his character throughout the rest of the novel, causing him to thoroughly investigate his role in planning his father's murder in spite of his feelings of fear and to resist believing in the reality of his "devil" until he finally loses control of his faculties at Dmitri's trial.

Not only does Ivan subdue his own longing to give into his desires; he also attempts to restrain the impulses of others, particularly the passionate urges of his father and elder brother. His relationship with Mitya, in fact, resembles the correspondence between the id and superego. Dmitri, like the former, is always seeking pleasure while Ivan, acting as Dmitri's superego, attempts to keep his brother from illicit behaviors. Ivan tries desperately to stop Mitya's violent assault on their father, struggling to keep the

two apart, then pulling Dmitri away from Fyodor's battered body, exclaiming, "Madman, you've killed him!" (139). After this scene, Ivan's comment, "Viper will eat viper, and it would serve them both right!" (141), expresses his disgust at the immorality of both his father and brother. Although he, like a good superego, "will not allow a murder to be committed" (141), Ivan still despises Mitya's conduct just as the superego disdains the immoral desires of the id.

In spite of Ivan's opposition to Dmitri's carnality, Mochulsky asserts that the two brothers are "joined [...] by blood, by their common hatred for their father and their common guilt" (599). This connection between the two Karamazovs resembles another aspect of the id-superego relationship in the psyche, in which "the superego is always close to the id and can act as its representative" (Ego 48-49). While the id and the superego will usually strive for antithetical goals, occasionally each of the two will manifest the other's characteristics and even collaborate with one another when they believe that their combined effort will achieve greater pleasure for the psyche. As previously cited by Mochulsky, Ivan and Mitya reveal a similar sort of interconnectedness when the former defies his usual self-restraint and refers to his father and Mitya as vipers; and Dmitri also mirrors Ivan's "deep conscience" when he declares to Alyosha that "everyone is guilty for everyone" (Karamazov 591). Not only do Ivan and Mitya intermittently exhibit the other's behavioral patterns, but, like the superego, Ivan also sometimes serves as a "representative" for the desires of his id-like older brother. Towards the end of the novel, Ivan plans for Dmitri's escape from his upcoming exile—a plan that will allow Dmitri to satisfy his libidinal desires by fleeing to America with Grushenka. Ivan has realized the intensity of his older brother's sexual need.

Without Grushenka by his side, Dmitri fears that he "really can't live" and will "take the sledgehammer" he receives to work in the prison mines of Siberia and "smash [his] own head with it!" (595). In light of this possible outcome of Mitya's exile, Ivan chooses to act on his passionate brother's behalf, serving as a prime example of the superego's occasional supplication for the id when it perceives its supplication will benefit the psyche.

Along with Ivan's adherence to morality and his relationship with Dmitri, the middle Karamazov brother also resembles the superego through his relationship to his parent, Fyodor Pavlovich. In Freud's model, the superego serves as "the representative of our relation to our parents" (Ego 36). The typical superego also views the parent as an ideal person who is "admired" and "feared"; thus the superego strives to incorporate parental ideas, effectively taking the parent's nature into itself (36). Unfortunately for Ivan, his own father did not establish a behavioral model that his middle child could label ideal. As Geoffrey Carter observes, "Ivan yearns to regress to an unquestioning dependence on loving, but stern, parents," but has only the example of his depraved father, whose life embodies and possibly inspires Ivan's theory that "all is permitted" (22).

In his response to this ideological conflict, Ivan once again reacts in a way that mirrors the behavior of the superego. Unlike the id, which externalizes its frustrations through passionate impulses, Ivan functions like the superego and translates his angst into "self-judgment" (Ego 37). This self-critiquing begins when he dubs his mysterious act of listening to his father's movements downstairs on the night before his father's murder as "the basest action of his whole life" even though his behavior did not stem from any

conscious malicious intent (Karamazov 276). Jackson suggests that this and other instances of Ivan's self-directed condemnation result from "his need for retribution" (326). In a world where his father's example of "all is permitted" prevails, Ivan cannot attain the justice he desires and therefore "take[s] upon him[self] the guilt [of the world] and, through self-annihilation, [attempts to] reestablish the missing equilibrium" (326).

Ivan cannot, however, bear this guilt. Instead, he follows another behavioral trend of the superego: his aggressive guilt-feelings "lead to illness" (Outline 7). What begins as a feverish condition elevates to delusional schizophrenia that leads to a coma which Ivan remains in through the end of the novel. Mochulsky connects Ivan's schizophrenic state to his self-condemnation (608); and on the basis of Ivan's argument with his "devil," his theory appears to be accurate. Ivan does not label his apparition a liar or a demon, but refers to him as "everything in my nature that is stupid, long outlived, mulled over in my mind, [and] flung away like carrion" (Karamazov 648). His devil represents everything he despises about himself—a side of his character that Mikhail Bakhtin aptly describes in his definitive work on Dostoevsky, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics:

> All the loopholes in Ivan's thoughts, all his sideward glances at another's words and another's consciousness, all his attempts to get around the other's words and to replace them in his soul with an affirmation of his own self, all the reservations of his conscience that serve to interrupt his every thought, his every word and experience, condense and thicken here into the completed replies of the devil. (222)

Not only does Ivan's internalized guilt lead to his schizophrenia; it also compels him to believe that he is guilty of his father's murder. Freud notes that such a high level of guilt "can turn people into criminals" because they seem to find it "a relief to be able to fashion this unconscious sense of guilt on to something real and immediate" (Ego 52). Like an overactive superego, Ivan desires a tangible object for his guilt. By claiming an active role in planning the murder of his father, he achieves this goal.

Unfortunately, by this point in the novel, Ivan's guilt complex is too advanced to be placated by using his confession as an object of its catharsis. Instead, Ivan incarnates the fate of an unrestrained superego and dissolves into a feverish state of unconsciousness.

The Brothers Karamazov and Freud's Tripartite Model: Alyosha and the Ego

Ivan's psychological collapse partially stems from the failure of his brother Alyosha—who represents the ego of the Karamazov trio—to quell his older brother's moral and spiritual frustrations. Both Ivan and Mitya turn to their younger brother, hoping that he will help them resolve their crises; but, like the ego, Alyosha finds himself "owing service to three masters and consequently menaced by three dangers" (Ego 56): the external world, the id-like Dmitri and the super-morality of Ivan, which resembles the super-morality of the superego.

In his efforts to handle these three conflicting elements, Alyosha utilizes one of the ego's primary tools: reason ("Anatomy"). Dostoevsky's narrator emphasizes these traits in the youngest Karamazov, stating that "this young man, Alyosha, was not at all a fanatic, and, in my view at least, even not at all a mystic" (Karamazov 18). According to

the narrator, Alyosha does not enter the monastery with irrational, ethereal motives, but "because it alone struck him at the time and presented him, so to speak, with an ideal way out for his soul struggling from the darkness of worldly wickedness towards the light of love" (18). In other words, Alyosha grounds his decision to become a monk on a rational premise: he desires to improve morally and reasons that of all his options the monastic life will be the most beneficial to his ethical formation.

After he joins the monastery, Alyosha maintains his rational mindset and employs it in his interactions with others, even when discussing spiritual matters. His response to Ivan's Grand Inquisitor serves as a prime example of this rational behavior. Instead of telling Ivan to pray or have more faith, Alyosha engages in his brother's poem by questioning its plausibility, arguing that the Inquisitor's notion of freedom is "a far cry from the Orthodox idea" and that "there could not even possibly be such a fantastic person as your inquisitor" (260). He reasons that Ivan's vision of utopia on earth is un-Christian and pragmatically impossible.

In this instance, Alyosha evidences his adherence to perceived reality. Like the ego, he is "a realist" (25) who abides by the reality principle. He enters into his monastic training with a desire to better understand the world, "demanding the truth, seeking it and believing in it" (26) and is seen as a vessel of truth by the other characters (146, 612). To Alyosha and the other characters in The Brothers Karamazov, the "truth" he seeks and represents is intimately related to a knowledge of reality that transcends his perspective and ascertains at least a portion of what they consider to be truly real. In his quest to perceive and understand reality, Alyosha does not succumb to its negative, darker aspects. He "strive[s] for what is *useful* and guard[s] [him]self against damage"

("Formulations" 223), embodying the reality principle that governs the ego. Through this process, Alyosha achieves a sense of balance described by Simmons: "he understands the tempestuous passions around him, but his virginal soul is unscorched by their hot flame" (333).

Alyosha also seeks to share this balance with others through active love. His loving actions primarily consist of what Miller calls "plagiarism" (25). Though the term connotes the inappropriate duplicating of others' words or thoughts, Miller's use of the word in reference to Alyosha signifies "his ability to give back to others what they have given him—what they, unknowingly, already possess" (70). This skill, according to Miller, is "Alyosha's greatest gift as a 'good man'" (70). It also mirrors the ego's sublimation of the id's desires, in which the former takes the latter's wants into itself, placating the id and obtaining greater pleasure for the psyche by making itself the object of the id's affection (Ego 30). As Terras notes, "tact is a paramount trait of Alyosha's" (177); and Alyosha uses it in an effort to transform the desires of others that he deems inappropriate and/or unrealizable into something resembling his own desires. One can see this tactic at work in his conversation with Lise about Captain Snegiryov's refusal of Katerina Ivanovna's money. At first, Lise is upset that Alyosha failed to give Snegiryov the money and allowed the captain to run off, but Alyosha insists that "it's better that I didn't run after him" (Karamazov 215). When Lise objects, Alyosha launches into his explanation:

> [...] if [Snegiryov] had taken the money instead of trampling on it, he'd have gone home, and within an hour he'd have been weeping over his humiliation [...] But now he's gone off feeling terribly proud and triumphant, though he knows

that he's "ruined himself." And so nothing could be easier now than to get him to accept these same two hundred roubles, maybe even tomorrow, because he has already proved his honor, thrown down the money, trampled on it... (216)

His words convince Lise. "Ah, it's true," she says. "I suddenly understand it so terribly well!" (216). His reasoning—like that of the ego—transforms a failure into a triumph; it takes the reality of the situation and reconciles it with his own feelings of guilt and his unmet desire to give Snegiryov the money, appeasing all three realms—id, superego, and reality—with the well-reasoned promise of future consolation.

Alyosha attempts to use similar tactics in his interactions with his brothers. With his id-like brother, Dmitri, he serves as his "judge" (105, 593). Dmitri acknowledges that Alyosha is "someone higher," a figure of authority, and trusts him to act as an arbiter in both his affairs with Katerina Ivanovna and, later in the novel, his escape from exile. In the first situation, Alyosha flounders; he gives his brother a truism—"I believe God will arrange it as he knows best, so that there will be no horror" (122)—which fails to quell Mitya's increasing urge to kill his father. By the end of the novel, however, Alyosha has learned from his mistakes. As the ego grows in its ability to manage the id for the greater good of the psyche, Alyosha has also improved in relating to Dmitri. He knows that his older brother is "not ready" for the suffering of exile in the prison camps of Siberia and tells him "such a cross is not for you" (763).

Dmitri accepts Alyosha's judgment because he views him as "someone higher." However, as previously noted (cf. pp. 8-9), Alyosha also possesses the Karamazov sensuality that dominates his eldest brother. His attraction to Lise and his near-liaison with Grushenka display his latent sensuality, providing evidence for his claim that he is

just like Mitya. In this aspect of his character, Alyosha once again resembles the ego which "is not sharply separated from the id; its lower portion merges into it" (Ego 24).

Similarly, Alyosha and Ivan, as ego and superego, also share characteristics. Alyosha still serves as Ivan's "judge": he listens to his brother's poem, "The Grand Inquisitor," and, as Terras observes, uses "a few simple words to tear through the web of Ivan's self-deception" (95), citing Alyosha's line, "Your Inquisitor doesn't believe in God, that's his whole secret!" (Karamazov 261) as an example. Later in the novel, Alyosha again tries to derail Ivan's self-imposed guilt concerning their father's murder, saying, "You've accused yourself and confessed to yourself that you and you alone are the murderer. But it was not you who killed him, you are mistaken, the murderer was not you, do you hear, it was not you!" (601-02). Through his words, Alyosha tries to get Ivan to adhere to the reality principle by making what Miller terms "a firm distinction between desiring and enacting murder" (118).

On the other hand, Alyosha also berates himself for his own inappropriate thoughts. When he tries to determine whether or not Katerina Ivanovna loves either of his brothers, "he reproache[s] himself" (Karamazov 187) and later rebukes himself for his attempt to offer Snegiryov Katerina's two hundred roubles (215) even though his behavior in the situation was kind and generous. Not only does Alyosha share this trait with Ivan; he also occasionally exhibits his brother's intense desire for moral justice—an aspect of his personality that surfaces after Ivan describes a general who commands attack dogs to kill a boy in front of his mother. "Well…what to do with him?" Ivan asks his brother. "Shoot him? Shoot him for our moral satisfaction? Speak, Alyoshka!"

"Shoot him!" Alyosha replies, "looking up at his brother with a sort of pale, twisted smile" (243). This disturbing moment—along with Alyosha's self-critiques—shows that he and Ivan, like the ego and superego, cannot be neatly separated and categorized (Ego 36).

Benefits of Interpreting the Karamazov Brothers as a Representation of Freud's Tripartite Model

In viewing the three brothers as a symbolic picture of the psyche akin to Freud's model, the reasons behind their behavior towards and interconnectedness with one another seems markedly clearer. Like the id and superego, Ivan and Dmitri need Alyosha, the ego, to remain healthy and stable and to achieve maximum pleasure. As Dmitri struggles with his passions for Grushenka, contemplating parricide, and Ivan wrestles with questions of universal morality and justice, Peace asserts that "both brothers need Aloysha's help"; but "both turn away from him" (227). In actuality, as Peace later notes, Alyosha also abandons his brothers: he "returns to the monastery [...] for Ivan has deeply disturbed him with his 'Rebellion' and his 'Legend of the Grand Inquisitor'" (248). At this point in the novel, Alyosha has lost track of Dmitri, is overwhelmed by Ivan's questions and worried about the potential for conflict within his household. The id and superego both frustrate the young ego who retreats from each of them, mirroring the behavior of the ego in Freud's model when it comes in contact with "obsessional neurosis": the id transforms the object of its desire—which has been sublimated into the ego—into an outlet for its aggression. Meanwhile "the superego [...]

behaves as if the ego were responsible," rebuking the ego for the id's aggressive impulses (Ego 53). As a result, the ego responds:

> Helpless in both directions, the ego defends itself vainly, alike against the instigations of the murderous id and against the reproaches of the punishing conscience [...] the first outcome is interminable self-torment. (53-54)

Alyosha also defends himself vainly; his return to the monastery occurs just prior to his elder Zosima's tragic death. As Zosima's body decays during his memorial service instead of producing the pleasant aroma associated with the dead bodies of especially saintly people in the Orthodox Church, his opponents begin to denounce him. Reality has joined the id and superego in tormenting the Karamazov ego, resulting in a crisis of faith and identity within Alyosha. By the time he reaches a resolution to his personal dilemma, Ivan has left for Moscow, which leads to Mitya's near-murdering of his father. Alyosha's absence, in other words, produces the conditions essential to the occurrence of the family catastrophe that consumes the second half of the novel, much as the collapse of the ego causes the disintegration of the psyche.

This series of events serves as a particular example of how reading the three Karamazov brothers as representatives of Freud's tripartite model can provide meaningful insights into and a better understanding of the dynamics of the brothers' symbolic presentation of the psyche. Freud's three-part model provides a cohesive system in which each portion of the psyche maintains its particularities while still remaining mysteriously connected to one another. This allows for the previously noted manifestation of Dmitri's carnal, id-like traits in Ivan and Alyosha, the superego's moral concerns plaguing Alyosha and Dmitri, and Dmitri and Ivan both desiring and striving for

the balance they perceive in Alyosha. Freud has indeed developed a model in which Dostoevsky's "separated" representations of components of the psyche can "merge again" ("Anatomy"), creating an image of the psyche that blends particularity and complexity. In light of this compatibility between Dostoevsky's Karamazov brothers and Freud's tripartite model, Louis Breger's suggestion that "the insights [...] found in [Dostoevsky's] novels parallel those in Freud" (7) appears to have some validity.

Disadvantages of Interpreting the Karamazov Brothers as Representatives of Freud's Tripartite Model

On the other hand, some aspects of Freud's model fail to account for certain aspects of the Karamazov brothers' representation of the psyche. Dmitri, whose passions and sensuality mirror the impulses of the id, is far too complex to be reduced to a bundle of libidinal desires. Some of his passions contain sentiments of nobility foreign to the id of Freud's model. Dmitri's dream of "the wee one" exhibits this distinction between himself and the id by describing his inward state:

> [He] feels a tenderness such as he has never known before surging up in his heart, he wants to weep, he wants to do something for them all, so that the wee one will no longer cry, so that the blackened, dried-up mother of the wee one will not cry either, so that there will be no more tears in anyone from that moment on[.] (Karamazov 508)

This impulse to aid these imagined peasants could not have originated in the id as defined by Freud; nor could Dmitri's desire voiced moments later, when he declares to his interrogators, "I want to suffer and be purified by suffering!" (509). These sentiments

have no place in the id, where "the pleasure principle [...] reigns unrestrictedly" (Ego 25).

His brother Alyosha also fails to measure up to the ego's reality principle, which always "strive[s] for what is *useful* and guard[s] itself against damage" ("Formulations" 223). Alyosha, on the other hand, "want[s] to suffer"; he actively requests to share in Ivan's questioning of how a loving God can allow children to suffer, even though he realizes that continuing the conversation will result in his own psychological pain (Karamazov 242). After this damaging event, Alyosha's behavior defies the characterization of the ego once again. Instead of handling Ivan's doubt and Zosima's death with the ego's primary tools, "reason and common sense" (Ego 25), Alyosha overcomes these psychological obstacles through a mystical experience. Freud acknowledges that "certain practices of mystics may succeed in upsetting the normal relations between the different regions of the mind, so that, for example, the perceptual system becomes able to grasp relations in the deeper layers of the ego and in the id which would otherwise be inaccessible to it" ("Anatomy"); but this type of experience does not stem from the ego, which is supposed to represent reality to the rest of the psyche through primarily rational processes.

Instead, Alyosha's experience comes from his spiritual inclination—an aspect of the psyche that Freud places in the superego and dissociates from reality. Conversely, Ivan relies on the rationality characteristic of the ego. His reasoning abilities lead to his doubt in the existence of a loving God who allows children to suffer, fuel the arguments of his Grand Inquisitor, and allow him to believe Smerdyakov's rational proofs that Ivan himself collaborated in his father's murder by leaving for Moscow.

Due to the Karamazov brothers' deviations from Freud's categories, his tripartite model fails to produce a fully adequate paradigm for understanding how the Karamazovs function as a representation of the human psyche. Another model must be employed.

Chapter 3: The Karamazov Brothers as Representations of Body, Mind, and Spirit: A Textually-Based Tripartite Model of the Psyche

As noted in the introduction, numerous scholars have already proposed textually-based understandings of how the three Karamazov brothers function as a collective personality. Most gravitate towards a similar depiction of the brothers: Dmitri represents something akin to the sensuality of humankind ("the principle of feeling"; "emotionality"; "sensual, aesthetic man"), Ivan the center of thought and reason ("the life of the mind"; "the intellect"; "the principle of reason"), and Alyosha a manifestation of human spirituality and love ("spiritual man"; "innocence and love"; "the life of the spirit") (Breger 227; Mochulsky 598; Peace 229; Terras 44; Yarmolinsky 386). While many of these critics elaborate on how the brothers fit into their models, none of them define their model's terminology. Perhaps they believe that their terms do not require an explanation; but, in actuality, each of their labels contains ambiguous elements. "The principle of feeling" could refer to the emotions alone or to the emotions and the senses or to the emotions and the senses and the sex drive; it could be a synonym for or an antonym of "sensual, aesthetic man." "The life of the mind" is also a nebulous term: does it refer to the mind's thinking and reasoning capacity, its passive role of perceiving reality, or both? And any time one uses the words "spirit" or "love" to describe something, the vastness of both terms can always lead to multiple interpretations.

In an attempt to avoid a similar lack of clarity in my model's referents, I will provide a detailed explanation of the three categories I will use in my efforts to construct a textually-based tripartite model of the human psyche as represented by the Karamazov brothers. My model will, in part, resemble what de Alvarez refers to as "the traditional

philosophical conception of the tripartite division of the soul" connected to Augustine of Hippo and made up of feeling, reason and will ("Abstract"). Along with de Alvarez, David Cunningham also notes the influence of Augustinian psychology on Dostoevsky as well as one of Dostoevsky's close friends, Russian philosopher Vladimir Solovyov (Cunningham 143). In Solovyov's Lectures on Godmanhood, he uses Augustine's tripartite model to describe the three primary actions of the psyche as "being, knowing, and willing," and suggests that "each of these three fundamental acts of the spirit is completed in itself by the other two, and thus becomes individualized into a full triune being" (qtd. in Cunningham 143).

Although Cunningham notes these connections between Dostoevsky and Solovyov's conception of the psyche, he also posits that "even without Solovyov's schema, the brothers can be seen as representing the three aspects of human nature (mind, body and spirit)" (143). Using the three terms Cunningham lists, I will explicitly define the body, mind and spirit as components of the human psyche, attempting to reflect the text of The Brothers Karamazov as well as Dostoevsky's own philosophical underpinnings with more clarity than previous efforts, with the hopes of deriving a deeper understanding of Dostoevsky's concept of the psyche as well as a more complete comprehension of the human psyche in general.

Explanation of the Body-Mind-Spirit Model

My use of the term *body* resembles in part Freud's concept of the id: governed by the passions, the body chases "the pleasure principle [...] unrestrictedly" (Ego 25). It is not, however, limited to libidinal desires. While the body contains the senses and sexual

energy of the psyche, it also houses the emotions. It can, therefore, reject a sexual and/or sensual desire if it believes that the emotional pleasure derived from this repression will be greater than the immediate gratification of its carnal urge. In this sense, the body resembles the desires of romanticism: in it, the emotions and the sensual part of human nature exist, merged and unrestrained.

The mind serves as the body's antithesis. It possesses the ego's reality principle and strives to acclimate the psyche to its surroundings through the use of reason. The "reason" of the mind extends beyond the ego's "common sense" (Ego 25); it encompasses the entire intellect and is the part of the psyche that yearns for understanding; it asks all of life's looming philosophical questions and wants all of them answered rationally. To achieve this goal, the mind often attempts to detach itself from the world in order to think with greater clarity and develop objective opinions. At times, this can be beneficial; at other times, it can lead to escapism, unhealthy antisocial behavior, and/or insanity.

The third part of this model, spirit, resists definition. The Oxford English Dictionary uses over five pages in its attempt to explain spirit, which the OED describes as "the animating or vital principle in man (and animals)"; "the soul of a person"; "the active essence or essential power of deity"; "a supernatural, incorporeal, rational being or personality"; "the emotional part of man as the seat of hostile and angry feeling"; and "the mind or faculties as the seat of action and feeling," to name a few (251-53). The word itself often resembles the wind—which is also another definition of spirit—as described by Jesus in the Gospel of John: "The wind blows wherever it pleases. You hear its sound, but you cannot tell where it comes from or where it is going. So it is with

everyone [...] of the Spirit" (3.8). Spirit can mean a myriad of things; thus, when it is used, one often finds her/himself in the position of the Pharisee Nicodemus who, after Jesus' statement, finds himself in a state of confusion.

I will not attempt to eradicate all of this ambiguity because in this model, the term *spirit* retains its connection with deity and the ethereal, both of which cannot be fully perceived within the limits of human understanding and therefore entail a degree of mystery. These sentiments reflect Dostoevsky's idea that "a richer conception of the deity and [...] full confidence in [...] religious beliefs," one must "transcend the ordinary operations of human reason" (Scanlan 235). They also surface in Freud's lecture, "The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," when he makes the following statement:

> [...] certain practices of mystics may succeed in upsetting the normal relations between the different regions of the mind, so that, for example, the perceptual system becomes able to grasp relations in the deeper layers of the ego and in the id which would otherwise be inaccessible to it.

Through mystical experiences—religious or non-religious—the spirit can perceive facets of the self or reality previously inaccessible to the psyche via an inexplicable process outside the realm of reason.

Other aspects of the spirit, however, allow for a more detailed explanation. This portion of the psyche produces altruistic sentiment; it is the source of good deeds performed with selfless motives. The spirit serves as the force behind voluntarily caring for the poor, the sick and social outcasts, as well as the part of the psyche that encourages one to treat other humans as he/she would like to be treated. These elements are often found in religions, which are also intimately connected with the spirit. As the seat of

religious feeling, the spirit provides the impetus to worship and obey a deity of some form or another, creating a system of sorts in which morality and religious sentiment play off of and feed one another.

As a result, the spirit keeps the body's pleasure-seeking in check by imposing a sense of morality upon it, while the body simultaneously keeps the spirit from detaching itself from reality and losing itself in transcendental experiences by regularly voicing its sensual desires. Similarly, the body prevents the mind from abstracting itself in the world of thought while the mind reminds the body of the limitations of reality, which will always keep the body from realizing all of its desires. The mind also strives to keep the spirit from straying too far from rationally-perceived reality as the spirit tries to protect the mind from overwhelming itself in its efforts to resolve all paradoxes and contradictions.

While the previous paragraph does give an accurate description of the general relations between these three portions of the psyche, this model cannot be categorized or described with such simplicity. As Freud did with his tripartite model, "we must allow what we have separated to merge again" ("Anatomy"). This body-mind-spirit model attempts to create a holistic model of the psyche, in which each section—though it maintains its distinctive traits—remains connected to the other two parts of the model and will occasionally exhibit the others' characteristics. The body, mind and spirit labels, therefore, only indicate the regular tendency of their respective parts of the psyche, not an infallible rule that dictates its behavior.

Since each portion of this model is intrinsically linked to the other sections, when any part of this model falters or ceases to fulfill its role, the psyche becomes imbalanced

and will progressively worsen in its ability to function normatively. This psychological degeneration eventually results in insanity if the dysfunctional part of the psyche fails to recover.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Body-Mind-Spirit Model: Dmitri and the Body

In relation to this model, the eldest Karamazov brother closely resembles the body. As de Alvarez notes, Dmitri's name "is derived from Demeter" (28)—a symbolic representation of the fact that "Mitya's self-knowledge is in a peculiar way dependent upon existential attachment to the things of the earth" (44). He retains much of his father's sensuality yet is a different type of sensualist. Unlike Fyodor, who is "simply an evil buffoon and nothing more" (Karamazov 8), Dmitri evidences a complex combination of good and evil impulses. Perhaps the most apt description of his character is found in the closing argument of Ippolit Kirillovich at Dmitri's trial. After noting Dmitri's honorable donation of five thousand rubles to Katerina and his later despicable squandering of the three thousand rubles Katerina entrusted to him for her sister, Ippolit concludes:

> Most likely in the first instance he was sincerely noble, and in the second just as sincerely base. Why? Precisely because we are of a broad, Karamazovian nature [...] capable of containing all opposites and of contemplating both abysses at once, the abyss above us, an abyss of lofty ideals, and the abyss beneath us, an abyss of the lowest and foulest degradation. [...] Two abysses [...] in one and the same moment [.] (699)

Which abyss Dmitri goes towards depends on which one will provide the most sensual and/or emotional gratification. As Richard Curle notes, Mitya does not choose between these abysses on the basis of logic; instead, "his conduct is founded entirely on emotion" (184, 188). Throughout the novel, the reader watches Dmitri's dramatic mood swings—described by Terras as "a psychological label of Dmitri's" (371)—dictate his behavior. These impulses cause him to "[give] himself passionately to every new idea" (Karamazov 383).

This behavioral characteristic evidences itself early in the novel within his confession to his brother Alyosha. Throughout their dialogue, Mitya frequently cites the poetry of Schiller in dramatic outbursts that, according to Breger, shows "he acts from the heart and not from the head" (228). His use of Schiller shifts from darker verses to poems of hope and joy as Dmitri follows the dictates of his senses. After Mitya reads the note of summons Katerina Ivanovna sent to his younger brother, he begins to utter fragmented thoughts until he suddenly bursts into verse, reciting three stanzas from Schiller's "Eleusinian Festival" which depicts Ceres, the Roman goddess of the fertility of the earth ("Ceres"), searching a desecrated land for foliage. Schiller and Dmitri use the image symbolically to represent earth's actions after the fall of humankind:

> Wide and far, where'er she [Ceres] roved,
>
> Still reign'd Misery over all;
>
> And her mighty soul was moved
>
> At man's universal fall. (Karamazov 106)

As soon as he finishes delivering these verses, "sobs [...] burst from Mitya's breast" as he laments the status of humankind: "still fallen, still fallen even now" (106). Moments

later, however, Mitya bursts into lines from Schiller's famous poem "To Joy"—a stark contrast to the somber imagery of "Eleusinian Festival." But before he begins, he reveals to his brother the impetus behind this abrupt change in tone:

> [...] when I fall into the abyss, I go straight into it, head down and heels up, and I'm even pleased that I'm falling in just such a humiliating position, and for me I find it beautiful. And so in that very shame I suddenly begin a hymn. Let me be cursed, let me be base and vile, but let me also kiss the hem of that garment in which my God is clothed; let me be following the devil at the same time, but still I am also your son, Lord, and I love you, and I feel a joy without which the world cannot stand and be. (107)

This passage sheds light on the forces behind Mitya's actions: he strives for what he finds "beautiful" and longs for whatever allows him to "feel a joy," without which his world cannot stand. This portion of his confession particularly illuminates his first interactions with Katerina Ivanovna. When she comes to him requesting forty-five hundred rubles, expecting him to offer the money in exchange for sexual favors, Mitya's first intention was to proposition her. When he confesses to Alyosha, Dmitri expounds on the intensity of emotion produced by this thought: "[it] so seized my heart that it almost poured out from the sheer sweetness of it. It seemed there could even be no struggle: I had to act precisely like a bedbug, like an evil tarantula, without any pity" (114). But before Dmitri can act on this impulse, he receives another one. He has the urge to tell her he could never give her that much money and to send her away, thinking of how much pleasure he would feel as he obtained "infernal revenge" on Katerina's pride (114). This second impulse yields to a third: Dmitri gives her the money and bows

to her with what he describes as "a most respectful and *heartfelt* bow" (114, emphasis added). Although Mitya does not comment on the feelings behind this bow, Miller notes that his "actual course of action, honorable though it may have been, may be the most sensual of all" (34). In this instance, Miller's use of the term "sensual" appears to wed it with the emotional; thus, Mitya's prostration before Katerina is labeled the most "sensually" gratifying option to him because it achieves the revenge he desires while it also satisfies his longing to appear noble, satisfying two impulses instead of only fulfilling his sexual desires or his craving for revenge.

While Mitya's bow exemplifies the sensual, emotive behavior Mitya exhibits throughout the novel, other examples show that this representative of the body also manifests traits of the mind and of the spirit. Both of these aspects evidence themselves in Mitya during his subsequent conversation with Alyosha after the elder brother's arrest. As the two talk in the visit room of the prison, Dmitri brings up the theories of Claude Bernard which he and Rakitin had just been discussing:

> Imagine: it's all there in the nerves, in the head, there are these nerves in the brain (devil take them!) [...] these nerves have little tails, well, and when they start trembling there...that is, you see, I look at something with my eyes, like this, and they start trembling, these little tails...and when they tremble, an image appears, not at once, but in a moment, it takes a second, and then a certain moment appears, as it were, that is, not a moment—devil take the moment—but an image, that is, an object or an event, well, devil take it—and that's why I contemplate, and then think...because of the little tails, and not at all because I have a soul or am some sort of image and likeness, that's all foolishness. [...] It's magnificent,

> Alyosha, this science! The new man will come, I quite understand that... And yet, I'm sorry for God! (Karamazov 589)

Simultaneously, Mitya finds Bernard's theory to be "magnificent" and longs for the God that this theory precludes. The intellectual appeal of science fascinates him as does the potential to interact with the being that made his "soul"; and, in his characteristic form, Mitya struggles to choose between the two desires, hoping to choose the one that will give him the greatest amount of sensual and emotional gratification.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Body-Mind-Spirit Model: Ivan and the Mind

While Dmitri chases the pleasures of the senses, his brother Ivan, on the other hand, tends to strive for philosophical and intellectual satisfaction. From the narrator's first description of his character, Ivan presents himself as a stark contrast to Mitya's earthy, sensual nature. "Gloomy and withdrawn" with an "unusual and brilliant aptitude for learning" from his childhood (15), Ivan is immediately cast as a solitary intellectual. Throughout the novel, he maintains a quiet aloofness that leads his older brother to conclude that "brother Ivan is a sphinx; he's silent, silent all the time" (592).

Instead of speaking freely, Ivan spends most of his time in the world of his thoughts, participating in the detached mental activity characteristic of the mind. Consequently, he embodies what Simmons labels a "purely rational being" (337)—a trait de Alvarez connects to the Enlightenment (115). Ivan's philosophies give credibility to de Alvarez's assertion. When Ivan puts forth his theory that "there exists no law of nature that man should love mankind" (69), his argument, according to Krag, relies on naturalistic principles of Enlightenment thinking: "To a naturalist, man is nothing but a

geological species" (283); thus, Ivan posits, "there is no virtue if there is no immortality" (Karamazov 70), because nothing else in nature would inspire humans to treat one another with benevolence. This naturalism inevitably leads to another characteristic of the Enlightenment: an adherence to empiricism. Ivan exhibits this quality when he limits himself to the confines of his "Euclidean mind" (235), which Geir Kjetsaa describes as "closed to everything that lies outside the province of reason and experience" (344). On the basis of these instances from the novel, Robert Lord asserts that Ivan is a secular humanist: "Any transformation he foresees will be the work of men" (153). Consequently, Ivan abstains from mystical or spiritual practices because, to him, they lack a rational or empirical foundation. Instead, the middle Karamazov brother personifies, in essence, the active mind of the body-mind-spirit model: he relies on his reason to interpret his perceptions with the intent of understanding them.

Throughout the novel, Ivan, like the mind, strives to use the evidence provided by the world around him to "resolve the everlasting questions" of life (Karamazov 233). The elder Zosima perceives these intellectual efforts in Ivan's article on ecclesiastical courts and notes that the question his article proposes of whether or not immortality exists "is not resolved in [him], and there lies [his] great grief, for it urgently demands resolution" (70). In an effort to answer this question with the mind alone, Ivan tries, according to Wasiolek, to "reconcile the irreconcilable": "If there is no immortality, then according to [Ivan's] own words, 'all is permitted.' Ivan believes that there is no immortality, but he wants to believe that only the good and noble will be permitted" (161).

Ivan could resolve this conundrum through religious belief but, as de Alvarez observes, for Ivan, "to believe means not to understand" (94)—an unacceptable premise for both Ivan and the mind. Instead, as Seeley observes, Ivan constructs the myth of the Grand Inquisitor, "the man-god, to whom 'everything is permitted,' and of the earthly paradise to follow" (129). His ideology mirrors Raskolnikov's theory in Crime and Punishment that "an extraordinary man has the right [...] to decide in his own conscience to overstep...certain obstacles, and only in case it is essential for the practical fulfillment of his idea (sometimes, perhaps, of benefit to the whole of humanity)" (206). Sigurd Fasting also makes this connection between Ivan and Dostoevsky's earlier protagonist, noting that "like Raskolnikov, Ivan is only willing to accept the [...] part of his being that is his reason" (qtd. in Kjetsaa 336). The Inquisitor embodies Ivan's reason: he berates Christ for giving humankind "everything that [is] unusual, enigmatic, and indefinite, [...] everything that [is] beyond men's strength" instead of "a firm foundation for appeasing human conscience once and for all" (Karamazov 254). His disgust with Christ stems from his reasoned argument that humankind seeks "a firm idea of what [they live] for," otherwise "[they will not consent to live and will sooner destroy [themselves] than remain on earth" (254). Christ's mysteries have not provided them with this idea. Christ also has not given them "universal union," which, the Inquisitor notes, has resulted in endless warfare in an attempt to achieve this goal through human strength (254-57). After presenting his analysis, the Inquisitor takes a rational course of action: he decides to use the Church to rectify Christ's mistake and give humankind "someone to bow down to, someone to take over [their] conscience, and a means for uniting everyone at last into a common, concordant, and incontestable anthill," which will satisfy humankind's "need

for universal union" that Christ left unfulfilled (257). Terras observes that the Inquisitor also plans to achieve his goal through reason; like Ivan, he believes that "human ('Euclidean') reason is sufficient to master life" (51). By removing mystery from the human experience and making it solely the property of the Church, the Inquisitor will "pacify all" through rational authoritarianism and will thus "have *corrected [Christ's] deed*" (Karamazov 258, 260), exercising the privilege Raskonikov gives to his "extraordinary man" by creating Ivan's idea of an earthly utopia.

Unfortunately for Ivan, his theory remains a theory and he cannot keep himself from obsessively thinking about "the everlasting questions" that bring his Grand Inquisitor into existence. Like an imbalanced mind, Ivan refuses to accept the paradoxes of the world around him. Mochulsky suggests Ivan's refusal stems from the empirical fact that "the world is not justified by reason," making it "impossible" for Ivan's "purely rational being" to accept it (615; Simmons 337). Yet Ivan longs to accept it; as Seeley notes, "he is torn apart between the urge to live and the need to know what life is for" (120). These paradoxes within his mind eventually lead to his schizophrenia, in which his apparition of a devil plays a part in acting out the conflict within himself, leading to his feverish unconscious state at the novel's end. "[He] becomes the slave and finally the victim of his own intellectual convictions," writes Lord (168)—an image of the mind detached from body and spirit, lapsing into insanity.

Although his personal collapse and heavy-handed rationality mirror the activity of the mind, Ivan also displays characteristics of the body and the spirit. His love of "the sticky little leaves of spring" (Karamazov 230) and his passionate desire for Katerina Ivanovna exhibit his sensuality; and prior to reciting "The Grand Inquisitor" to Alyosha,

he confesses to his spiritually-oriented brother, saying "perhaps I want to be healed by you" (236), which hints at a latent spirituality within Ivan. Consequently, Ivan, like the mind, cannot be pigeonholed as a mere cerebral, rational entity. His complex character contains aspects of the sensual and the spiritual as well.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Body-Mind-Spirit Model: Alyosha and the Spirit

Although he possesses spiritual elements, Ivan differs greatly from his spiritually-oriented brother, Alyosha, the representative of the spirit in the body-mind-spirit model. While Dostoevsky describes Ivan with relative precision, he struggles to depict the youngest Karamazov brother. He names Alyosha his hero, yet remains "in some perplexity" about what makes him heroic. "To me he is noteworthy," Dostoevsky writes, "but I decidedly doubt that I shall succeed in proving it to the reader. The thing is that he does, perhaps, make a figure, but a figure of an indefinite, indeterminate sort" (3). Curle, Mochulsky and Joseph Frank each echo the sentiments of Dostoevsky's introduction, noting the "pale and sketchy" (Curle 205) character of Alyosha (Mochulsky 626; Frank, Prophet 577) which, according to Frank, is "deliberately vague so as to suggest a possible otherworldly inspiration" for Alyosha's actions (577). Frank's theory gains credibility when Dostoevsky attempts to elaborate on Alyosha's nature, labeling him "a strange man, even an odd one" (Karamazov 3). The author's self-declared "vague and uninteresting explanations" (3) hint at Alyosha's possession of mysterious, unquantifiable traits. Like the spirit, Alyosha's character cannot be fully described; it can only be intuited.

This connection between Alyosha and the spirit finds further support in Nina Perlina's work, Varieties of Poetic Utterance: Quotation in The Brothers Karamazov. She cites Vladmir Kljuchevsky's presentation of the Russian hagiographer as a mirror image of Dostoevsky's narrator's efforts to portray Alyosha. Kljuchevsky writes:

> [The hagiographer's] unquenchable thirst to write of the Saint and his humble love for the Holy Elder inflame and excite his thoughts; a great zeal encourages and inspires him to speak and write.... But his unworthiness and imperfection, the impurity of his passionate heart restrain him. He suffers *perplexedly*, being at a loss to know whether he is among those called to the task of hagiography. How does he wax bold [in his God] to speak unto his listeners and to fulfill this work that is beyond his power, for great and marvelous works require a righteous tongue. (qtd. in Perlina 79-80, emphasis added)

Like the hagiographer, the narrator is "in [...] perplexity" (3); he does not know how to adequately convey the spiritual depth of his "Saint." When the narrator does attempt this feat, he emulates other hagiographical patterns: the chapters "A Little Onion" and "Cana of Galilee" contain "all the elements of [hagiographical] narration" in depicting the traditional hagiographical scene of "the momentous transformation of a humble meek creature into a Christian zealot" (Perlina 81-82). Not only does Alyosha resemble the hagiographic hero; he also shares his name with "Aleksei, man of God, one of the most popular saints of the Russian people"—which, as Terras observes, "creates a powerful undercurrent of religious-symbolic associations" (99). Alyosha's name as well as the hagiographic elements of his story also connect him to the spirit, which houses religious sentiment.

Later in the novel, the narrator links Alyosha's mysterious and religious traits by associating him with the *iurodivyi* or holy fool (Karamazov 21). Kjetsaa describes the "holy Russian fool" as one who

> voluntarily feigns idiocy in order to be able to vanquish his spiritual pride. [...] His apparent weakness, humility, proves, however, to be an 'unprecedented strength.' It is precisely by means of his innocent humility that this holy fool wins through and displays his prophetic gift. (221)

As a "holy fool," Alyosha resembles his literary predecessor, the idiot Prince Myshkin. The youngest Karamazov is, according to Yarmolinsky, "another attempt on Dostoevsky's part to portray the ideal Christian" (386); he is Dostoevsky's second "positively good man" (qtd. in Leatherbarrow xv). Both assert their humility; both have clairvoyance; both receive their impetus from mysterious premonitions; and both derive most of their energy and foundational beliefs from mystical experiences. For the prince, these moments occur right before his epileptic fits:

> [...] all of a sudden [...] his mind and heart were bathed in an extraordinary illumination. All his agitation, all his doubts and anxieties, seemed to be instantly reconciled and resolved into a lofty serenity, filled with pure, harmonious gladness and hope filled too with the consciousness of the ultimate cause of all things. (Idiot 236-37)

For Alyosha, his defining experience comes on the eve of Zosima's death when he sees a vision of his elder then goes onto the grounds surrounding the monastery and kisses the earth ecstatically, "[vowing...] to love it, to love it unto ages of ages" (Karamazov 362). In this instance, Alyosha "[falls] to the earth a weak youth and [rises] up a fighter,

steadfast for the rest of his life" because "someone visited [his] soul in that hour" (363). As George Panichas observes, "every aspect [of] the incident breathes mystical joy and ecstasy" (177), which, according to Mochulsky, "becomes the source of [Alyosha's] spiritual energy" (630). After this point in the novel, Alyosha submits to what de Alvarez calls "the life of the imagination" (193)—a term she links to Alyosha's entrance into the monastic life, which had "struck [Alyosha's] imagination and presented itself to him as offering an ideal means of escape for his soul from darkness into light" (qtd. in de Alvarez 193). His submission to this force is therefore spiritual, is concerned with "his soul," and contrasts sharply with "Ivan's commitment to the abstract life of the reason" (193) because of his decision's intuitive nature and its lack of rational, empirical support. By using this imaginative, mystical frame of reference, Alyosha can "bear [...] paradox" (221)—another characteristic of the spirit. Unlike Ivan or the mind, "Alyosha accepts the answer given to Job, that the exigencies of temporal existence are not external accidents of fortune or whimsical determinations of fate but the concrete and proper mode of human being" (221-22). He believes that the events of his life have some semblance of purpose and order which he finds in God; and his faith in this principle, like the faith of the spirit, stems from religious sentiment and mystical experiences.

Alyosha's mysticism and willingness to accept paradox affiliates him with a particular mode of spirituality alluded to in chapter one: the kenotic tradition (cf. pp. 4-5). Kenotics exemplify both traits in their treatment of the Christ hymn in Philippians 2. Ziolkowski notes that while European theologians of the nineteenth century used this text to question Christ's divinity, "the theological issues that might be raised by the second [chapter] to the Philippians seem to have eluded Russian monks" of the same time period

(33); or perhaps it was simply not a concern of theirs and was instead an acknowledged paradox. Regardless, they contented themselves with using "the potential model for spiritual behavior that Paul suggested, namely, self-humiliation as a means of transcendence" (33).

In fact, the kenotics' mode of behavior seems to undergird much of Alyosha's demeanor. Ziolkowski hints at this connection in her own description of the kenotic tradition and its relationship to Dostoevsky:

> The kenotic model available to Dostoevsky had [...] acquired a number of reasonably well defined traits, some of which developed logically from the notion of self-humiliation, like the avoidance of ecclesiastical honors and a reluctance to flaunt one's spiritual authority. [...] [A] mystical bent has often characterized Russian kenotics; this is certainly true of [those of the] nineteenth-century [...]. Perhaps related to this mystical tendency is a phenomenal insight into human psychology that may border on clairvoyance. Such understanding also does not stem organically from an emphasis on humility, but seems implicitly to derive from the spiritual awareness attained through adherence to kenotic thinking. A number of these conventional qualities are exploited by Dostoevsky in his portraits of Tikhon and Zosima. (35)

Alyosha also exhibits the kenotic traits Ziolkowski associates with his elder. Along with his previously mentioned mysticism, the youngest Karamazov also possesses remarkable insight, which Peace refers to as the ability to "[look] deep into the souls of the other characters" (221). Liza perceives this trait when she exclaims that Alyosha "already knows what's in the soul" after he delineates the psychological workings of Snegiryov

(Karamazov 216). Indeed, Alyosha usually appears to understand everyone's true motives: he knows Rakitin's thoughts, sees through his father's play-acting, and has "a sort of illumination" that uncovers Ivan and Katerina Ivanovna's true feelings for one another (43, 134, 191-92). These moments, while granting a kenotic flavor to Alyosha's spirituality, also further his connection to the spirit, which discovers unknown elements within the psyche through a mysterious process that Alyosha cannot explain.

Along with his clairvoyance, Alyosha's humility also associates him with kenosis and the spirit. Even when acting as a confessor, Alyosha hesitates to claim any sort of spiritual authority. When Dmitri tells his brother about his molestation of an officer's daughter, Alyosha responds by saying, "I'm the same as you" (109), even though he has never committed an immoral act of this magnitude. In this instance, Alyosha exemplifies what de Alvarez calls his character's "absence of self-interest" (192).

Although this humble attitude may seem only tangentially related to Alyosha's personification of the spirit, it plays an essential role in allowing him to strive towards Dostoevsky's own spiritual goal: "to seemingly annihilate that *I*," which would allow Alyosha to love others selflessly (Unpublished 1:39). According to Wasiolek, Alyosha's humility enables him to accept Zosima's teaching that "each of us is guilty before everyone and for everyone" (Wasiolek 177; Karamazov 298)—a precept that surfaces in Alyosha during his mystical experience when "he wanted to forgive everyone and for everything, and to ask forgiveness, oh, not for himself! but for all and for everything, 'as others are asking for me'" (Karamazov 362). His desire to forgive everyone stems partially from his humble assumption that he has also wronged others and shares in their guilt. Others must pray for his forgiveness just as he prays for theirs.

This moment of humility closely follows Alyosha's urge to love the earth, which implicitly connects the two sentiments. The same humility that inspires him to love and forgive his fellow humans also leads him to embrace the world and seek unity with it because he is striving towards the Dostoevskian idea to "give [oneself] wholly to each and every one wholeheartedly and selflessly" (Unpublished 1:39). Alyosha strives to embody this principle; he lives by the credo, "everyone should love life before everything else in the world" (Karamazov 231). This notion of all-encompassing love serves as the primary method by which Alyosha exhibits the spirit's selfless altruism. It also differs from Dmitri's carnal love: instead of residing almost solely in sentiment, Alyosha's love is active. "He [can] not love passively; once he [loves], he immediately also [begins] to help" (187). When the schoolboys attack Ilyusha with stones, not only does Alyosha try to stop them; he moves in between Ilyusha and the boys, actively loving Ilyusha by shielding him from the stones (177). When he learns of Captain Snegiryov's misfortune, he does everything he can to help the captain and his family, from staying with them to seeking financial support for them. And when his brothers involve him in their intersecting lovers' quarrels, he intervenes with hopes of helping them sort through their feelings and conflicts with one another and eventually reaching a point of reconciliation. Acts such as these exhibit this part of Alyosha's character which, Mochulsky notes, allows Alyosha to "realiz[e] [him]self in active love as an ideal" (598). Along with his mysticism and kenotic humility, this love comprises an essential part of his character and links Alyosha with the spirit of the human psyche.

Like his two brothers, however, Alyosha cannot be reduced into rigid categories. He also possesses the sensuality that plagues his brother Mitya. His carnal desires

surface when he kisses Liza as well as when he has sausage and champagne with Rakitin while Grushenka sits on his lap. Ivan's cerebral rationalism exists in him too; it causes the "realist" Alyosha (25) to question God's justice after Zosima's death and subsequent humiliation at his memorial service (339-40). Yet again, this interconnectedness among the brothers resembles the internal dynamics of the body-mind-spirit model, in which each part is distinct from yet united with one another.

Benefits of Interpreting the Karamazov Brothers as a Representation of the Body-Mind-Spirit Model

From the perspective of this model, the interaction between and breakdown of the three brothers described in chapter two (cf. pp. 31-33) once again seems markedly clearer, perhaps even clearer than they appear under the guidelines of Freud's tripartite model. While Freud's model associates the brothers' calamity with the collapse of the representative of the ego, Alyosha, the body-mind-spirit model traces their breakdown back to Dmitri's first confession to Alyosha. As the representative of the spirit, Alyosha's role in this conversation is to curb the body's immoral desires, personified by Mitya's admission that he may kill his father. At this point in their discussion, Alyosha should derail his brother's inappropriate yearnings through some form of moral reproof. Instead, he responds to Dmitri with a platitude: "I believe God will arrange it as he knows best, so that there will be no horror" (Karamazov 122). Mitya finds his brother's religious language unconvincing and says, "And I'll sit and wait for a miracle. But if it doesn't happen, then..." (122). His parricidal inklings remain unchecked; and, like the

body's unmitigated urges, this leads to the beginning of the brothers' downfall, in which they collapse like an imbalanced psyche.

The repercussions of Alyosha's failure first evidence themselves in Dmitri's assault on their father. Ivan and Alyosha play the parts of mind and spirit, restraining the body-like Dmitri from committing parricide to secure his relationship with Grushenka; but in the midst of the brothers' successful coalition against Mitya, the eldest brother's actions cause Ivan to start to slip from his balanced state. After Alyosha expresses his thankfulness that they were able to save their father, Ivan responds maliciously with the phrase, "Viper will eat viper, and it would serve them both right!" (141). Feeding off the body's immorality, the mind-like Ivan also toys with the possible benefits of the immoral act. He seems to immediately feel the disrupting import of his words when he leaves the scene moments later complaining of a headache—a plausible precursor to his brain fever.

Alyosha leaves his father's house despairing for the first time in his life, wondering "how would it end between his father and his brother Dmitri with this terrible woman?" (143-44). Painfully aware of the danger in this interfamilial rift, he follows the course of the spirit and retreats to the monastery, hoping to find solace and spiritual wisdom. After receiving spiritual encouragement from Zosima and Father Paissy, he returns to town to track down Mitya. In his search, he stumbles upon Ivan first and engages in a conversation that proves to be his second failure as a representative of the spirit. In the course of their dialogue, Ivan puts forth the paradox of a loving God allowing innocent children to suffer. Instead of helping Ivan process or accept this paradox, Alyosha joins him in his frustrations. When Ivan describes a general having a child torn to pieces by dogs before his mother's eyes, Alyosha reacts against the injustice

and echoes Ivan's desire to have the general punished here and now, saying, "Shoot him!" and "looking up at his brother with a sort of pale, twisted smile" (243). Later in the conversation, Alyosha does bring up Christ and tries to help Ivan come to terms with the conflicting concepts of a loving God and a seemingly unjust world, but as Miller notes, "Alyosha's recovery of his faith cannot undo its momentary loss" (64). Instead of leading Ivan to a positive conclusion, his reference to Christ elicits Ivan's poem "The Grand Inquisitor"—a literary tirade that labels God's gift of freedom as cruel and presents the possibility of human beings creating a society with a higher sense of justice than God's created order. Alyosha counters this argument with "literary theft"; he kisses Ivan in imitation of Jesus' kissing of the Inquisitor. This act does inspire a declaration of brotherly love from Ivan, but it appears to have little to no lasting effect. Alyosha leaves their meeting troubled, while Ivan begins to experience the initial stages of brain fever in the next chapter. Again, the spirit's representative has not fulfilled its role in the psyche, leading to further psychological imbalance.

The disturbance within the brothers' symbolic representation of the psyche reaches its apex after Zosima's death and subsequent humiliation at his funeral when, according to Panichas, Alyosha joins in Ivan's rebellion, echoing his older brother's sentiment, "[I rebel] not against God, but simply against this world" (176). As he leaves the monastery with Rakitin, he abandons all his responsibilities as a personification of the spirit. He sees an "image of his brother Dmitri" that "remind[s] him of something, some urgent business, which could not be put off a minute longer, some duty, some terrible responsibility," but "this recollection did not make any impression on him, did not reach his heart, it flitted through his memory and was forgotten" (Karamazov 342).

Abandoning the body, the spirit's representative allows Mitya to roam with his parricidal desires unchecked, which gives Dmitri the opportunity to go to his father's house and nearly kill him.

Meanwhile, Ivan begins to struggle with uncertainty concerning his own motives. As he prepares to leave for Moscow, he cannot "define anything either in his expectations or even in his desires. And yet at that moment, though the anguish of the new and unknown was indeed in his soul, he was tormented by something quite different" (265). Ivan wonders, "Can it be loathing for my father's house?" (265) The middle Karamazov brother has many more similar experiences in his subsequent mysterious conversations with Smerdyakov and his final preparations for departure, during which he labels himself "a scoundrel" (280) for reasons that, to him, remain unclear.

In his earlier conversation with Alyosha, on the other hand, Ivan's mind had been remarkably perceptive. His younger brother's presence and clairvoyant observations helped Ivan realize and/or accept aspects of himself, such as his greenness and his desire to "be healed" by Alyosha (229, 236). Unfortunately, at this point in his struggles, Alyosha is not present when Ivan needs him the most. Just as the mind occasionally needs the insight of the spirit to sort through its depths, Ivan needs Alyosha's discernment to help him uncover the driving forces behind his desire to leave his father's house immediately and to tell Smerdyakov of his travel plans. At this critical juncture in the novel, Alyosha's absence has dire consequences. He leaves the mind's representative alone; and without the spirit's help, the mind-like Ivan unconsciously makes a series of decisions that indirectly lead to the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich.

As Mitya sneaks through the garden of his father's house and Ivan leaves for Moscow, Alyosha spends the night renewing and fortifying his spiritual strength through a mystical experience. By this point, however, his brothers have involved themselves in situations that exceed his powers of deliverance; Alyosha cannot keep either of their self-destructive tendencies in check. Or one could argue that Dmitri and Ivan's confessions to Alyosha checked Alyosha's spiritual nature too severely, rendering it incapable of assisting either of them. Either way, the revitalized Alyosha cannot liberate Dmitri from his orgy at Mokroye or his unjust imprisonment and sentencing for his father's murder; nor can he free Ivan from his brain fever. Alyosha attempts both: at Mitya's trial, Alyosha experiences a moment of mysterious illumination in which he gives evidence that points to the truth of Mitya's claim that he only had fifteen hundred roubles in his possession and therefore did not have to have used the three thousand roubles he supposedly stole from his dead father for his spree in Mokroye; but Katerina Ivanovna trumps Alyosha's evidence by presenting a letter written by Dmitri in which he declares his intentions to kill his father. Alyosha also tries to deliver Ivan from his madness and guilt by telling him, "It was not you who killed father [...] God has sent me to tell you that" (601-02). Unfortunately, the deceptive words of Smerdyakov had already combined forces with Ivan's brain fever; thus, the middle Karamazov brother loses his mind and lapses into a state of unconscious by the novel's end. The trio finishes the novel as a picture of a broken psyche in which the spirit tries to repair the body and mind in hopes of restoring health and balance in the future.

Disadvantages of Interpreting the Karamazov Brothers as a Representation of the Body-Mind-Spirit Model

While this model allows for this insightful handling of the brothers' representation of the psyche, it also has its flaws. Even though the body-mind-spirit schema allows for broadness within its categories, certain actions and aspects of the characters still seem out of place within this model. For example, Mitya's last-minute decision against killing his father rests on a spiritual impetus he receives—he claims, "God was watching over me then" (393)—but at this point in the novel, his source of spiritual inspiration, Alyosha, is at the monastery working through his own spiritual crisis. Although Mitya, as a representation of the body, can occasionally exhibit traits of the mind and/or the spirit, this instance is the first time in which his spiritual feelings transcend the realm of mere sentimentality and actually affect his actions; and it happens during a moment of crisis within the brothers' personification of the psyche, which makes its occurrence doubly odd.

Along with Mitya's sudden spirituality, Alyosha's "realism" also severely contradicts the tenets of his place in the model. The narrator places Alyosha's realist attitude in opposition to "fanaticism and mysticism" (25), implying that the youngest Karamazov does not engage in either form of religiosity. While Alyosha's spiritual experience outside of the monastery seems to contradict this statement, his impatient desire for truth and inability to handle uncertainty (26, 187) both evidence his realist bent and sharply contrast with the nature of the spirit, which accepts paradox and focuses on altruism instead of certitude. In both of these cases, the body-mind-spirit model, even with its relative broadness, cannot fully account for the brothers' behavior.

Chapter 4: The Karamazov Brothers as an Integration of Freud's Tripartite Model and the Body-Mind-Spirit Model

Like the body-mind-spirit model, Freud's tripartite picture of the psyche also has its respective weaknesses. The former, by approaching the brothers from an exclusively textual standpoint with occasional supplementation from historical background information, cannot attempt to explain the brothers' actions and interactions using the knowledge base of modern psychoanalytic theory. The latter, on the other hand, cannot expound on any of the Karamazovs' behaviors that exist outside the bounds of Freud's model. However, if one combines the Freudian tripartite model with the textually-based body-mind-spirit model, both pictures of the psyche can compliment one another by further elucidating the problem areas of the other model via the insights gleaned by its specific methodology.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Combined Model: Dmitri as the Body-Id

By applying this integrated model to Mitya, one broadens the particularly narrow Freudian interpretation of the eldest Karamazov brother's instincts. As a representative of the id, Mitya can only be a bundle of confused and primarily sexual impulses. By combining this understanding with the concept of the body, one expands the range of Dmitri's instincts. They now include his emotive desires: the desire to love and be loved; the desire to drown in depraved ecstasy and the desire for self-improvement.

This picture of Dmitri Karamazov closely aligns him with the Orthodox understanding of human nature discussed in chapter one (cf. pp. 3-5). Unlike Freud's id, which almost restricts itself to libidinal desires that reside in continual conflict with one

another and often earn societal condemnation if they escape the control of the ego, the Orthodox understand the psyche as a conglomerate of both good and bad desires. According to Vladimir Lossky, "The person, called to union with God, [...] is bound to a mutilated nature, crippled by sin, ravaged by contradictory desires" (129). As a result, "[He/she] no longer knows how to choose, and too often yields to the impulses of a nature which has become the slave of sin [...] although it still retains its [...] ability to return to God" (129). These theological underpinnings of Dostoevsky's Russian Orthodoxy further illumine Dmitri's struggle between the ideal of the Madonna and the ideal of Sodom (cf. p. 21). Mitya's divided conscience embodies the natural state of the fallen human. Like the id, Mitya contains "contradictory impulses [that] exist side by side without neutralizing each other or drawing apart" ("Anatomy"); and like the body, he has both upright and morally reprehensible impulses (cf. pp. 38-40). As a representative of the body-id, Dmitri wants to "be base and vile, but [...] also kiss the hem of that garment in which [his] God is clothed" (Karamazov 107) ; he wants to run off with Grushenka, yet tries to humbly submit to the prior claims of her "former, indisputable one" when he comes for her; he longs to hurt Katerina Ivanovna for her vengeful pride, yet still desires to preserve her honor by not naming her during the prosecutor's investigation; he "contemplat[es] both abysses at once" (699), following the guidance of his passions and instincts.

In understanding Dmitri as the body-id with connections to Orthodox theology of human nature, his sudden decision to abort his parricide attempt falls within the confines of the integrated model of the psyche. As he prepares to strike his father, Mitya's desire to reflect the image of God suddenly usurps his desire to kill the old man who has

deprived him of his inheritance and is trying to take away his lover. "God was watching over [him] then" (393) in the sense that the godly desires implanted by his Creator overcame the corrupt instinct of his nature—the urge to murder for personal gain. In this moment, he achieves the body-id's great desire that he articulated poetically in his earlier confession to Alyosha: "Glory to the Highest in the world, / Glory to the Highest in me…!" (103). Both Mitya and God are glorified by the former's decision, which makes his act of self-restraint the most sensually and emotionally gratifying option for him at the time.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Combined Model: Ivan as the Mind-Superego

Although interpreting Ivan as a representation of the mind explains his behavior relatively well, integrating this interpretation with the insights gained from analyzing Ivan as a personification of the superego will provide a more comprehensive understanding of his role in the Karamazov brothers' portrayal of the human psyche by showing how the characteristics of the mind and superego overlap and interrelate.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Ivan, as the mind, yearns to understand everything that appears to be paradoxical or ambiguous (cf. pp. 43-45). This incessant drive can be connected to the superego's desire to impose an idealized version of parental authority on the psyche. Freud notes that the superego contains an understanding of the parents that it retains from childhood; it views them as "higher natures, [it] admire[s] them and fear[s] them" (Ego 36). As a corollary, the child and superego see the parents' ideology as simple and complete, which leads the superego to attempt to create a flawless comprehensible system of understanding the world—one of the primary desires of the

mind—so the psyche can return to the idealized bliss of childhood. This desire is, in fact, behind the logic of Ivan's Grand Inquisitor, who wants to prove to the masses that "they are only pitiful children, but that a child's happiness is sweeter than any other" (Karamazov 259) because children do not wrestle with the seemingly unanswerable questions of free-will and authority that plague adults.

To achieve this state of unity and harmony that the mind-superego longs for, this part of the psyche evidences another trait of the superego: its ethical concerns. The only way to actualize the perfect, understandable world desired by the mind is to impose the morality and justice that the mind deems acceptable. Ivan illustrates this aspect of the mind-superego when he complains to Alyosha about the injustice of suffering:

> Oh, with my pathetic, earthly, Euclidian mind, I know only that there is suffering, that none are to blame, that all things follow simply and directly one from another, that everything flows and finds its level—but that is all just Euclidian gibberish, [...] I cannot consent to live by it! What do I care that none are to blame and that I know it—I need retribution, otherwise I will destroy myself. And retribution not somewhere and sometime in infinity, but here and now, on earth, so that I see it myself. (244)

Dissatisfied with what he perceives to be God's justice, Ivan's Inquisitor creates his own system of retribution in which the good receive their reward and the bad their punishment through the Church. According to Jones, this idea represented by the Inquisitor "is Ivan's supreme attempt to solve this problem [of moral uncertainty], to impose structures upon man's experience, [and] to assure him of happiness" (180). The middle Karamazov's

comprehension of the world, his desire for justice, and his ethical concerns all unite in the legend he creates.

Unfortunately for Ivan, his legend does not provide a flawless system. When Christ kisses the Inquisitor, he ends their encounter with an unresolved mystery that has plagued Ivan since the beginning of the novel. The question of whether or not immortality exists still haunts Ivan because, if it does exist, his Grand Inquisitor is damned and his system falls apart. Since Ivan cannot resolve this metaphysical inquiry, he gradually develops a guilt complex for failing to achieve the mind-superego's goals: he has not unraveled the paradoxes of existence and/or returned himself to the all-encompassing simple worldview of his childhood. Eventually, this internal conflict becomes too much for him to bear, which results in the complete breakdown of the mind-spirit's representative at the end of the novel.

The Brothers Karamazov and the Combined Model: Alyosha as the Spirit-Ego

Unlike the body and id or the mind and superego, the spirit and the ego do not initially seem to be compatible. Though both attempt to process reality, the ego employs "reason and common sense" to interpret its observations (Ego 25), while the spirit relies on intuition and mystical experiences to understand the world around it. As a result, each can create a markedly different picture of reality. Through the process of "reality-testing," the ego uses human judgment—which, according to Freud, "is very well able to distinguish realities from ideas and wishes, however intense they may be" (Metapsychological 230)—to determine the reality of its perceptions (230-33). The spirit, on the other hand, can accept realities that human judgment labels as irrational. As

mentioned in chapter three, this trait of the spirit allows Alyosha to bear paradoxes that his hyper-rational brother Ivan, with his "Euclidian mind," cannot tolerate (cf. pp. 48-49). Alyosha also gains the ability to accept seeming contradictions in the world through his mystical visionary experience, while the ego remains void of religious sentiment; it echoes Freud's own thoughts on religion, which he presents in The Future of an Illusion:

"[...] religious ideas [...] are not precipitates of experience or end results of thinking: they are illusions, fulfillments of the oldest, strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind" (30). Instead of trusting religion, the ego relies on "scientific work," which is "the only road which can lead us to a knowledge of reality outside of ourselves" (31). In other words, the only reality that the ego can conclusively perceive is external. Conversely, Freud posits that the "intuition and introspection" associated with religion and, consequently, with the spirit, "can give us nothing but particulars about our own mental life, which are hard to interpret, never any information about the questions which religious doctrine finds it so easy to answer" (31-32). In this respect, the ego's attitude towards religion reflects the notions of Ivan and his Grand Inquisitor, not those of Alyosha, the representative of the spirit.

In fact, Alyosha and the spirit seek a slightly different type of reality than Freud's ego. They operate on the principle of what Dostoevsky calls "fantastic realism." Dostoevsky first uses this term in responding to criticism of his characters in The Idiot, which many labeled as being too farfetched to be believable. In a letter to his friend and fellow writer, Apollon Maikov, he writes:

> I have a totally different conception of reality and realism than our novelists and critics. My idealism—is more real than their realism [...]. Just to narrate sensibly

> what we Russians have lived through in the last ten years of our spiritual development—yes, would not the realists shout that this is fantasy! And yet this is genuine, existing realism. This is realism, only deeper; while they swim in the shallow waters. (qtd. in Frank, Miraculous 308)

On the basis of this concept of reality, Dostoevsky critiques the writers of his day for their one-dimensional understanding of the world—an understanding similar to that of Freud's reason-dominated ego and Ivan's Euclidian mind—when he writes, "The ordinariness of events and a routine view of them is not realism in my view, and [is] even the opposite" (qtd. in Miraculous 351). To comprehend what Dostoevsky believes to be reality, one must transcend the realm of pure reason that binds the ego; one must "note the facts *and* delve into them" (351, emphasis added) through thoughts and experiences outside the realm of absolute rationality.

In his book Dostoevsky and Romantic Realism, Donald Fanger notes the presence of Dostoevsky's "fantastic" understanding of reality in the opening paragraphs of The Brothers Karamazov. As the novel's narrator acknowledges the difficulty of rationally justifying his choice of Alyosha, "a figure of an indefinite, indeterminate sort," as his hero, he adds that "an odd man" like Alyosha is "'not always' a particular and isolated case, but, on the contrary, it sometimes happens that it is precisely he, perhaps, who bears within himself the heart of the whole" (Karamazov 3). In these sentences, Fanger argues that Dostoevsky "perceive[s] the broad significance in what sometimes masquerades as eccentricity" (217)—which is, in essence, what the spirit does. Like the holy fool, which Dostoevsky connects with Alyosha through his narrator (Karamazov 21), the spirit's behavior may appear odd but will often unearth deeper understandings of reality.

Although the spirit's perception of reality seems contrary to Freud's theories, it does connect with Freud's comments on mysticism. In his lecture on "The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," Freud observes that "certain practices of mystics may succeed in upsetting the normal relations between the different regions of the mind, so that [...] the perceptual system becomes able to grasp relations in the deeper layers of the ego and in the id which would otherwise be inaccessible to it." While he later expresses his doubts that "such a procedure can put one in possession of ultimate truths, from which all good will flow," he does acknowledge the ability of spiritual practices to potentially deepen one's understanding of oneself—a hypothesis that resembles Zosima's idea of "other worlds" which Dostoevsky presents in the elder's homilies: "Much on earth here is concealed from us, but in place of it we have been granted a secret, mysterious sense of our living bond with the other world [...] and the roots of our thoughts and feelings are not here but in other worlds" (Karamazov 320). Unlike Freud, however, Dostoevsky believes that these mystical experiences *can* lead to the possession of ultimate truths "from which all good will flow." Alyosha's vision of his elder fosters the youngest Karamazov's belief in the resurrection, which, according to Lord, "Dostoevsky was convinced existed, not in a crude 'spiritualistic' sense, but in 'other worlds' normally hidden from human perception" (194). After this experience, good does flow from Alyosha in the form of active love for his family, his brothers' lovers, and the boys of the town; the ultimate truth of the resurrection drives him to altruistic deeds characteristic of the spirit but foreign to the self-serving ego that operates on the basis of self-preservation in order to achieve maximum pleasure for the psyche ("Formulations" 223).

In spite of all the differences between the ego and the spirit, in the novel, the latter seems to encapsulate the former. The spirit does not deny the validity of reason; it only refuses to limit itself to rational experiences. Yet even in experiences that transcend the bounds of rational explanation, Scanlan argues that Dostoevsky views such "mystical knowledge" as being "consistent with" human reason and the Russian author believes that reason plays a part in "establishing" this knowledge (238). This interconnectedness between the reason associated with the ego and the mystical knowledge associated with the spirit can be seen in Alyosha's discernment of Ivan and Katerina Ivanovna's mutual feelings of love for one another. As he watches the two of them interact, Alyosha has a sudden "illumination" that leads him to conclude Katerina is flaunting her supposed love for Dmitri in front of Ivan because she loves the middle Karamazov brother and is tormenting him intentionally because she loves him (Karamazov 191-92). In this instance, Alyosha's discernment stems from an intuitive insight that incorporates the details of Katya and Ivan's interactions. He sees how the two of them respond to one another and his "illumination" finds support in a reasoned analysis of their dialogue, but also transcends the confines of pure rationality, which could not have uncovered their feelings without assistance from the spirit's intuition.

Alyosha's aptitude in combining rational evidence with intuitive discernment resembles the detective work of Poe's famous protagonist, Auguste Dupin. Dostoevsky admired Poe for "the vigor of his imagination" by which he would convince the reader of the reality of his fantastic tales through "the power of specific detail" (qtd. in Frank, Liberation 74)—a process that Poe's Dupin enacts in the American author's short stories. According to Shawn Rosenheim, Dupin takes these specific details and "convert[s] them

into a world of signs articulating webs of effect, or [...] webs of meaning" (382). Throughout The Brothers Karamazov, the reader watches Alyosha exhibit this same behavior: he discovers that Ivan and Katya love each other; he intuits that his brother Dmitri "is seeking suffering" (Karamazov 81) before Mitya himself is aware of it; he discerns that Ivan blames himself for their father's death; and, in a moment of brilliance at Mitya's trial, he uncovers the mysterious significance behind his older brother thumping himself on the chest during their earlier conversation, which nearly convinces the jury of Dmitri's innocence until Katya presents the damning letter in which Mitya declares that he will kill his father. In each of these instances, Alyosha utilizes reason and intuition. Like Poe and Dupin, he combines the vigor of imagination with attention to specific detail.

In this sense, Alyosha serves as a representative of the spirit-ego. He is "a realist" (25); but his reality incorporates both the rational and the irrational. He employs reason as one of his primary tools for understanding; but he weds his reasoning with intuitiveness. Through this combination, Alyosha functions as the part of the brothers' personification of the psyche that attempts to uncover all shades of reality and share its insights with the other two parts of the model.

Then Again, What about Smerdyakov?

While this integrated model of body-id, mind-superego and spirit-ego appears to eliminate the weaknesses each model possesses separately, it does not account for the role Smerdyakov plays in the brothers' dysfunction and collapse—a role that consists of assisting Mitya in spying on Fyodor and convincing Ivan that he is primarily responsible

for his father's murder. Although the legitimacy of Smerdyakov's connection to the Karamazovs remains questionable throughout the novel (cf. pp. 11-15), his impact on the brothers is obvious and essential to their state of disrepair at the end of the novel. Without Smerdyakov, Ivan retains his sanity, Dmitri is never imprisoned; in fact, the most crucial event in the novel, the murder of Fyodor Pavlovich, hinges on Smerdyakov's actual commission of the crime. Thus, even if he is not a fourth part of Dostoevsky's representation of the psyche, he still must personify some aspect of human psychological processes within Dostoevsky's symbolic picture of the psyche.

In an attempt to understand Smerdyakov's significance in the novel, many critics label him as the embodiment of evil (Miller 43; Wasiolek 176). As a proponent of this view, Miller depicts the family servant as an inferior, malignant clone of Ivan. She describes Ivan's ideas as "bristl[ing] with complexity and ambivalence," while Smerdyakov's "are simple, flat, [and] concrete" (57). Although Miller's understanding of Smerdyakov appears to adequately handle his literalist argumentations about faith and martyrdom with Grigory and his seemingly elementary comprehension of Ivan's claim that without immortality, everything is permitted, she borders on repeating the mistake of the middle Karamazov brother, who laments in his final meeting with Smerdyakov, "No, you're not stupid, you're much more intelligent than I thought" (Karamazov 631). In fact, even in his debate with Grigory and his understanding of Ivan's philosophy, Smerdyakov's "flat" thoughts bristle with a complexity of their own: he admits to Grigory that one or two people may exist who have a faith great enough to usurp the laws of science and make mountains move (130); and his eventual suicide after he murders

Fyodor illustrates that Smerdyakov also struggled with the validity and implications of Ivan's idea that "everything is permitted."

These moments of ambivalence characterize Smerdyakov throughout the novel, causing many scholars to label him an unsolvable mystery (Curle 212; Mochulsky 624; Terras 55). Yarmolinsky notes that the family servant's ambiguity even applies to his gender. "Seem[ingly] sexless" (388), Smerdyakov "despise[s] the female sex" (Karamazov 126) and is often described as a eunuch (125, 267, 605); yet he also appears to court Maria Kondratievna, whom he lodges with during the final weeks of his life. On the other hand, their courtship seems to be sterile. Peace observes that Smerdyakov woos Maria "apathetically" with a "condescending attitude" (224, 262); and even when Smerdyakov moves into Maria's dwelling, he sleeps in a separate room by himself. According to Peace, this relationship paradoxically emphasizes Smerdyakov's eunuch status. He posits that Maria Kondratievna's name has "special connotations": it "not only suggests the Madonna figure important to [...] Castrates, but the patronymic Kondratievna [...] seems to imply that Kondratiy Selivanov, the founder of the sect of the Castrates, is her spiritual father" (262), which connects both her and Smerdyakov to a heretical sect that advocates castration as the primary means to salvation (Tulpe and Torchinov). However, Peace acknowledges that "at the end of the novel Smerdykov, it appears, is about to marry this girl" (262), implying that the supposed eunuch may plan on having sexual relations with Maria.

Along with his sexual ambiguity, the symbolic religious connotations of Smerdyakov's relationship with the "Castrate Madonna" Maria (Peace 262) allude to the uncertainty of his spiritual orientation. While he often behaves with malicious cruelty,

Smerdyakov frequently unites his evil deeds with religious rituals and symbols. His childhood habit of "hanging cats," for example, includes "burying them with ceremony": "He would put on a sheet, which served him as a vestment, chant, and swing something over the dead cat as if it were a censer" (Karamazov 124), enacting rituals that resemble the sacrificial rites of the Hebrew Bible and practices of the Orthodox Church. Later in the novel, the white stocking and copy of St. Isaac the Syrian's teachings in his room also present what Miller refers to as "many rich ambiguities" (119). Addressing the former, Peace suggests that the stocking represents the "religious fanaticism" of the Castrates' sect, whose members "referred to themselves as 'The White Doves", dressed in white, and called the process of castration itself 'whitening'" (262-63). The teachings of St. Isaac connect Smerdyakov not only with the Persian monk Isaac, but also with the elder Zosima, who, according to Terras, frequently reflects St. Isaac's ideas in his homilies (23). Both of these details imply that the Karamazov family's servant possesses some form of genuine spirituality, which Smerdyakov himself seems to hint at when he tells Ivan that God is "right here with us now" as they talk; but he later negates this apparent statement of faith by saying that he does not believe in God (Karamazov 623, 632). This double-sidedness in his treatment of God leads Mochulsky to conclude that the stocking and the book of St. Isaac's teachings do not convey a direct message. "The expressiveness of these artistic symbols can be only shown," Mochulsky writes, "but not explained" (625).

In fact, Smerdyakov himself does not seem to understand the nature of his character. The narrator describes him as "a contemplator [...] greedily storing up his impressions, almost without knowing why himself" (Karamazov 127). As a result,

Robert Belknap notes that Smerdyakov's psychological workings remain unclear to the reader, leaving him/her uncertain of the lackey's thoughts or desires (86). Peace also notices Smerdyakov's psychological ambivalence, which leads him to the plausible hypothesis that Smerdyakov represents "the devious, unlit recesses of man's psyche" (229) that defies explanation but affects the psyche nonetheless.

The Karamazov Brothers and Smerdyakov: A Representation of the Combined Model of the Psyche and Its Remaining Ambiguities

Unaware of and/or unable to manage this ambiguous portion of the psyche, the spirit-ego works with the body-id and mind-superego, attempting to ground them both in reality in a way that resembles the role of the ego in Freud's model: it acts as a unifying and balancing force, keeping the body-id from overindulging its sensual and/or emotional desires and protecting the mind-superego from striving for a level of understanding and control that it cannot achieve. On the other hand, the body-id and the mind-superego also prevent the spirit-ego from detaching itself from the more tangible aspects of the world. Instead of roaming freely in the "other worlds," the spirit-ego remains anchored to this world by the body-id's instinctual drives and the mind-superego's quest for a more rational, complete comprehension of the world.

The reader perceives this interaction between the three representatives of these divisions within the psyche during Dmitri and Ivan's respective confessions to Alyosha. Mitya's recollection of his sensual escapades reminds the spiritually-oriented realist Alyosha that, even though he has chosen a monastic way of life and actively seeks to master his impulses, he cannot escape this world or this part of the psyche. Like his

brother Mitya, Alyosha has stepped onto the ladder of the senses and emotions; he cannot avoid ascending it. Although he acknowledges the inevitability of his own moments of depravity, Alyosha continues to play the role of the spirit-ego: he tries to placate Mitya's emotive, carnal desire to kill their father by offering him the seemingly unrealistic consolation, "I believe God will arrange as he knows best, so that there will be no horror" (122). Later in the novel, however, his words evidence their accuracy. Given the opportunity to kill his father, Dmitri decides against it, claiming that "God was watching over me then" (393)—a statement that makes Alyosha's earlier prediction appear to be prophetic.

Alyosha's words, however, do not shield the body-id's representative from the intrusion of Smerdyakov, the embodiment of the unlit recesses of the psyche. Even in Dmitri's confession to Alyosha, Smerdyakov's influence over the eldest Karamazov brother is apparent. The family servant has told Dmitri of his father's plans to win Grushenka with his envelope of money, of the envelope's supposed hiding place and of the signals Smerdyakov will use to let Fyodor know when Grushenka has arrived. Each of these pieces of information incites Mitya's frustration with his father and his fear that Grushenka will accept his father's money over his eldest son's poverty-stricken love. They subtly prod him until he finds himself in his father's backyard, using the knowledge he has gained through Smerdyakov to trick his father into opening the window, and almost proceeds to kill him.

As Dmitri struggles to handle his father's potential liaison with Grushenka, relying on Smerdyakov as his informant, Alyosha once again embodies the spirit-ego as he converses with the representative of the mind-superego, Ivan, in a local tavern. The

interaction between the two resembles the two-sided dialogue of Alyosha and Dmitri during the latter's confession. Ivan reminds Alyosha that he still remains bound to a Euclidian mind that cannot possibly understand the contradictions and paradoxes of this world. Like Ivan's Grand Inquisitor, the representative of the spirit-ego must also struggle with what Ivan dubs the God-given problem of humankind: a desire for peace and unity in a world where human beings have free will. After Ivan finishes his poem, Alyosha reenacts the response of Christ to the Grand Inquisitor's argument: he kisses him, which does not resolve the Inquisitor's/Ivan's questions but still affirms the active, altruistic love characteristic of the spirit-ego and the God of Russian Orthodoxy.

The conclusion of this exchange seems to indicate that both the mind-superego's and spirit-ego's representatives have fulfilled their relational obligations to one another; but, during their conversation, Alyosha makes a mistake that undermines his role as the spirit-ego and may also play a part in Ivan's eventual mental breakdown. In this instance, referred to in chapter two (cf. p. 31), Alyosha agrees with Ivan in advocating the execution of a general who murdered a boy in front of his mother (Karamazov 243). As a personification of the spirit-ego, Alyosha should be able to bear the paradox that Ivan as the mind-superego finds unbearable: the fact that good and evil people often do not get what they deserve on earth. Instead, Alyosha falters; and both he and Ivan reap the consequences.

For Alyosha, these consequences begin on the eve of Zosima's death and the subsequent slandering of the elder at his memorial service. Alyosha does not understand why "he who [...] was to have been exalted higher than anyone in the whole world [...] was suddenly thrown down and disgraced" (339). The representative of the spirit-ego,

who later, according to de Alvarez, will find God's answer to Job acceptable (221-22), does not do so here. He longs for "a 'higher justice,' which [...] he believe[s] ha[s] been violated" (Karamazov 339). At this moment, he succumbs to the frustrations of the mind-superego's Euclidian, empirical understanding of reality, in which justice must be meted out tangibly, "here and now, on earth, so that [he] see[s] it [him]self" (244).

As a result, Alyosha temporarily disconnects himself from the fantastic reality of the spirit-ego and—because of the overwhelming bitterness presented by the unresolved questions of the mind-superego—gives into the sensual and emotional desires of the body-id. Fortunately for Alyosha, the loving-kindness of Grushenka resuscitates his faith and altruism. "I came here looking for a wicked soul," Alyosha confesses. "I was drawn to that, because I was low and wicked myself, but I found a true sister, I found a treasure—a loving soul...She spared me just now...I'm speaking of you, Agrafena Alexandrovna. You restored my soul just now" (351).

Leaving Grushenka with more kind words, Alyosha returns to the monastery, where he makes contact with one of the "other worlds" open to the spirit-ego, which presents him with a vision of his elder that affirms the resurrection of the dead. Now, armed with this deeper perception of reality, Alyosha can rationally accept the seeming injustice of his elder's humiliation because of his mystical belief in the life to come, in which Zosima will receive his proper reward.

Unfortunately, Alyosha's crisis occurs at a point in the novel when his two brothers need him the most. Following the unrestrained impulses of the body-id and the influence of the nebulous part of the psyche, represented by Smerdyakov, Mitya nearly kills his father, severely wounds Grigory, then leaves town and has a spree with

Grushenka in Mokroye—which all serve as evidence against him in his later trial. Meanwhile, Ivan finds himself being mysteriously influenced by Smerdyakov. The middle Karamazov cannot understand why this "worthless scoundrel" provokes him to anger; yet, like the mind-superego, he yearns to comprehend his feelings as well as this mysterious family servant (266). His efforts to do so founder. As the ambiguous portion of the psyche, Smerdyakov remains incomprehensible for the duration of the novel; and in contemplating this "contemplator," Ivan becomes more aware of the uncertainties and incongruities that exist within himself—an awareness that eventually leads to the creation of his devil. Without the help of the intuitive spirit-ego, he cannot adequately process or cope with these internal ambiguities and degenerates into insanity.

When Alyosha returns, he tries to repair the damage that has been done to the representatives of the body-id and the mind-superego by sharing a deeper understanding of reality with them. With Mitya, he achieves a relatively large degree of success. Even though his intuitive remarks at Dmitri's trial do not lead the jury to acquit his brother, Alyosha does encourage Mitya by telling him that his flight from his undeserved punishment "will only serve to make you feel a still greater duty in yourself, and through this constant feeling [...] you will do more for your regeneration, perhaps, than if you went [to the Siberian work camps]" (763-64). Once again, Alyosha bases his conclusion on an intuitive yet reasoned interpretation of the details of Mitya's situation. Dmitri has been pardoned for other crimes in the past and has continued in his debauchery; but Alyosha discerns his brother's character and denies the seemingly rational conclusion of this evidence—that only imprisonment can break Mitya's wild habits—in favor of an interpretation that relies heavily on Alyosha's intuitive understanding of his brother's

pride and sense of honor. Dmitri immediately appears to validate Alyosha's deduction when he responds, "I will run away [...] But I will condemn myself in return, and sit there praying for my sin forever!" (764) Even though Alyosha never condones Mitya's remarks, one can plausibly assume that the younger Karamazov has envisioned this life for Mitya himself. Through his brother's new life of prayer and repentance, Alyosha may see the opportunity for Mitya's regeneration through contact with "other worlds," which will counterbalance the instinctual drives of the body-id.

Unfortunately, Alyosha does not obtain similar results with his brother, Ivan. He perceives that his older brother condemns himself for their father's death and, in a moment of prophecy, asserts the fantastic realism of the spirit-ego when he tells Ivan, "You've accused yourself and confessed to yourself that you and you alone are the murderer. But it was not you who killed him, you are mistaken, the murderer was not you, do you hear, it was not you! God has sent me to tell you that" (602). Alyosha's intuitive, mystical perception causes Ivan to question his feelings of guilt and self-loathing; but he takes his questions to Smerdyakov, who convinces Ivan of his greatest fear, saying to him, "You killed him, you are the main killer, and I was just your minion [...] I performed the deed according to your word" (623). These words from the representative of the unknown recesses of the psyche precede Ivan's conversation with his seemingly illusory "devil," which results in his delirium and eventual unconscious fever. Nevertheless, Alyosha "ha[s] every hope that [Ivan] will recover" (763) and, given the accuracy of his previous intuitions as well as Dostoevsky's plans to write a sequel to the novel, the youngest Karamazov's hope will probably be realized at some point in the future beyond the novel's end.

Conclusion: The Psyche and the Image of God

After reading the preceding analysis, one may wonder, "What conclusions am I supposed to draw?"—a just question, to which Dostoevsky himself does not appear to give a direct answer. As Bakhtin notes, "formulas and categories are foreign to [Dostoevsky's] thinking" (98); Dostoevsky excludes them from his work. Instead of presenting black-and-white ideas, Bakhtin argues that Dostoevsky presents "concrete event[s] made up of organized human orientations and voices" (93). In other words, Dostoevsky's understanding of the psyche in The Brothers Karamazov embodies itself in the Karamazov trio and their potential half-brother, Smerdyakov. Each of these characters resists rigid categorization, undermining what Bakhtin terms a "monologic" understanding of their relationship to the world and to one another. They retain a "*diagolgic* character" that "never leads to a *merging* of voices and truths in a single *impersonal* truth, as occurs in the monologic world" (Bakhtin 95). The inevitable result of such an approach is an indeterminate picture of humanity, which seems to be the picture the author himself desires to paint. While Dostoevsky does present the reader with a world full of vivid details and information, he also, according to Frank, strives to retain the "sense of the unearthly and transcendent as a controlling force in human life" (Miraculous 75) in his writings.

On the other hand, his characters do not completely defy or resist description. While one should not minimize Dmitri as a mere representative of passion alone or label Alyosha a solely spiritual being, Mitya is primarily defined by his carnality and his youngest brother is best known for his spirituality. These overarching characteristics of the brothers imply that, as representatives of the psyche, they form a loose framework of

humankind's psychological processes, with the family servant Smerdyakov embodying the "mystery of man" that remains in the psyche, still inexplicable.

This combination of structure and mystery resembles the doctrine of the Trinity, which, Cunningham claims, is essential to Dostoevsky's representation of humanity through the Karamazov brothers. Cunningham suggests

> the way in which the three [brothers] relate to one another [...] illustrate[s] the essential trinitarian concept of *perichoresis*, in which the specific characteristics of the three *hypostases* [(or members)] are understood to interpenetrate one another in a way that binds them in relationship. (144)

In reading the brothers with this schema in place, Cunningham observes that "each brother provides us with a slightly different reading of what it means to be a Karamazov, but the family as a whole tells us more than does the sum of its members" (145).

Cunningham's reading seems especially astute when one considers Dostoevsky's Russian Orthodox faith, which focuses on humankind's reflection of the *imago dei*, or the image of God. Cunningham himself notes the importance of this theological tenet, arguing that "in the Orthodox tradition [...], an emphasis on the doctrine of the *imago dei* means that anthropology is inseparable from theology, inseparable from the doctrine of God" (151). This facet of Orthodoxy explains why Dostoevsky disdained critics who referred to him as a psychologist. "They call me a psychologist," he writes. "[I]t's not true, I am merely a realist in a higher sense, that is to say I describe all the depths of the human soul" (qtd. in Freeborn 133). Like the Triune God of the Orthodox Church, the depths of the human soul remain inexhaustible for Dostoevsky; yet, like the Triune God, the human soul also contains distinct characteristics seen in the three brothers who,

through their interactions and interconnectedness with one another, manifest the tripartite nature of the unified human psyche while retaining its mystery through the ambiguous character of Smerdyakov.

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